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PREFACE
The present study has three main goals.

The first is to contribute to

the anthropological building of a model of the technoeconomic organization of
industrial complex societies.

The second is to understand the role of the

social organiza:ion of power in these societies.

Finally, byond all academic

purposes, we wish to pay tribute to those men who suffer the consequences of
the assymetrical exercise of power in present day societies around the world,
and especially in Latin American and the Dominican Republic.

Hopefully, by

achieving the first two objectives, their organizations might change their
present status of social, political and economic dependence.
Anthropological work in social units other than the primitive isolate
requires general and comprehensive models not yet in existence.

Starting from

simple beginnings in the twenties, anthropologists have grown increasingly
worried by the presence of "civilizations", "nations", "complex and urban
societies", and "cities" (cf. Kusher 1969).

First they studied

11

isolated 11

cultural systems, for instance a local community, taking into account its
large cul tura 1 matrix.

Later they described

the assumed isolated cultural system.
11

11

outs i de factors" which affected

With Steward's (1955) recognition of

levels of sociocultural integration" and "national sociocultural systems",

anthropology has come to recognize that nations or systems of the higher level
do not consist merely of more numerous and diversified parts.

Therefore, it

would be methodologically incorrect to treat each social unit as though it
were an independent system in itself.
Probably guided by Redfield 1 s question about the structural differences
vi

vii
between the primitive isolate and greater systems some anthropologists came to
conclude that national institutions are so complex that even small competence
in their operations seems to require specialization.

The analysis of these

national instituions, then, have been left open for study by specialists in other
disciplines.

Nevertheless, economic, po1 itical and legal variables in industrial

societies are not closed systems.

They are integrated into a sociocultural system.

Thus other social scientists have discovered that they must pay attention to
shifting group relationships and their adaptational activities if their studies
are to reflect this cultural dimension of institutional

11

real ity1 1 •

As Wolf

reminded us (1956:1066)
institutions are ultimately but cultural pattenrs for group relationships. Their complex forms allow groups to relate themselves to each
other in the multiple processes of conflict and accomodation which
must characterize any complex society. They furnish the forms through
which some nation-oriented groups may manipulate other nation-oriented
or community oriented groups.
In the anthropological 1 iterature the constant object of study has
normally been not the "whole social system 11 as a unit but groups of people.
In other words, we have limited ourselves to segmental analysis of cultural
systems in most cases.

The problem of how these supplementary groups and the

structures resulting from their operations are articulated is normally presented amid the increasing interest with complex sociocultural systems.
issue, however, is hardly resolved.

The

Even such studies as Steward's in Puerto

Rico (1956) does not adequately face this problem.

In it, we are presented

with an analysis of the adaptational operations of social units selected for
study because patterns of land use or operational roles, but how these g_;oups
of peasants and prestigious families are linked to the national sphere is not
analyzed.

In addition, it is difficult even to imagine what the

11

national

sphere11 is.
In this situation, one starts suspecting with Schneider (1961 :215) that

vi i i
although complex societies is an in-problem in anthropology,
gener a

lly accorded

11

11

the tT'eatment

complexity 11 today consists mainly in simply referring to

"complexity" and then ignoring the matter.

The fundamental problem is that of

dealing with the range of different kinds of societies within the framework of
a theory of society''·
In the last decade a number of studies have faced this problem.

For

instance, Mitchell (1966) struggles with the basic conception of the town or
city and the extent to which either can be viewed as a single social system.
He seems to be saying that a city can best be viewed as a set of overlapping
social fields rather than one of inter-locking institutions, structures, norms,
or other values.

In 1961 (cf. 1969), Epstein distinguished between effective

and extended networks within the urban social organization.

And Plotnicov's

study of Jos, Nigeria (1967) uses situational analysis as derived from Mitchell,
Epstein and Gluckman to deal with urban behavior and adaptation.

He takes

significant areas of social interaction and observes the development of standards of behavior appropriate to the social environment in which they occur.
These works study social units of operation within contemporary industrial societies.

They tend to indicate that kinship networks are virtually

assimilated within more inclusive societywide social networks.

In addition,

they offer valuable insights and descriptions into the social networks studied.
These descriptions and analyses of the

11

supplimentary interpersonal sets ...

not only reveal a great deal about the hidden mechanisms of complex society ...
(but) also reveal much of the social dynamic, of the changing distribution of
forces in the social body ••. (and) indicate the way in which the parallelogram
of social forms in one society differ from that of another" (Wolf 1966 b:20).
The scope of research of these studies, however, has to be augmented
beyond the social structure of industrial complex societies in order to provide
us with a model of these societies and their cultural systems.

If not, like

ix
11
tn recent stu d .ies on the ''culture of poverty and urban ethnic ghettos, these
social networks might be understood as isolated, self-originated, and selfperpetuating groups with a distinctive sub-culture (see Valentine 1968).
Two main reasons account for the need of a wider scope of research
and for the elaboration of models of complexity.
position of cultural materialism:

First of all, a theoretical

the explanation for cultural differences

and similarities is to be found in the technoeconomic processes responsible
for the survival of the material requirements of biosocial survival.

In other

words, the technoeconomic parameters of sociocultural systems exert selective
pressures in favor of certain types of organizational structures and upon the
survival and spread of definite types of ideological complexes.
In principle, therefore, all of the major problems of sociocultural
differences and similarities can be solved by identifying the precise nature
of these selective parameters.

Nonetheless, as a general principle. it does

not commit itself to the explanation of any specific sociocultural type or
any specific set of institutions.

It goes without saying, that this is not

to argue for an absolute unconditional one to one effect upon the cultural
forms and functions growing out from the technoeconomic organizatbn.

This

would ignore the actual interaction of the technoeconomic organization with social
structures, ideologies, and personality configurations in the social system.
But only a recognition of causal priority in conformity with the prediction
that group structure and ideology are responsive to the interaction between
behavior and environment as mediated by the human organism and its cultural
system.
The second reason justifying wider scope of research lies behind
Polanyi 1 s (1944) The Great Transformatbn.

The social structure of industrial

complex societies is presently subjected to the virtual dominant influence of
a market economy.

In the market place every cultural object is priced

)C

including such non-commodities as land, human labor and money.

Thus social

security disappears and competition and individualism reinforce their presence
in the human group.

Through this technoeconomic organization we all find our-

selves playing in the market place and even exposing ourselves {labor) as a
cornnodity for a price (wage).

Where the market economy exists, it appears

to be the main, although obviously not the only one, institution perpetuating
and articulating the links among social units in the society, and even between
the societies themselves.

As Jules Henry (1966:97) recently acknowledged while

presenting some theoretical considerations for the study of the United States
'~he

culture:

economic system has certain consequences for personality .•.

The consequences and the emergent personality traits can be detected in all
phases of culture11 •
In this perspective White's civil societies (1959:296 ss.) has to be
reconsidered from its

or~inal

formulation as transformation of interpersonal

relations and the state-church as an integrative mechanism.

Instead, industrial

complex societies appear as sociocultural systems transforming energy resources
according to a structural pattern of a market economy regardless of interpersonal
relations.
In dealing with social networks or group relationships in a market economy,
we cannot neglect the fact that the exercise of power by some social units over
others is present on all levels of articulation.

Certain economic and political

relationships are crucial to the functioning of any industrial complex society.
Regardless of what other functions such a society may perform, its integrating
units must both produce surpluses and exercise power to transfer a part· of these
surpluses from the producing units to manufacturing, distributing and consuming
units.

This means that all interpersonal and intergroup relationships in

industrial complex societies (or all complex societies?) must at some point
establish and conform to power transactions.

xi
The determinant influence of power in industrial complex s<>4:ieties has
been well emphasized by Adams and his associates (1970).

By using a framework

of power structure, they study the relationship that integrated the Guatemalan
peasant into the nation.

In their study, power appears as a feature of every

social relationship spreading its effect differentialy through the entire
society.

Once society itself is understood as a system articulated through

power networks, social development itself is evolution:
If development is in some sense growth and expansion, what is the connection between it and evolution, that theoretical area of anthropology
that has usually been concerned with growth and expansion? ... The
answer that emerged was that development was itself, in a sense, evolution. It comprised that aspect of evolution having to do with the buildup of goods and human time usage, the expansion or growth of the material
and economic side of life. More than this, however, with the concept of
power in hand, it was not merely that technology and economics related
development to a larger evolutionary framework, but that their concerns
were part of a more inclusive subject matter. This, it turned out, was
again power, for power had to do with the control of both individuals
and goods, voters and laborers (Adams 1970:4 and 5).
The present study intends to contribute to this line of research of
anthropologists in industrial complex societies.

It is a look into the organi-

zation of power growing out of the social networks of a group of units within
the tobacco market.

The marketing of this crop and the preliminary conditions

for the economic transactions were originally studied with the intention of
determining the interaction of a particular market system, its power organization,
and the social networks of the units operating within a common system.

The

problem of the system's complexity was a prime target of the study as well as
the organization of the different units within the system.
of the following strategic resources:

From the exchange

tobacco, capital and liquid assets in

the market place originates a distinctive segmentary technoeconomic organization
which

secures and protects a rational flow of these resources in society.

This organization we will refer to as an eco-market system.
One of the more significant contributions of the present study is its

xi i
methodological approach in addition to its object of analysis.

It ..does not

deal with "the culture" of one group, of one commuh.ity, of one city, or of one
nation.

Instead, it analyzes the social organization of power resulting from the

production, purchase, processing, packing and exporting of tobacco until it
reaches manufacturers in Europe or in the United States.

This work then is the

analysis of one product in order to understand the social consequences resulting
from it structural flow.

In this analytical perspective the operations of the

peasants, the middlemen, the warehouses, the local packers, the exporters, and
the international dealers, all come within the framework of one common system
of adaptation.

The various environments articulated through the flow of

tobacco between these units overlap through a reciprocal feedback process
consisting of social networks, 1 iquid assets, tobacco and capital.
The value of this methodological approach is open to evaluation.

Especially

because of its technoeconomic exclusiveness and the apparent isolation with which
the operating units within the tobacco eco-market system might seem to be operating.
These "optical illusions'', result from the methodological need to abstract and to
delimit the cultural system under investigation.

The insights provided by this

approach into the natura·of industrial complex societies outweigh the disadvantages.

The advantages of this approach are as follows:

First, it provides a

framework for an examination of the activities and interactions of social units
from different social classes, and national and international environments.
Second, it tries to understand their operations in relation to the complex
organizational structure they are a part of and to take into account the reciprocal
processes resulting from the whole environmental system.

Third, it provides an

insight into the origin of the social stratification in the society and the
resources of power within the system.

Fourth, it acknowledges the structural

complexity and the overlapping operating units in these societies while trying
at the same time to build a model illustrating how the units come into contact

xii i
and articulate into the system.

Fifth, it does not ignore the fact that economic

or market transactions are supported by social networks.
The export tobacco production in the Dominican Republic has a number of
relevent cultural aspects associated with it in the larger cultural frame of
reference of the Caribbean.

First, its production is not contingent upon a

plantation organization nor is it a crop requiring large capital investments
in the producing country.

On the contrary, it is produced by minifundist

peasants who traditionally have constituted a free peasantry and are market
orientated.
Secondly, the crop is exported to European and North American manufacturers
through the financial intervention of

international dealers who subsidize the

operations of a complex national organization to secure the crop and reduce their
capita 1 risks.
Third, the distributive system resulting from the operations of exporters
and the local warehouses, plus the production activities of the peasants seem to
be customarily free of governmental intervention.
Fourth, tobacco export is one of the three main sources of revenue in the
Dominican Republic with sugar and coffee.
Finally, since it is an export commodity, its analysis will offer an
insight not only into forms of dependence of some national groups from power
elites, but also into the financial dependence of a whole nation upon foreign
capital investors.
At this point it is necessary to recognize my personal indebtedness to
Dr. Ken Sharpe for suggesting to me the present line of research; and to Mr.
Antonio Lluberes and Mr. Frank Moya for helping in the historical research.
Without the assistance of these scholars the present work would have been
incomplete.

Special gratitude is also due to my professors at Loyola University

of Chicago who have introduced me into the field of Anthropology.

Above all

..
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• •
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kindly and patiently commented on individual portions of the manuscript. Their
help is deeply appreciated:
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But this work is indebted to no one more than to those who helped in
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Without their spontaneous and insightful contribution in

matters of knwledge, time and friendship this work would have become impossible.
For this reason I am especially grateful above all to both Juan Arturo Jaquez
and his wife, Gladys, as well as to
"maestro Luis 11 , and
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INTRODUCTION
The Traditional Anthropological Method
In the Social Sciences, Anthropology traditionally has been identified
as the science concerned with the study of primitive andexotic cultures.
understanding of Anthropology might seem valid if we realize that:

11

This

From its

conception, anthropology has --at least in principle-- considered all cultures
at all times and in all places to be its legitimate province.

In practice,

however, anthropologists have generally concerned themselves with non-Western
cultures, and especially with the small-scale and exotic among these" (Kaplan

& Manners 1972:190).
Pre-literate and "primitive' 1 societies have been studied by anthropologists as isolated, small, self-contained and culturally homogeneous.

Corresponding

to this formulation of the object of study, a characteristic method and technique
became peculiar to anthropologists.

The cultural or ethnographic method consisted

in observing a sufficient number of individuals to ascertain the typical or
expected

behavior of the society's members which is then described as the

culture.

On the other hand, participant observation became both practicable

and desirable for data-gathering as technique among small, homogeneous and isolated bands, tribes and villages.
Tribal culture is a construct based essentially on behavioral traits
that characterize all members of the society. Although there are
some differences associated with sex, age, role, and status, there
are no major occupational, regional or social groups or segments that
differ significantly from one another and can be said to have subcultures, and there are larger, supra-personal institutions that cannot be understood fairly well by studying the behavior of individuals.
(Steward 1956:5).

2

But today this primitive and isolated world is disappearing.
·
--with certain reserve-- McLuhan's
approaching

11

We are

global vi 1 lage11 (1967:67).

And as weaver and White rightly point out, the time is overdue for a reassessment of anthropological methodology and techniques in order to study complex
societies (1972:109).

Whereas autonomy and intra-group functional independence

may have been useful methodological assumptions when there existed a greater
degree of cultural isolation, this is not the case any more.

More complex

sociocultural systems such as modern nations are not dealt with so easily.
These assumptions of the traditional ethnographic method that culture consists
of shared behavior will not serve to describe nor to explain the functioning
of a government or a system of international commerce.
Industrial Complex Societies
Industrial complex societies not only seem to be the most recent level
of social evolution, but also to have a relatively recent appearance in the
stage of anthropological studies.
.qual ification of

1

11

Normally, a society seems to deserve the

industrial complexity 11 when it has, at

least, the fol lowing

characteristics: (1) a division of labor articulated through centers of role
specialization; (2) levels of articulation; (3) wider environmental adaptation
coordinated by centers of control; (4) a distributive system based upon industrial
production and a cash economy of market systems.
(1) Its.elaborate divisbn of labor is organized by centers of role

specialization.

These centers consist of one or more social units.

Both the

integrating units and the center itself operate in order to fulfill certain
social requirements by means of (i) a sophisticated technology and (ii) an
interchange of information and other means within them.
The existence of a division of labor is not a sufficient reason for
classifying a society as an industrial complex society.

An intricate division

3
of labor was already present in archaic kingdoms and empires growing out from their
mec han
organ

·ism of redistribution and in the guilds of pre-industrial cities.

The social

·ization of the society through specialized centers is a further step toward

complexity for at least two reasons.
consist of various

unit~

First, these centers of role specialization

each one specialized in specific technical functions.

Secondly, none of these centers appear to be self-sufficient while exercising their
adaptational functions.
The appearance of the centers of role specialization probably is because
of population and productive pressures.

This will not only increase the dependence

of the social units upon cooperation (see Durkheim's concept of organic solidarity
1933: ch.3), but contrary to Durkheim's predictions will also increase competition
and conflict as result of self-motivation in an adatational context (see Marx and
Engel's concept of class struggle 1955).

This situation is one of antagonistic

cooperation.
(2) These centers of role specialization will be articulated among themselves in what Adams (1970:54) has methodologically referred to as levels of
articulation which range from the local to the international sphere of social
activity.

The 1 inkage between the groups will be both vertical (role centers at

different levels) and horizontal (centers at the same levels) integrating operating
networks and system of networks.

The articulation of different specialized centers

and of their specialized operating units, will constitute a complex adaptive systern of the society both to its social and to its natural environment.

The com-

plexity residing in the supplementary operations of the centers of specialization
and the structures resulting from their adaptational networks.
(3) Industrial complex societies have an adaptational capacity to a variety

of strategic environmental resources and to various environments.

In relation to

each one of these resources and environments one or more centers of role specializatbn

will be adapted; thereby, normally, the greater the number of these role

4

centers, the wider the range of operations of the society.
The wider range of environmental adaptation is facilitated through the
operation of centers of control in the society.
centers of control is the State itself.

The most significant of these

In addition, a group of centers of

role specialization might also have specific centers of control inter-locking
their operations.

The social function of these centers of control is basically

to regulate the operations of social units within their domain and to guarantee
the flow of strategic resources within the different units.

This articulation

is achieved mainly by overlapping different environments and thereby the activities of the units within the environments.
(4) Finally, economically the distributive system of the society is
usually based on industrial production and articulated through a cash economy
of market systems in contrast to a subsistence economy.
consequences of a

1

~arket

The sociocultural

system11 has been best explained by Polanyi:

The transformation {resulting from the Industrial Revolution) implies
a change in the motive of action on the part of the members of the
society: for the motive of subsistence that of gain may be substituted. All transactions are turned into money transactions; and
these in turn require that a medium of exchange be introduced into
every articulation of industrial life. All incomes must derive from
the sale of something or other (such newly defined commodities as
labor, land, money), and whatever the actual source of a person's
income, it must be regarded as resulting from sale. No less is
implied in the simple term "market system 11 (1944:41; pp. 74-75, 68-76).
Obviously, there is interaction between division of labor and market
exchange.

As Belshaw noticed, the market does not come into existence to

enable persons to dispose of surpluses.

It comes into existence as a function

of the division of labor, so that those who concentrate on production of one
sort may obtain the produce of others {1965:78).

But the complexity of the

society's distributive system is not well characterized nor explained by calling
upon the market exchange relations resulting from the society's division of labor.
market system is normally dependent upon the use of a specific technological
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know-how and the recognized cultural value.

The use of specialized machines in

an agrarian and commercial society typically affected these societies.
The use of elaborate machinery and plant involved the development of
the factory system and therewith a decisive shift in the relative
importance of commerce and industry in favor of the latter. Industrial
production ceased to be an accessory of commerce organized by the merchant as buying and selling proposition; it now involved long-term investment with corresponding risks. Unless the continuance of production
was reasonably assured, such a risk was not bearable. But the more
complicated industrial production became, the more numerous were the
elements of industry the supply of which had to be safeguarded. Three
of these, of course, were of outstanding importance: labor, land, and
money. In a commercial society their supply could be organized in one
way only: by being made available for purchase. Hence, they would have
to be organized for sale on the market --in other words, as commodities.
The extension of the market mechanism to the elements of industry --labo~
land and money-- was the inevitable consequence of the introduction of
the factory system in a commercial society (Polanyi 1944:75).
In summary, the development of the industrial market system was accompanied
by a change in the organization of the society itself which now became almost
dependent bh the economic organization.
units of production but the factories.

The domestic units are no longer the
In addition, new segmentary systems for

the distribution of strategic resources have to be gradually elaborated and coordinated to replace former kin based distributive systems and secure the financial
and capital investments in production.

Thus, one of the main differences between

so-called primitive societies and industrial complex societies' technoeconomic
organization and economic activities is a legitimate field of social and economic
achievement open to the operating units and their manifestation of satisfaction.
In other words, the political economy becomes increasingly differentiated.

It

is a difference in the scale and complexity of the system resulting from industrial
production and market systems, as well as from the emergence of elaborate networks
interconnecting centers of role specialization.
Challenge to Anthropology
The traditional theories, methods and techniques of anthropology have
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not prepared anthropologists to study the cultural system of these complex
societies.

The subcultural groups of the latter, such as communities, occupa-

tional classes, ethnic minorities, and the 1 ike, may not be exclusively studied
by the traditional ethnographic method.

Also, modern nations have certain

nation-oriented institutions and features, such as governmental structures, legal
systems, economic patterns, and religious organizations, which differ qualitatively
from anything known in band and tribal cultures and which cannot possibly be grasped
by ascertaining the behavior of the typical individual associated with them.
But it is not only a questbn of theories, methods and techniques.

Referring

to urban anthropology, Gulick denounced ten years ago both anthropologists unjustified statements when referring to urban situations, and their lack of urban field
stuqies.
Because of their commitment to the all-inclusive idea of culture,
anthropologists tend to claim the universal applicability of their
principles of human behavior and accordingly have made sweeping
pronouncements on the nature and problem of whole societies, many
of which include urban environments (or cities). So indirectly
and probably often unwittingly, anthropologists have encompassed
cities. But only to a minor extent, in comparison to the research
which non-anthropologists have done in cities, have they done
research directly in and on cities (1962:445).
Even traditional studies of formerly remote and independent peasant
societies have been affected by present day complexity of sociocultural systems.
With the growth of cities and megalopolis, the country people are forced into
establishing ties of dependence with them and to

~evelop

economic and political

relationships, as well as relationships of status, with the city people, thus
becoming what Redfield cal led
(1947:306).

11

that special kind of rural folk we cal 1 peasantry!'

Even more today peasants are defined in reference to their subordinate

relationships to a group of controlling outsiders {Wolf 1966:3-4; 13); and Adams
argues that:
The 1954 revolution in Guatemala, supported directly by the United States
and fol lowed by tf-e reject ion of many of the advances made by the two
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volutionary governments, reinforced a fact that was already evident
re some of my co 11 eagues: ·rt was ·1mposs1· b 1e t o un ders t and t he 1·1 f e
to
trajectories of peasants and poor peoples in contemporary society
without understanding the larger society within which they lived; and
it was equally necessary to see how the larger society related to the
world (1970:3).
At the present time the cultures of the world appear to be evolving and
adapting to (or being incorporated within) one of a few cultural types, with a
distributive system growing out from an industrial technology and an exclusively
cash economy in a market system economy.

Concomitantly, they manifest an increas-

ing trend toward the interdependence of social, political and economic units.
Thus, anthropology is confronted today with the study of complex sociocultural
systems.

This generates the following set of major problems:
(l)The modification and elaboration of a set of theoretical, methodological

and descriptive concepts since much of the empirical data as the basic concepts
and theories of anthropology have been derived from the study of primitive and
relative autonomous social units.
(2) To develop new cultural theories, methodologies and research techniques that in face of present day large-scale and complex societies will maintain and reinforce one of anthropology's main contributions to social studies:
its comparative method and holistic approach.

In this perspective, it is vital

to anthropology that an attempt be made to relate such apparently inscrutable
phenomena as the social structure and the ideology of a complex social system
to the basic technoeconomic( arrangements by which the total sociocultural
system interacts with its natural and cultural environment.

This research

should be conducted cross-culturally in order to determine functional interrelationships of cultural patterns which occur independently among societies
in different parts of the world.
(3) In conjunction with the two preceding points, anthropology should

probably understand and strive to overcome the

11

dilemma 11 in which urban sociology
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in the United States finds itself according to White and Weaver:
community studies with an increasing number of exceptions,
related to the larger issues of structure; •.. quantitative
tend to become overly narrow in terms of their theoretical
the degree that they are divorced from behavioral study in
texts and rely upon survey data exclusively (1972:106) .

............

are not
approaches
import, to
social con-

CHAPTER I
THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS
In this first chapter some theoretical and methodological considerations
which guided the field work and helped to organize its findings are schematically
presented.

It has to be acknowledged that the present study operated within the

frame of what Pelto (1972:7) has called a "general theoretical point of view".
One which shapes various aspects of data collection and interpretation, without
providing a set of axiomatic propositions from which research questions are
derived.

This type of research is mainly defensible "because no general theory

exists at present which can effectively anticipate and prescribe all the relevant
factors and variables affecting any given aspect of culture or social organization"
in complex societies (Pelto 1972:7).
Culture as an Adaptive Mechanism
Culture
One of Anthropology's most cherished concepts is that of culture.

In the

process of adapting to the environment human societies develop and organize a set
of adaptational features ranging from tools and customs to language and beliefs.
These extrasomatic adaptational devices are referred to as culture.

For matters

of clarity, culture might be defined as the systemic organization of artifacts,
institutions, ideologies, and the total range of customary behavior with which
a society is equipped for the exploitation and transformation of the energy
resources of its particular environment--or environments--and the subsequent
distribution and use of them in time.
9

10

As such,

culture is a diachronic process through which

to adapt to th e ·1 r environments .
f orma t

human societies are able

The main function of culture being the trans-

ion of those strategic resources necessary for the maintenance and expansion

of the society.

In order to achieve this goal various groups within society have

to organize their operations, select between different adaptational alternatives,
and compete for control of their respective ecosystems.

The cultural process of

adaptation is historical by nature and has proven to be an endless task of deadlocks and innovations.
Between society and culture a very close interrelation is established.
As a matter of fact, society and culture both represent facets of components in
basic human situations.
If, for instance, society is taken to be an organized set of individuals
with a given way of life, culture is that way of life. If society is
taken to be an aggregate of social relations, then culture is the content
of those relations. Society emphasizes the human component, the aggregate of people and the relations between them. Culture emphasizes the
component of accumulated sources, irrrnaterial as well as material, which
the people inherit, employ, transmute, add to and transmit (Firth 1952:27).
Energy
Leslie White was the first anthropologist, to our knowlede, that systematically utilized the concept of energy.
resting upon and being determined by

He explained the functioning of culture as
11

the amount of energy harnessed and by the

way in which it is put to work" (1949:367-368).

Cultural systems operate only

by harnessing energy in one form or another, and by transforming it in the production of human need-serving goods and services.
We may distinguish three factors in any cultural situation or system:
(1) the amount of energy harnessed per capita per year; (2) the efficiency
of the technological means with which energy is harnessed and put to work;
(3) and the magnitude of human need-serving goods and services produced

(1949:368).
The following pages include White's concept of energy but i5 usage departs
from traditional undertanding of it.

Energy will not refer exclusively to the
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physica 1

or cultural ability to do work nor to a variable within a formula for

cultural development (cf. White 1959:ch 2; specifically pp. 40-49).

White's

understanding of energy as the ability to do labor is too restricted for the
purposes of this study; mainly because it unnecessarily remains an undefined
potentiality amid an operating adaptational system.

In addition, it seems to

be reducible at times to society's technological output (White's product) apd
at others to the society's technological capacity ("energy and work are interchangeab 1e terms").

If used in either sense, it is an over-emphasis on one

variable of the cultural system.
Still in other instances, energy resources might be reduced to a physicobiological variable.

Because the amount of work that the human organism is

capable of producing will depend largely upon the food intake, energy is reduced
to sheer diet calories.

But an analysis of industrial complex societies through

the theoretical perspective of food energy harnessing becomes cumbersome and
methodologically inadvisable; (for a good analysis of the energetics of primitive
cultural systems in terms of calorie consumption see Kemp 1972, and Rappaport 1972).
If it is granted that cultures might be viewed as mechanisms for ecolog· ical adaptation through the transformation, distribution and use of energy, then
energy is the means, environmentally available, for subsistence, survival and
expansion of the operating unit's existence.

The subsistence, survival and expan-

sion of the unit might be understood biologically and/or socially.

Biological

existence refers to the physical or organic sustenance and protection of life
of the integrating members of the units.

Social existence alludes to the expan-

sion and maintenance of the unit's adaptational network; thereby it includes the
web of social relations emanating from the unit's environmental activity.
In a sociocultural system energy resources range from mere raw products
to manufactured goods, and will include all those resources necessary to permit
the harnessing, transformation, distribution and consumption of the energy resources
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within the system.

The employment and value of these energy resources will be

contingent upon a cultural perception of them.

While energy resources have an

• tive element to them, they are also subject to a cultural ·perception both
obJec
of their transformation and uses.

Most important, energy resources themselves

are culturally defined and as such their value and employment relies upon an
evolutionary cultural process •
. Because energy potentials are culturally perceived and defined, the
discovery of new energy resources or uses of them, regardless of the means through
whlth this is accomplished, should be expected to introduce a radical or partial
readjustment of the cultural system.

The effects of the cultural change being

more or less radical in association with the strategic value of the energy
resources involved in the process of change.
It remains for future empirical research to resolve the question of (a)
which energy resources are more strategic (vital) in a sociocultural system; and
{b) which ones are more commonly employed for their instrumental value to provide
access or control over any other resources.

In the meantime two considerations

are relevant to non-instrumental energy resources in general.

First, while the

.units in a complex society might adapt to different networks or sub-systems
dependent on different energy resources, not all of them have the same determinant
position for the socio-cultural organization.

And secondly, the unit's existence,

in terms of which energy resources have been defined, is a relative term for it
can be distinguished, at least, a level of bare subsistence, moderate and affluent
well being (cf. Samuelson 1967:17; Lenski 1966:36, 37-38).
Preliminarily, the energy resources upon which society's cultural system
is contingent upon might be categorized into nuclear and peripheral energy resources.
Nuclear energy resources are responsible for the subsistence and expansion of the
social units regardless of its evolutionary cultural sophistication.

Peripheral

energy resources are associated with a secondary level of subsistence in which
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ry or supplementary sources as well as prestige and comfort factors deteraccess O
e unit's form of existence once it has been secured by the nuclear resources.
mine th
This classification tries to arrive at a distinction between indispensable and
dispensable energy resources for the unit's existence while adknowledging that
this distinction is being mediated by a historic-cultural perception.
Ecological Adaptation
One of the safest observations which can be made
adaptive nature.

abo~

culture is its

In fact, cultural ecology's main goal seems to be ''the study

of the process by which a society adapts to its environment" (Steward 1968:337).
Evolutionary theory can be characterized as a succession of levels of adaptation,
each level being distinct and providing human society with different capacities
--both social and technological-- to sustain and propagate life.
By ecological adaptation is meant the process by means of which units
obtain and maintain control over strategic energy resources of their environment
for productive, distributive and consumptive ends.

Operating units are any

selected unit of analysis, be it a man, a human group, or a whole society, adapting
and exploiting their environment.

They are methodologically defined in relation

to their output regardless of individual composition.

This process of ecological

adaptation can only be fully understood in a historical perspective because of
the alternative strategies of adaptation it embraces and the options actually
followed.

In addition, the resources of the operating units are influenced by

the historic experience of the operating units.
In any case operating units, as well as society itself, are unavoidably
faced with the problem of optional strategic adaptation to the different energy
resources of their environment.

Man himself, as human groups in general, like

all other 1 iving beings, is confronted with the problem of adjustment to his
environment in terms of subsistence, protection from the elements, defense from
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. s reproduction and organization of social life. Basically from these
enem1e '
fundamental needs grow man's social action and thus the adaptive nature of the
cultural system.
Broadly speaking, society's
studied on two levels.

cultural mechanism of adaptation might be

First, with regard to the way cultural systems adapt to

their total environment.

For instance, we should consider such interrelationships

between population, culturally styled necessities, the division of labor and centers of specialization, centers of control, social networks, technoeconomic organJzation, and the ways of dividing natural resources among those who need and use
them.

Secondly, we should consider this systemic adaptation with regard to the

way operating units within a given culture adapt to one another.
Most recently, Bennet (1971 :11) has suggested a third strategy closely
linked to the former.

Emphasizing adaptive behevior, he looks into ''the coping

mechanisms or ways of dealing with people and resources in order to attain goals
and solve problems.

Our emphsis here is not on relationships between institutions,

groups, or aggregates of data, but on patterns of behavior:

problem solving,

decision making, consuming or not consuming, inventing, innovating, migrating,
staying".

Bennet 1 s strategy, although recognized as significant, will not be

followed systematically in this study.
Environment
It is impossible to think of adaptation without reference to some environmentor to the energy resources in the environment for which operating units might
or might not be competing.

Explicitly, by the environment of a particular operating

unit is meant any significant variable or set of variables beyond the unit itself
whose relevancy relies upon its potential use as an energy resource, or its
procurement value for energy resources.

For analytic purposes of exposition,

two main supracategories might embrace these variables:

natural and societal

15
elements.

Thus the adaptational process might not only be examined in relation

atural environment, but also in relatbn to the social environment.
to the n
While on the one hand, the environment is composed of a set of objective
strategic resources, on the other
the environment is not a natural thing; it is a set of interrelated
parts, a product of culture •.. What this envrironmental is, is not
discoverable objectively; it is a matter of perception (Leach 1965:
25 and 37).
Leach could have said that the environment, as the energy resources composing it,
ts a product of cultural perception.

For any definition of what a strategic

resource is or the possible procurement advantage provided by another operating
unit will always be mediated by the cultural system within which the unit operates.
The term environment in actual field situations and for explanatory purposes might be too broad and vague, especially when studying a complex system.
What is the adaptive environment of a specific unit in a total system?

In order

to answer the question Barth's expositon of the development and perpetuation of
cultural differences by ethnic segmentation and economic interdependence in North
Pakistan (1968) might become helpful.
biological concept of

11

In this paper Barth significantly uses the

niche 11 and speaks of an ecological niche as ''the place of

a group in the total environment, its relation to resources and competitors"
(1968:387).
Accepting Barth's use of ecological niche, for the purposes of this study,
the semantic connotations of the concept will be

elabo~ated.

First, the use of

niches will not only refer to the place of a group in the total environment, but
of any operating unit instead.

Second, an ecological niche will delimit the

concept of environment to a position within a complex of relationships within
a geographic area or a social

sys~m

or both.

Third, emphasis is given to the

fact that niches become adaptively relevant and advantageous because of their
available energy resources, or because the adaptational advantages which might
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be procured through the interrelation with other operating units.

Fourthly, ecolog-

ical niches are selectively and competitively occupied by the units and involve the
cultural procurement systems of the society plus other relations between units and
of units to natural resources.

Finally, the basic adaptation of an operating unit

within its ecological niche might be to the micro-environment of which it is a
part, as well as to a single micro-environmental feature (such as a plant or a
specific operating unit) which might even cross-cut several environments.
The adaptation of the operating units to their environments will be achieved
through a complex of relationships organized in connection with energy resources and
other operating units.

If this adaptational activity is traced the resultant graph

will represent the unit's

1

~daptational

networ~'.

By the adaptational network of

an operating unit is meant the web of relationships connecting the unit with either
social or natural elements through which an environmental position is obtained,
maintained and enlarged.

The term network is not employed to refer exclusively

to a structure in the tradition of Radcliffe-Brown with its formal and normative
connotations.

It is here employed as embracing principles of responsibility,

election, accomodation and economy of effort.
For methodological purposes the adaptational network of any unit might be
studied througha system approach (see Watson et al. 1971:ch3).

Such processes as

feedback, outputs, mapping of the environment by control centers and centers of
role specialization and even homeostatic and morphogenic processes, employed in
systems theory could be of methodological relevance for the description and understanding of the adaptational process of operating units.
Adaptational Gap
Up to this point ecological adaptation has been presented as if it were
a mechanical or automatic process adjusting environment and operating units.
is further from reality.

Nothing

If adaptation implies maximizing the biological and social
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life chances of the operating units, maximization is almost always a compromise
of the ·internal organization of culture end the external pressure of the environment.

Every culture carries the penalty of a past within the frame of which,

barring total disorganization, it must work out its future (see Sahl ins 1968:369).
Adaptational

systems might or might not be successful when evaluated

in terms of either a cross-cultural (etic) criteria or a cultural criteria (emic).
Thus the concept of

'~daptational

gap 11 is here introduced to refer to the second

alternative which probably (this is still subject to empirical verification)
results from two features of the system.

First, the fact that the operating

unit's adaptational systems are open ones competing for scarce energy resources
with other social units in their environment.

Second, because of the self-centered

and non-altruistic nature of human action and of social life within the cultural
system itself (cf. Lenski 1966:25-42; 441-442).
In any case then, to adapt is not to do perfectly well from some objective
(etic approach) or cultural (emic approach) stand point, nor even necessarily to
improve performance.

It will be to do as well as possible under the circumstances,

which might not turn well at all.
·Culture as a System
Cultural Sub-systems
The concept of culture itself has been generally distinguished for explanatory and descriptive purposes in terms of subsystems.

The major subsystems gen-

erally selected for stydy by anthropologists include:

ideology, social structure,

technoeconomics and personality.

The latter, at the present time will not be

included in the discussion.
Technoeconomic:

Broadly speaking what Marx and other authors have con-

ceptualized as economic infraestructure has been successively substituted first
by the concept of technology and more recently by technoeconomics which seems
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best suited to refer to the

11

modes

11

and ' 1means 11 of production.

The technoeconomic

subsystem focuses not only on techniques and tools used by operating units in meeting their adaptational goals, but also on the social arrangements employed by the
units in applying its technical equipment and knowledge for production, distribution and consumption of energy resources.
Every technoeconomic is a particular kind of social system.

In addition

to denoting specific sources of energy, artifacts, and customary ways of behaving
towards the environment, a technoeconomic subsystem refers to the organization of
labor, access to means of production, modes of distribution and allocating energy
resources, and tf-e definition of the socioeconomic status of the different operating units.

These are some of the spheres in which the most fundamental cultural

adaptations and adjustments have to be made after technological advances have
become possible.

In addition, it is in these spheres that people in most societies

exhibit their fundamental conservatism because of the social consequences of these
changes, and where power play becomes most determinant.
The importance of the technoeconomic organization to explain culture
changes and even the organization of the cultural system itself has been clearly
defended by White when speaking of tf-e technological stratum:
We may view a cultural system as a series of three horizontal strata:
the technological layer on the bottom, the philosophical on the top,
the sociological stratum in between. These positions express thar
respective roles in tf-e cultural process. The technological system
is basic and primary. Social systems are functions of technologies;
and philosophies express technological forces and reflect social
systems. The technological factor is therefore the determinant of
a cultural system as a whole ... This is not to say, of course, that
social and technological systems are not affected by philosophies.
They do and are. But to condition is one thing, to determine quite
another (1949:366; see part I II).
Social structure:

Structural studies in anthropology deal mainly with the

way in which parts of a given system relate to each other.

In the analysis of the

relations between the parts and the whole, methodological precedence has been
frequently given to

11

social1 1 variables over "cultural" variables.

The main reason
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for this approach is that social relations, or human groups' interactions,

11

can

be observed directly'' in contrast to cultural patterns of behavior.
social structure conceptualizations range from Evans-Pritchard's conf iguration of stable groups to Leach's set of ideal norms or rules, and Levi-Strauss'
formal models of social relations.

However, as a cultural subsystem, social

structures have traditionally been conceived as the normative pattern of social
behavior.

The best example of this approach is the work of Radcliffe-Brown who

defined social structures as "the continuing arrangement of persons in relationships or controlled by institutions, i.e., socially established norms or patterns
of behvior 11 (1958:177); or in more sophisticated and abstract terms: '' ... human
beings are connected by a complex network of social relations.

I use the term

social structure to denote this network of actually existing relations" (1952:
190; cf. Barnes 1954:43).
Insightfully, Levy Strauss noticed that Radcliffe-Brown identified and
thus confused social structure with social relations because of his empiricemorphological approach.

Social structures should not refer to social relations

but to the models built upon the systemic understanding of the former.

In this

perspective, social relations are the empirical raw data from which the social
structure transformational models are built (cf. Levy Strauss 1963:ch. 15).
In addition to the understanding of social structures in the RadcliffeBrown tradition, Raymond Firth (1951:39-40) observed that structural forms set
a precedent

and provide a limitation to the range of alternatives possible.

Thus in order to acknowledge structural change a new concept was needed.

While

the continuity principle of society is found in the aspect of social structure,
the change principle is found in the concept of organization "by allowing evaluation of situations and entry of individual choice''.

It should be noticed that

although the undeniable value of the social organization concept, when it is
Understood as dependent upon ''individual choice 11 , will lead to the conclusion
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tha t

deviant personalities are the ultimate source of modification in the social

structure.
t i me.

Especially since structural change is not permanent in space or in

and Firth does not acknowledge the origin of this change from new cultural

devices emerging within or encroaching into the systemic organization of society.
on the descriptive and functional level, the strategy of studying sociocultural systems from the perspective of social relations an'd their networks is
most profitable because it is the acting and interacting of individuals that will
be observed in the field; (see more recent formulations of this approach in Bott

1957, Clyde Mitchell 1969).

However, the explanatory value of the structural

approach has long been put into question, especially when it comes to the question
of origins and social change.

The social structures are frequently formulated in

normative and synchronic perspective.

In addition, their value seems to be more

than theoretical, methodological.
Ideology:

The ideological s.ubsystem of a cultural system covers the

realm of values, norms, knowledge themes, philosophies, religious beliefs, ethical
principles and the like.

The term ideological is not here used as referring to a

set of rationalizations being enforced by power upon a society; although this
·possibility is not excluded.

Instead its meaning refers to the unquestionable

observation that man is a symbolic organism.

And furthermore, that he is dependent

upon symboling to conduct his social life to such an extent that culture and
ideology has even been identified.

For instance, Goodenoug (1964:36) defines

culture as an ideological system in itself.

For him, culture

11

is not a material

phenomenon; it does not consist of things, people, be:1avior or emotions.

It is

rather an organization of these things that people have in mind, their models for
perceiving, relating and otherwise interpreting them. 11 (See Tyler's definition
of culture in terms of semantic domains in 1969:11).
The question of how much of a determinative role ideological factors
Play in cultural maintenance and change remains a highly controversial one;
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(cf. Childe 1941; Redfield 1953; Levy Strauss 1962:117; Berger and Luckman 1966).
Nevertheless, available studies seem to indicate that technological and social
organizations in over all give rise to ideological transformations.

The operatfng

•t's conception of the relations between the cultural system, the process of
un•
ecological adaptation, and environment, is a function of modification of their
awn technoeconomic and social structure organizations.
The analytical consideration of culture in terms of subsystems grants the
opportunity of employing different research and explanatory strategies by just
emphasizing one or the other subsystem of culture.

In addition, it provides the

formulation of a functionalist model providing for interactive effects and accomodations between the parts of the system.

Finally, it guarantees the provision

for analysis of system-origin, system-maintaining and system-destroying varaiables.
Subsystems Interaction
The analysis of the cultural system in terms of subsystems is today best
known in anthropology by such definitions as "a culture is an integrated organization of technology, social structure, and philosophy adjusted to the life
problems posed by its natural habitat and by nearby and competing cultures"
(Sahl ins and Service 1960:53). These definitions are in line with previous definitions made by evolutionists (i.e., White 1949:366; 1959:6-8) and cultural ecologists (i.e., Steward 1955:40-41).

But undoubtedly, Marx's strategy for the

explanation of cultural evolution is behind contemporary formulation of cultural
subsystems.
In the social production of their existence, men inevitably enter into
definite relations, which are independent of their will, namely relations of production appropriate to a given stage in the development
of their material forces of production. The totality of these relations
of production constitutes the economic structure of society, the real
foundation, on which arises legal and political superstructure and to
which correspond definite forms of social consciousness. The mode of
production of material life conditions, the general process of social,
political and intellectual life. It is not the consciousness of men
that determines their existence, but their social existence that
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determines their consciousness .•. The changes in the economic foundation lead sooner or later to the transformation of the whole immense
superstructure (1970:20-21).
Recent field studies have contributed to condition the causal role which
HarX assigned to the economic infraestructure in view of the interaction of the
different subsystems; (see Cancian 1972:189-199; Bennet 1968:303; Polany 1968:

63-65; Nash 1967). Nevertheless, the most powerful generalization about cultural
systems seerrS to be found by studying the relationship between the qualitative
and quantitative aspects of the technoeconomic system for the harness and distribution of energy as the independent variables and the quantitative and qualitative
aspects of the other cultural domains of sociocultural phenomena as the dependent
ones.

Because causal dependence upon the technoeconomic subsystem is not an abso-

Jute one to one effect, to explain particular socio-historical situations we have
to consider the interaction between the different subsystems.

But in any case,

the cultural materialist research strategy requires that priority be given to
studies concerned with the-material conditions of the sociocultural system.
Furthermore, cultural materialists' hypothesis should be abandoned for cultural
idealists' hypothesis only after the material circumstances have been given careful consideration.
The understanding of the

11

relations of production 11 is complicated beyond

Marx's definition in the preceding quotation by the presence of centers of control
in complex societies, especially the state.

In stateless societies technological

change seems to be closely related to institutional change.

But non-technological

political institutions seem to be able to harness and employ sufficient power
in state societies as to underlie and direct technological change itself.

For

instance, in stateless societies labor specializations are almost alwa~ tied to
immediately available local resources and do not depend on transportation and
importaion of raw or finished materials.

Items secure" in trade are not essential
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to survival even when they may be important in spheres of cultural adjustments.
eut trade that furnishes the raw materials for specialized production requires
regulatory bureaucracies to negotiate treaties, assure safe passage and establish
equ ·,valencies in money, weights and measures, and to insure the dependability of
supply.

These activities can be carried only by state bureaucracies.
Thus the relations of production appear not as an autonomous and self-

supporting range of the cultural system in complex societies, regardless of their
decisive causal influence upon it.

Centers of control have to be understood as

connected and interacting in an infinite feedback process with the economic
structure as defined by Marx.

Furthermore, this interacting process takes place

amid specific environmental parameters.

The problem to solve in a research of

Industrial complex societies is then to discover the control exercised upon, and
the circumstances determining the harness and distribution of energy resources
within the cultural system.

In other words, the power domains delimiting the

modes and means of energy harness and distribution and the parameters of the resulting causal influence of the technoeconomic subsystem upon the cultural system
at large.

If this research strategy is not followed, the explanation of cultural

change and of the social organization of the cultural process will tend to ignore
the institutional complexity of the cultural system and its dynamics as well.
In general, it should be concluded that in industrial complex societies
the cultural system should be analysed as the historical result of the subsystem's
interaction.

Theoretical formulations shou1d acknowledge technoeconomic condition-

ing, especially to explain the sociocultural organization and its process of
change, because of its causal effect upon the cultural system.

The functional

causality of the technoeconomic subsystem upon the cultural system relies in the
control of the means of production plus the control exercised by the units upon the
process of harness, elaboration, distribution and consumption of energy resources.
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subsystem Articulation
The recognition of cultural subsystems has undeniable theoretical as well
as methodological advantages.

This should not make us conclude that the subsystems

are mutually exclusive or self-sustaining.

On the contrary, they are analytical

aspects of one complex reality, the cultural system.

Thus, for instance, culture

might be studies as social structure at the technoeconomic level just as ideologies
are related to the other two subsystems.

It is for this reason that when an anthro-

pologist of any theoretical persuasion moves from an ethnographic descripton to an
explanation, he is normally forced to employ theoretical orientations which have
been developed from studies in all cultural subsystems.
If the aim of the anthropologist is explanation and the formulation of
theories, he will discover that each of these orientations (theoretical
orientations resulting from studies emphasizing one or the other of the
subsystems) logically implies the other and that, therefore, all tend
to converge when applied to a similar set of problems {Kaplan and
Manners 1972:88).
The Analysis of Cultural Subsystems
Social Action and Social Organization
Social actions constitute the core of the subsystems of any culture.

With-

out it the adaptational network of the operating units will be non-existent and
ecological adaptation impossible.

Operating units' adaptation is contingent upon

environmental energy resources through their social actions.

It is through these

relations that the adaptation of the units is apparent and from them the cultural
system develops.
One profitable method availabe to anthropology for the study of complex
social systems is

the analysis of social actions.

Since the sociocultural sys-

tem is to be understood as a working adaptational system, social actions should
be understood as a social organization, and not as an erratic unarticulated
behavioral output of the units within society.

Thus a methodological approach

for the study of adaptational processes may be developed by analyzing the social
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or9 an

ization of the cultural system.

In this perspective social actions are not

understood as isolated and random behavior but as a systemic set of relations
for environmental adaptation by means of acts

of choice and decision.

Regardless

of the degree of structural patterning and of complexity, the directional activity
of the cultural system reveals itself as being contingent upon its internal organizat ion.
As previously defined, culture is a "systemic organization" of various
elements for the exploitation, transformation, distribution and use of energy
resources.

The systemic organization by which culture is defined has to be under-

stood in association with the cultural system's social organization.
upon society itself that culture is contingent.

It is directly

Through the organization of the

adaptational activity of the operating units within society the cultural system
is structured and understood.
The term

organization 11 , however, requires some further specification.

11

Most frequently social actions are identified with social structure while social
organization is taken to be synonymous with social structure.

But as Firth has

argued, social structure stands for form while social organization stands for
process in social life.

While continuity is expressed in the social structure,

variance in social life is embodied in social organization.
In studying a field of social relations, whether we are using the notions
of society, of culture, or of community, we can distinguish their structure,
their function, and their organization. These are separable but related
aspects. All are necessary for the full consideration of social process.
Briefly, by the structural aspect of social relations we mean the principles on which their form depends; by the functional aspect we mean the
way in which they serve given ends; by the organizational aspect we mean
the directional activity which maintains their form and serves their ends
(Firth 1951:28; see 1964:35).
Thus by social organization is meant
actions by acts

of choice and decision.

the~

the systemic ordering of social

Still in other words, it is the set

of systemic strategies followed by the operating units in their process of
ecological adaptation.
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It is ·the organizational configuration of social actions that becomes
relevant for the study of complex cultural systems.

In contrast to structures,

which in anthropological literature are associated with one cultural subsystem
as well as with order, continuity and form, social organization pervades the
cultural system and is to be regarded as a primary aspect of co-ordination and
cooperation between the operating units for adaptational purposes.
As here employed, the term social organization has a number of methodological advantages over that of social structures as understood in the Radcliffeerown tradition.

First, it refers to the working arrangements of social actions.

Thus it is not limited to "structural" arrangements but includes a wider range
of possibilities

characteriz~d

in the process of ecological adaptation and in

the process of cultural change itself.

Second, organization does not refer to

the total sum of social acts in the cultural system.

It refers only to those

that are significant to the directional flow of the cultural system.

In this

respect the social organization of societies have to be understood as heuristic
models that, regardless of their scale, are constructed from the social acts.
Third, social organization pervades the cultural system since it penetrates every
single input and output of the system.

Fourth, one of the principal character-

istics of the social organization is its systemic nature; i.e., the directional
activity of the operating units forming the system affects the ordered whole.
Accepting a broad classification, the operating unit's social organization will include social and economic relations.

In the following section an

analysis of these relations will be included in order to discover the nature
of them.
Social Actions as Exchange Forms
Social organization, at least, can be subdivided for analytical purposes into social and economic organization.

The core of the social organiza-
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tion is its social relations while at the core of the economic organization,
Integration is obtained through economic relations.
social relations are characteristic because of their systemic exchange
nature.

Some operating units communicate by means of a common set of symbols

and objects in order to obtain an explicit or implicit goal.

The goal achieve-

ment might be valuable to one or to all of the units involved in the interaction.
In any case, social actions include a reciprocal give and take.

For this reason,

social relations have been interpreted as instances of exchange.

For example,

Blau defines social exchange as "voluntary actions of individuals that are
motivated by the returns they are expected to bring and typically do in fact
bring from others'' (1964:91).

Social exchange theory has been most influenced

from Mauss' interpretation of gift-giving and gift-receiving.

The French sociolo-

gist discovered a structure in most primitive institutions:
All these institutions reveal the same kind of social and psychological
pattern. Food, women, children, possessions, charms, lan~ labour, services, religious offices, rank, --everything is stuff to be given away
and repaid. In perpetual interchange of what we may call spiritual
matter, comprising men and things, these elements pass and repass between clans and individual~ ranks and sexes and generations (1967:11-12).
This gift exchange taking place through social channels bases itself on three
obligations:

the obligation to give presents, the obligation to receive them,

as well as to repay them (Mauss 1967:10; Sahl ins 1965:162).
The need to reciprocate for benefits in order to continue receiving them
serves as a starting mechanism of social interaction and group organization for
the operating units.

The adaptational advantages to be gained from entering

into exchange relations furnish incentives for social interactions, and the
exchange processes serve as a mechanism for regulating social interaction,
developme - of a network of adaptation and a rudimentary social organization.
The norm of reciprocity merely reinforces and stabilizes tendencies inherent in
the character of social action itself.
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Thus as Mauss himself recognized (1967:70) the nature of social exchange
Is a kind of hybrid.

It results neither in purely free and gratuitous protesta-

tions, nor in purely interested and utilitarian production and exchange.
exchange involves calculated risks and implicit agreements.

Social

In a recent study

of agricultural operators in Canada, Bennet found that while
Jasper agriculturalists prefer to view cooperative economic exchange
as a spontaneous expression of benevolence, good will, and neighborly
assistance ••. The most important rule of exchange equivalence was:
do not permit the exchange to get too far out of balance; although,
it is good to let it be a little out of balance because this builds
credit. There was a second rule which more directly governed the
actual equivalence: try not to exchange things that are markedly
different in value {or with people who have few resources for reciprocation), otherwise the balance becomes difficult to maintain (1968:
291 and 293; cf. Benedict 1968:2-3).
Exchange:

Social and Economic

Some anthropologists and

sociologis~view

social exchange as the basic

principle upon which all of the actions of the operating unit are contingent.
But contrary to this tradition some distinctions can be established at least
between ritual, social and economic behavior.
First of all, much ritual and religious behavior is not necessarily
governed by expectations of return, gain-loss considerations or manipulation of
wants.

Their expressive significance, lacking decision-making for specific

advantages, may mean they are oriented to the pursuit of ultimate values rather
than to the pursuit of immediate adaptational rewards in their adaptational
networks.

Thus they lack an exchange nature, at least in social terms.

An

analogical consideration applies to altruistic behavior in its pure form when
existing.
In order to diffe1Y1tiate between ritual behavior and exchange relations
Blau proposes the following criteria.

First, the action must be led toward ends

that can only be achieved through interaction with other operating units.

Secondly,

it must seek to adapt means to further the achievement of these ends (Blau 1964:5).
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In this perspective social exchange might appear to be reducible to
economic behavior because of their gain-loss considerations.
action will be equivalent to an economic relation.

Thus all social

It has even been argued that

because pre-money moral values were based in social exchange reciprocities with
gain-loss considerations, they should be termed economic transactions (cf. Belshaw
l965:51; Bennet 1968:303; for a critical review of the problem see Dalton 1971).
One main characteristic differentiates social from economic exchanges:
(i) in contrast to economic relations, social exchange entails unspecified obligations (cf. Blau 1964:315; Sahl ins 1965).

Furthermore, it should be left open

for empirical verification whether or not social exchange is characterized more
frequently than economic exchange by {a) including a higher degree of personal ism
and directness in the network, and (b) consideration of a broader set of guide1 ines of the ideological and normative sphere at the operational level than does
economic exchange.
Admitting a difference between economic and social exchange, it seems
safer to maintain, that economic exchange is but one form of output of an
important type from a wider set of adaptive responses. available to the operating
units for adaptational purposes.

It is the attempted calculation of price and

cost to the unit in its adaptational network.

Both economic and social exchange

then become a specialized field of the adaptive organization of the operating
unit.
Exchange as an Adaptational Strategy
Be it social or economic, exchange in social life has a most important
characteristic:

it is a logistic and transactional output by means of which

the operating units through a reciprocal exchange either implicitly or explicitly
try to obtain or maintain certain strategic position in their environment.
rational standing is one of means to ends.

Its
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Operating units do not enter into exchange relationships only because
of a psychological process such as those underlying the feel.ing of attraction
between individuals, but mainly to obtain various kinds of advantages in their
environmental position.

The economic and the social organization of the oper-

ating units are in line with the adaptational dimension of the cultural system
of which they are the elements.
tional dimension:
context.

Social and economic exchange have an adapta-

they are a way of securing something in an environmental

Exchange becomes a calculated risk within the cultural system in

every single adaptational network.
It is this ever-present transactional nature of exchange in social and
economic relations that is strategically most valuable for the study of cultural
systems of complex societies.

By understanding power in a broad frame of reference

of control, power relations appear at the core of every exchange relation.

Control

is exercised for regulating and/or directing the operating unit's adaptational
process by means of interchanges.
This is not an argument stating that all exchange relations have the
same power dimension or the same adaptational strategic importance.

It is only

stating that there is a power dimension at every social and economic exchange
linking operating units in their environment.

It remains for empirical research

to determine the significance of specific exchanges in cultural situations and
the means through which they are controlled.
Power in Industrial Complex Societies:

A Hypothetical Model

In general, power has been used to refer either to the tactical control
that is exercised by an operating unit over the environment of another (cf. Weber
1947:152; Adams 1970:119), or to the unlegitimized use of control over another
Un '1 t

( cf.

Buckley 1967:195 ) .

In a social relationship we will take power to

mean the dialectical resultant of the effective control that one operatingunit
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holds over the environmental resources of adaptation of other units and the
latter's ability to resist the former.
Power relations are a mechanism available to the operating units for
adapting to their environment.

It is not only a matter of units establishing

a complex of relationships in their adaptational networks, but of exchanging
through them adaptational advantages and obtaining control and access to energy
resources at the base of their sociocultural organizations.
Power situations are features of every social action.

They are the

link uniting operating units and thus constituting the adaptational network.
They spread their effect differentially through the entire environment but
anything that threatens the ecological niche of another operating unit provides
the basis for the exercise of power.

Every operating unit will probably be related

to others in some manner that can be initially estimated on the basis of a general understanding of the larger system of adaptation.

In addition, by seeing

power in social actions as a rational evaluation of a situation in which an
operating unit decides to do what is best for it, a common

or at least over-

lapping, cultural system is implied (cf. Adams 1970:117).
An important element in every power situation is the defensive feedback
of the operating unit affected by the control being exerted upon its environment.
Blau in a different theoretical setting proposes four situational alternatives
for an operating unit to escape from the power domain of another:
Individuals who need a service another has to offer have the following
alternatives: first, they can supply him with a service that he wants
badly enough for him to offer his service in return ... Second, they may
obtain the needed service elsewhere, assuming that there are alternative suppliers ..• Third, they can coerce him to furnish the service ..•
Fourth, they may learn to resign themselves to do without this service,
possibly finding some substitute for it ... Finally, if they are not
able or willing to choose any of these alternatives, they have no other
choice but to comply with his wishes (1964:118-119).
An essential quality of power lies in the fact that the various operating
units command different resources of control.

And, if nothing else, they can
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obligitariness" (1954:4; cf. 1962:72). He classified types of legitimacy
according to the means by which it was guaranteed.

One of his most fundamental

distinctions was between subjective guarantees involving "purely disinterested
motives" and objective guarantees which depend on "entirely self-interest" (1947:
12 6-130).

On the other hand:

legitimacy may be ascribed to an order by those acting subject to it
in the following ways: (a) by tradition, a belief in the legitimacy
of what has always existed; (b) by virtue of affectual attitudes,
especially emotional, legitimizing the validity of what is newly
revealed or a model to imitate; (c) by virtue of a rational belief
in its absolute value, thus lending it the validity of an absolu~e
and final commitment; (d) because it has been established in a
manner which is recognized to be legal. This legality may be
treated as legitimate in either of two ways: on the one hand, it
may derive from a voluntary agreement of the interested parties on
the relevant terms. On the other hand, it may be imposed on the
basis of what is held to be a legitimate authority over the relevant persons and a corresponding claim to their obedience (1947:130).
At the core of the matter is the cultural perception which one

operating

unit has over the control other units are exerting over the environment and the
latter's justification of this power exertion.

Legitimacy then is the process

by means of which ideological consent is blended with power exercise either in
the exchange relations between operating units, or in the complex of relationships constituting an environment.
Normally an operating unit tries to justify its exercise of power by an
appeal to legitimacy either in the form of custom, of law or belief.

Custom

refers to any habitual or usual course of action, or any established practice
in the environment.

An appeal to law implies a justification of power exercised

through rules of conduct enforced by sanctions administered by a determinant
locus of power.

Finally by appealing to belief, a request is made to consensus

in social actions by referring to non-ordinary and sacred causes, whether of
a religious nature oiof social dimensions, which are above and against established
Practices.
The process of legitimacy is closely related and dependent upon a

33
always command different amounts of physical force that they can bring into play.
The indicators of power and the means of effective control of the interchange of
energy resources will vary greatly even within operating units of different levels
of articulation in the same environment.

In any case, the adaptational threat of

power will be effectively exercised when the units have some common value or need
of

energy resources and an understanding of the adaptational networks of the

units in the environment.
sources and Means of Power
One crucial question pertaining to data gathering and data analysis in
the study of power relations as mechanisms of adaptation deals with the sources
and the means of power available to the units.

In other words,

the "how" and

''why" of power relations and their significance in the cultural system, especially
within concrete ecosystems.
In power situations a distinction might be made between potential and
effective power.

The latter refers to the actual exercise of power while the

former acknowledges the possibility of a future exercise of it.

This distinction

signals a deeper reality, i.e., the existence of sources of power upon which
effective exercise of it is based.

A difference is then apparent between sources

of power and the means through which power is conveyed into the adaptational
network.

The former acknowledges the exchange nature of social action and the

need of the operating units to possess or control certain adaptational features
in order to bargain in their environments.

Means of power acknowledges the fact

that it is not sufficient to have command over certain resources of power unless
it is exercised in actual social situations.
In industrial complex societies the main resources of power, especially
at their technoeconomic subsystem, are: (1) control over energy resources;
(2) control over the processes of energy transformation; (3) control over the
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distributive system of transformed energy resources; (4) control over an operating unit's access to the exploitation of energy resources; (5) control over
an operating unit's access to the process of energy transformation; and (6)
control over an operating unit's access to the distribution and uge of the
energy surplus.
Congruent with traditional sociological interest it could be asserted
that the process of decision-making and decision-implementing in light of the
adaptational process characteristic of sociocultural systems becomes important
when explained in relation to power decisions.

However, in the perspective of

the present considerations, emphasis should be given to the discovery and study
of the means of power available and utilized by the operating units.
one thing to have power (potential) and another to use it (effective).

It is
The

means of power are embodied in the adaptational network of the operating units,
especially in their social and economic actions, and include the channels and
strategies through which power resources are conveyed into actual situations of
control.

The means of power might become associated with specific symbols of

power.
Legitimacy
The exercise of power varies in its strategic manifestations.
present time it suffices to
and force.

distingui~

three strategies:

At the

authority, influence

To clarify their difference some remarks are made in this sub-section

in relation to legitimacy and the round of legitimate action in adaptational
processes.
Operating units justify their possession and use of power by legitimizing
it.

Through this process of justification a shift occurs moving the basis of

POiier from might to right (cf. Lenski 1966:55; Parson 1947:22).

For Weber

legitimacy was the endowment of a rule ''with the prestige of exemplariness or
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of the technoeconomic and social structure of the cultural system
co d 'fication
I
to which certain or all of the operating units in the system contribute.

Phrased

in another way, to a valorative codification of the adaptational process of the
society to its environment.

The ideological subsystem then has a

11

practical",

every day relapsing in social life through the framing and patterning not only
of a model of social relations in general, but of legitimized action concretely.
Within this context, the main goal of any research of complex societies should
be to discover the process by means of which the units codify their environment
and legitimize or not the exercise of power in their networks.

Through this

approach the establishment and maintenance of what Freire (1970) refers to as a
"culture of silence" in developing societies will become explainable and most
meaningful.
POiier Strategies
Three main strategies of power relations were identified.

They are:

(1) authority which is the exercise of power by any one operating unit within
the sanctioned range of legitimate action accepted in the adaptive network in
which the unit is operating; (2) influence involves the exercise of power by
one operating unit within the permitted but not sanctioned or prohibited range
of legitimate action accepted in the adaptive network in which the unit is
operating; (3) Force (distinguished from "physical force" meaning any kind of
physical aggression) is the exercise of power by any one operating unit in
opposition to the sanctioned and/or permitted range of legitimate action in
the adaptive network in which the unit is operating.
The recognition of these three strategies of power evades in a certain
way the Marx-Weber controversy on whether or not the essence of the state is
"Power" (here defined as

11

force 11 ) or

11

authority 11 (cf. Horowitz 1969).

The core

of the cultural system and of the state institution is power regardless of

whether
remains
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it is exercised under one or another strategy.

Nonetheless, the issue

in deciding the process by means of which in some societies specific

pawer relations have or have not become legitimized.
pawer and Reciprocity
The essence of power relations is the exchange nature manifested through
actions of controls.

In other words, it is the reciprocal constitution guided

by the adaptational interests of the operating units.

For this reason Sahlin's

model of reciprocity (1965:145-149) can be translated in terms of power relations.
Power networks are not necessarily symmetrical.

As a matter of fact,

normally uneven control over environmental energy resources results in assymetrical exercise of power.

The exchange nature of power relations can be studied

in the frame of adaptational strategies according to the directional flow of
advantages.

In this setting a model of power can be identified which includes

three extreme poles in a triangula- continuum (generalized, balanced, and negative
reciprocity), and a resulting situation from the actual tension of power relations
(unbalanced reciprocity).
(i) Generalized reciprocity:

the modal exercise of power by means of

which a unit, while benefiting the adaptational interests of another unit (or
units), preserves or increases its sources of power while tactically endangering
or not endangering it.

While the manifest flow of advantages involved in the

relation move in one direction, they preserve or even increase, the source of
power of the donating unit.
(ii) Negative reciprocity:

the modal exercise of power in which one

unit preserves or increases its sources of power without conceding adaptational
advantages to another unit (or units), proper exception of the maintenance of
life.

Thus the actual interchange of advantages approximates a one directional

flow of exchange.
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(iii) Balanced reciprocity: the modal exercise of power in which
operating units either because competing on equal power resources for the
control of the other's environment, or because mutually agreed so (alliance)
for strategic reasons, are not able to or do not convert their relationship
into one of the generalized or negative or unbalanced nature but instead maintain a proportionate or commensurate exchange.

The flow of adaptational

advantages is bi-directional without offering superiority to either one of
them over the other's environment.
(iv) Unbalanced reciprocity:

any modal exercise of power in which

one unit preserves or increases its resources of power without establishing

either a negative or a generalized or a balanced reciprocity.
The establishment of one or another of these reciprocities will depend
upon considerations of the means and sources of power, on environmental energy
resources arrived at by the operating units in their adaptational network.
These types of reciprocities should be considered as representative of terminal
situations in a continuum.

Actual situations will approximate more or less

the ultimate forms here signaled.

The forms of reciprocity might be exercised

both between operating units of the same power domains and/or the same level
of articulation, as well as between operating units of different domains and/or
levels of articulation.

In any case the quantification of this model of power

reciprocity should provide an insight into the assymentrical power networks
within the sociocultural organization and its resulting effects of social
tensions, conflict, submission and rebellion.

CHAPTER I I
FOUNDATIONS OF THE TOBACCO INDUSTRY
The Dominican Republic and Its Agricultural Environment
Economic Environment
The Dominican Republic is an industrial complex society as defined in
the introductory chapter.

But contrary to the United States, Japan, and some

European countries, its complexity derives not from a secondary or tertiary
technoeconomic organization, but from its agricultural production in the midst
of a world wide market system.

Like any other Caribbean country, agricultural

production constitutes the core energy resources of the Dominican Republic's
international environment.

The national economic has followed a dependency

path in relation to industrial and capitalist countries:

The Dominicans export

agrarian products in exchange for manufactured goods and financial capital.
El modelo de desarrollo historico del pais ha seguido el marco de
desarrollo clasico de los paises de America Latina, o sea, una
economia volcada hacia fuera, exportadora de materias primas
agricolas tradicionales e importadora de bienes de consumo y de
capital. Asi, el pais ha crecido bajo la influencia y comando
de los centrol lideres del desarrollo economico en el contexto
mundial. Este desarrollo se ha basado, en la Republica Dominicana, en los cultivos de cana de azucar, cafe, cacao y tabaco,
bajo una agricultura extensiva con la incorporacion de mano de
obra y tierras que constituian los factores abundantes del pais.
(Secretaria Tecnica de la Presidencia 1968:109)
The strategic importance of agricultural production in the importexport balance of the Republic becomes self-evident in the export revenues
obtained through such products as sugar, coffee, tobacco, and cocoa.

In the

year 1970, for instance, these four leading export crops represented 84.2% of
the total national export; in 1960 they represented 86.3% of the national
38
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revenues, and in 1950, 89.7% (cf. Table 1)
TABLE 1
EXPORT VALUE OF THE LEADING DOMINICAN PRODUCTS

1950

1960

1964

1966

1968

1969

1970

rotal exports:

86.9

157.4

179.4

138.o

163.5

184. 1

213.2

--

Total imports:

43.0

90.3

202.4

166.9

196.8

210.4

266.8

--

sugar and its
sub-products

40.7

92.3

96.0

79.8

91.8

98.9

115.9

145.6

coffee

12.3

22.6

30.5

20.9

17.9

21.2

28.9

23.9

cocoa

17.3

19.6

16. 1

11. 2

13.8

20. 1

19.6

13. 2

tobacco

4.7

6.7

14.7

6.6

11. 3

12.7

14.3

20.8

bauxite

--

8.o

8.9

10.3

12.6

14.6

15. 1

16.0

beef

1.9

2.5

--

.2

4.4

4.2

3.4

3.0

fruits and
vegetables

2.2

.8

6.9

2.3

4. 1

5. 1

6. 1

8.4

7.8

8. 1

6.3

6.7

7,9

7,5

9.7

11. 7

~

1971

PRODUCTS:

others

,.

Values in millions of RD$.
Source: Banco del Desarrollo 1972.
The position of the agricultural sector within the national economy
can best be understood by sub-dividing the gross national product according to
contributing economic sectors.

The leading sub-sectors of the national econ-

omy, besides agriculture itself, include
ernment and commerce.

In connection

be considered their labor input.

with

mining, industry, construction, goveach sector's output

should also

In this way, the output capacity of each

sector--an economic variable--will best be understood in relation to the volume of labor consumptbn they generate--a socioeconomic variable.

The strategic

importance of the labor market relies upon its integrative force of different

i.
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oper
ture

ating units within the technoeconomic subsystem, and even the social strucof the Republic.

In this perspective, unemployment constitutes a disorgan-

tzation variable; above all, once isolated communities and subsistence economies
disappear.
TABLE 2
GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT BY ECONOMIC SECTORS
1950

1954

1958

1962

1966

1968

agriculture and livestock

29.6

28.5

26. 1

25.8

24.9

23.3

mining, industry, and construction

18.4

20.7

22.0

21.6

22.0

23. 1

co11111erce

18.3

19.0

18.6

18.0

16.4

17.5

government

8.8

7.9

10.2

12.4

12.7

11. 5

transport, communications
and electricity

4. 5

5.0

5.8

6.0

7.6

8.6

dwelling ownership

7.6

7. 1

6.6

6.3

6.8

7.0

12.8

11. 8

10.7

9.9

9.6

10.0

ECONOMIC SECTOR:
~

other services

Prices according to 1962 values.
Source: Aleman 1970:4.

Figures in percents.

TABLE 3
EMPLOYMENT VOLUME GENERATED BY EACH ECONOMIC SECTOR
ECONOMIC SECTOR::

1962

%

1964

%

manufacturing industry

62. 1

(7)

71.9

(8)

71.3

(7)

74.6

(7)

sugar industry

32.6

(3)

40.3

(4)

40.8

(4)

42.0

(4)

construct ion

23.7

(3)

34.0

(4)

28.0

(3)

35.2

(3)

agri cul tu re and 1 ivestock

440.2 (52)

mining

1.4

Other services
unemployment

(-)

216. 1 (26)
..

66.5

(8)

464.0 ( 51)
1.5

(-)

249.5 (28)
40.6

(6)

1966 %

1968 %

474.4 (49) 484.0 (46)
1.6

(-)

260.0 (27)
89.4

(9)

2.0

(-)

279. 5 (27 )
120.6(12)

Figures in thousands of persons
Source: Aleman 1970:5; cf.Secretariado Tecnicc de la Presidencia 1970,
Tab 1es 28 and 30
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Characteristically of underdeveloped societies, agricultural conditions
In the Dominican Republic are poor.

Productivity levels are low, for instance,

in 1968, 46% of the national labor force in the agricultural sector accounted
for 23.3% of the gross national product, meanwhile 14% of the labor force in
Industrial tasks--construction, sugar and manufacturing industries--was responsible for 23. 1% of the GNP.

Predictions for 1974 referring to these two sectors

call for 53.8% of the national labor, accounting for 23% of the GNP while 16.6%
of the industrial national labor produces 20.8% of the GNP.

There will be a 7%

increase in agricultural labor while a slight decrease in productivity is expected.
Still another characteristic element of the Dominican agricultural sector is its low annual average income.

This situation is worsened by the decrease

and in some areas virtual disappearance of a subsistence economy.

In 1968, for

instance, the national average income per laboring person was that of RD$1, 134.3
(one peso=one US dollar), but agricultural laborers only received $497.5 (cf.
Secretariado Tecnico de la Presidencia 1968: table 28).
This low income earning power decreases the peasant's saving abilities,
puts him at the mercy of middlemen and money loaners, affects any technological
improvement and investment in their plots, as well as personal and communal
education and health facilities.

But, above all, it contributes to the shrink-

ing of the national industrial market because 60% of the national population
is rural according to preliminary 1970 census data, and do not provide a market
for domestic production.
This income inequality is not per se unjust or an impediment to socioeconomic development.

Differences in

operating unit's abilities and responsi-

bilities can explain and justify income differences in specific cases.

But in

the Dominican Republic, like in other Latin American countries, the income
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dfstribution is a problem growing out

of

the unequal access _of the rural pop-

sources of power, and their failure to understand the means of this
uJation t °
power. The explanation of their income handicap, as well as their socioeconomic
pas it ion in the national environment, 1 ies mainly in their lack of control over
1an d ,

technological know-how and financial resources amid a market system.

Those

who hold land, technology and financial capital, especially since few employment
opp0rtunities exist outside agriculture, control the keys to power and even to
existence.

In addition, they attempt to provide access to these for rural laborers.

Geographical Areas
The national territory can be sub-divided into four major agricultural
regions {see map).

They are: {i) the Cibao, occupying the north and central por-

tion of the Republic; {ii) the Southwest, embracing from Bani in the south to San
Juan de la Maguana and west to the Haitian border; (iii) Santo Domingo region in
the central south, including the National District, and from San Cristobal to the
border of San Pedro de Macoris; {iv) the East, containing from San Pedro de Macoris
and the eastern frontier of Samana to El Seibo and Higuey.
From the agricultural perspective, the Cibao is the most important region
of minifundist production.

This region has an approximate 70% of the tobacco

production, and also other agricultural products such as cocoa, coffee, rice
and bananas.

The Cibao region includes 52% of the 4,011,589 total Dominican

population, and 54% of the 2,407,652 national rural population, according to
preliminary data from the 1970 census.

78% of the Cibao population is rural and

only 22% urban, which differs significantly with the 40% national urban population.

Its territory is 19, 146 km 2 , or 39.5% of the national territory.

Cibao's Landholding System
According to the ownership or to the use status of the peasant running
the farm, it is possible for the Dominican landholding system

to
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b• dif

ferentiated into: (i) private owned land; (ii) rented land, including the

pOPu 1ar

sharecropping system (aparceria or colonato) in which rent is paid by

half or one third of the crop's sale benefits; (iii) of the State (del Estado)
either
land which although belonging to the State is being used by a private party

1nY

ut adequate legal right for this; (iv) occupied land, farms which are being
wft h<>
Jegally used by the occupants because of improvements (mejorias) made by them

on the farms; (v) parcelerias, land obtained through the land reform program
of the national government through the official Dominican Agrarian Institute;
(vf) and any other landholding form not included in the preceding classification.

The Cibao landholding system is one of private ownership and sharecropping.

The exact figures for sharecroppers are not available since they

are grouped with the more formal procedure of renting.

Nonetheless, especially,

the figures for minifundists and even for middle farms of 80 to 160 tareas (63.9%
of the rented farms in the 80 to 800 tareas category in Table 4) will probably
refer almost exclusively to sharecropping.

First, because peasants do not

usually have enough cash to pay the annual rent at the beginning of the cont~ct

as legally required, nor do they have enough financial resources to

guarantee a bank loan.

Second, because they do not 1 ike getting involved with

legal papers, signatures and lawyers; all these elements are required for the
signing of rent contracts.
TABLE 4
LANDHOLD I NG SYSTEM IN THE CI BAO·; 1971

%

TOTAL

PRIVATE

9,678
5,293
3,258
258

13,030(66.2)
2 ' 860 (54. 0)
2' 196 (67. 5)
206(79.8)

Source:

RENTED

%

4,816(24.4)
1,679(31.7)
813(25.9)
33(12.7)

LAND %
REFORM

STATE %
OWNED

OCCU ·%
PIED

180 (0. 9)

344(0.7)
108 ( 1. 0)
70(2.2)
3(1.2)

353(1.8)
38(0.7)
24(0.3)
3 ( 1. 2)

331(6.2)
27(0.6)
2(0.8)

0

data elaborated from Secretariado Tecnico de la Presidencia
1972. Number of censed farms 28,487.

OTHERS

955(5.2)
277(6.4)
128(3.5)
11(4.3)
I

I
:1

i
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The subsistence and economic value of a farm depends on a number of
Interrelated variables.
the c r

Among them are, the yielding capacity of the soil,

op's productivity, the stability of crop prices in the market, the tech-

nological refinement of the peasant's labor, and the size of the plot.

To

these economic variables a sociological factor could be added, the standard of
living of the community which will determine the
which the peasant is exposed.

11

cultural necessities 11 to

Thus a definition of what is a minifundio and

what is a latifundio has to integrate these variables in it in order to evade
arbitrariness.

Nevertheless, and for preliminary purposes, a distinction

between these two landholding systems, minifundios and latifundios, can be
obtained by emphasizing the size variable.
In this case, a minifundio will refer to a farm extending from 1 to 80
tareas of land; on the other hand, a latifundio refers to any farm having more
than 800 tareas.

(One acre=0.4047 hectares=6.44 tareas.

15.901703 tareas.

2
One tarea=628.8634 m .)

One hectare of land=

Accepting these definitions, the

Cibao region is predominantly divided into two structural organizations (see
table 5): 84% of its farms are minifundist holdings occupying only 26.6% of
Its territory, while 1.5% of its farms are latifundios in control of over 34.6%
of the region.

Of the minifundios, 62.6% of them are conucos (from I to 32 ta-

reas) in which a mere subsistence level is sustained through their agricultural
operations.
TABLE 5
FARM EXTENSION IN THE CIBAO REGION, 1971
FARM AREA:
( tareas)

l-32
32-80

Bo-aoo
Boo and

%FARMS
62.6
21.4
14. 5

more
Source:

%TAREAS

11. 8
14.8
38.6
34.6
I. 5
data elaborated from Secretariado Tecnico de la Presidencia,
1972. The number of censed farms was 28,980 with a total
area surface of 164, 0569 tareas.
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Hinffundist Plots
The landholding system of the Cibao region has traditionally been one of
minifundios.

These conucos and parcelas (32 to 80 tareas) were freely used accord-

ing to the producer's needs during colonial times and the politically unstable
years of the nineteenth century; when the plots were not privately divided, a
shifting agriculture took place in the region amid little demographic pressure
and available terrain.

Even with present day latifundios there is not a region

wide plantation system in the Cibao, and probably never was even during colonial
times.

Instead, minifundist households or family agricultural enterprises pre-

dominate in the area with their cash crop production.

The decisions of the

household have the main, although not exclusive, objective of satisfying consumption wants of the unit and not, as in a business enterprise, of capital
investment and maximization of profits.
Minifundist peasants normally work their own conucos and parcelas with
the assistance of non-remunerated family members and perhaps of some neighboring day laborers {echa dias or peones), {cf. Table 8).

Household and market

crops divide their plots; and according to table 8, 74.8% of them make their
living out of their plots, and only 13% have to complement the revenues from
their plots with wage labor in a nearby farm or as sharecroppers.

Irrigation

facilities are scarce and intensive technological agriculture is almost nonexistent among them (Table 6).

Additional income is obtained in some cases

working in neighboring farms as wage laborers at crop's time or by taking a
conuco under an aparceria arrangement.

Although middle and large landholding

farms depend on wage labor--45. 1% and 77.0% (cf. Table

7)--they accounted

only for approximately 34% of the agrarian labor force in 1960.
There are not available statistics on the number of landless agricultural workers who have to earn their living day laboring.

Nonetheless, their

number is presumed to be high and their presence puts further strains in the
overcrowded agrarian labor market

tcf.

Table 7), and upon family ties.

In
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terms of income, landless wage workers as a group tend to be worse off than
ucing peasants on minifundios, although there are different types of day
pro d
laborers and different terms of employment; mainly because of greater insecurity of employment and lack of homegrown subsistence foods.

Besides minifundist

peasants can always complement their income by working as wage laborers.
TABLE 6
TECHNICAL FORCE USED IN THE CIBAO REGION, 1971
ARM AREA
(tareas)

# FARMS

1-32
2-80
0-800
00 and more

18,481
4, 705
2,816
198

ANIMAL

MECHANIC
FARMS

%

# FARMS

%

7 ' 812
2,447
1,344
59

(42 . 3)
(52.0)
(47.9)
(29.8)

961 (5. 1)
524 ( 11. 1)
372 (13.2)
48 (24.3)

BOTH

# FARMS %

529 (4. 0)
336 (7.2)
382 (13.5)
60 (30. 3)

NONE
FARMS

9, 179
1,398
718
31

%

(49.6)
(29.7)
(25.4)
(15.6)

rom Secretar1ado Tecnico de la Presidencia
censed farms 26,200.

ource:

TABLE 7
AGRARIAN LABOR FORCE ACCORDING TO PLACE OF WORK IN THE CIBAO, 1971
TOTAL

ARM AREA
(tareas)

FAM ILY MEMBERS
ONLY
FARMS

0

1-32
2-80
0-800
00 and more

18,481
5,290
2,916
198

Source:

13,217
2,654
939
18

71. 5
50. 1
32.2
9.9

FAMILY ME MBERS
ABOVE ALL
FARMS
%

3,754
1,081
663
26

20.3
20.4
22.7
13. 1

WAGE LABOR

# FARMS

%

1,510 8.2
1, 555 29.5
1'314 45. 1
154 n .o

data elaborated from Secretariado Tecnico de la Presidencia
1972. Information was available for 26,885 farms.
TABLE 8

MEANS OF ECONOMIC DEPENDENCE OF PEASANTS IN THE CIBAO, 1971
FARM AREA
(tareas)

TOTAL

1-32
18,481
2-80
1, 790
0-800
2,916
00 and more
198
Source:

HIS OWN
FARM

%

13,832
1,219
2,428
129

(74.8)
(68. 1)
(83.3)
(64.7)

NON-AGRICULTURAL ACTIVITY %

1, 660 (8.9)
209 ( 11 . 1)
80 (3. 0)
6 (3. 0)

AGRARIAN
NOT
WAGE LABOR % WORKING %

2,369 (13.0)
245 (13.6)
266 (8.9)
44 (22.6)

620
117
142
19

data elaborated from Secretariado Tecnico de la Pres1denc1a
1972. Information available for 23,385 f arms.

(3. 3)
(7.2)
(4. 8)
(9. 7)

I
I
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•fundist and Agrarian Entrepreneurs
Lat1
Privately owned minifundios have to compete for land, crop's market
prices,

financial and technological assistance, with a traditional land elite

and a newly arising agrarian entrepreneur.

Structurally more significant, the

latifundios are characteristically ill managed and their productivity levels are
relatively lower than that of the minifundios (cf. Tables 17 and 19).

The tra-

ditional landed elite is not able to improve their agricultural establishment
not only because of cultural values and lack of technical abilities, but also
because of their ill run operations which provide them with a respectable standard of living.

Normally they command the political and economic power available

in the peasant's environment; but, interestingly enough, they do not have liquid
assets to invest.
Este relative estancamiento de la produccion esta directamente ligado
a la concentracion de la propiedad agric0la. El grupo de grandes
propietarios que tienen el control de una gran proporcion de la tierra,
deja sin explotar una parte muy importante de sus propiedades. Las
rentas de la tierra que este grupo obtiene son tan grandes, que la
ef iciencia en su uso es un factor mas que secundario, especialmente
si se considera que no existe siquiera un impueston proporcional al
valor de la tierra. (Secretariado Tecnico de la Presidencia 1968:20;
cf. Aleman 1970:15-16).
The only alternative to this large landholding social organization-system
comes from

small but progressive and newly arising agricultural entrepreneurs

producing for a market in order to maximize profits.
exception than the rule.

They are still more the

Although statistical data on them is non-existent

they seem to be operating efficient farms not for a household economy or the maintenance of a traditional way of life, but for economic motives of money profit.
Frequently entrepreneurs' farms range from 300 to 800 tareas; but this
·figure is a private field estimate.

They provide labor opportunities to wage

Workers and run colonatos (sharecropping arrangements) within their farms
Without the characteristic patron-client relations observable between traditional
Peasants and landed elites and their respective sharecroppers.
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By modern standards the Cibao producers on minifundist plots utilize
and at low levels of management and production. But they are forced to
their l
do 50 by circumstances. They do not have easy access to better irrigated fields
and Jess eroded lands; nor to credit, machinery, improved seeds and fertilizers.

sesi des, they are excluded from the markets of these inputs through the lack of
adequate sources and means of power which reside in the hands of the landed
elite and other operating units.

On the other hand, the big farm enterprises

of the Cibao are generally poorly managed to such a degree that, within the
limits of their labor and capital resources, smaller agricultural units are
quite efficient in the exploitation of their land resources (cf. Aleman 1968:
211; 1970:15).

If this be the case, it can be concluded of the Cibao region, that production per tarea on large properties is generally inferior to that of smaller
plots; whereas the value of production per worker is, on the average, less than
on smaller farms.

Higher average productivity of land on the smaller enterprises

Is the result of more intensive land use.

This intensity of land exploitation

outweighs all disadvantages in terms of poorer soils and lack of capital and
technological resources by minifundist peasants; but nevertheless, it is not
able to solve the crucial point:

ati agrarian population incapable of controlling

its energy resources because of a

11

forceful 11 latifundist landholding system.

Historical Perspective
The early beginnings of tobacco culture by white settlers in colonial
America took place in the following areas on the dates indicated:

Santo Domingo

1531, Cuba 1580, Brazil 1600, Virginia, U.S.A. 1612, and Maryland, U.S.A. 1631.

The tobacco grown soon furnished one of the chief products in demand in Europe
as a commodity of exchange for the manufactured articles required by the colonists.

50
.

The

Tobacco Boom:

1780-1880

The roots of the tobacco boom during the XIX century in the Dominican
·

Repu

blic are associated with an October 12, 1763 Ordenanza which created a tobacco

facto ry

in the colony.

This factory should

11

promover y acaparar la cuota de tabaco

que se as1'gno a Santo Domingo, tabaco del Cibao, y sobre todo en la jurisdiccion
de Santiago yen todas las demas que puedan producir abundantes cosechas de buenos
tabacos para el mayor adelantamiento de la construccion de cigarros que se deben
labrar en las Real es Fabricas de Sev il la 11 (cited in Sanchez Valverde 1971 :66).
Coming out from the shadow of the tobacco from Cuba, Dominican tobacco
started successfully to compete with the former in Spain because of its quality.
Yield figures from those years indicate an increasing trend in production which
did not recede until the ending of the next century.

For instance, in 1773

the production was of 3,131 qq. (quintals of 50 kilos) and the next year it
increased to 6000 qq.

Immediately agricultural activity augmented by the con-

struction of roads to markets and ports; the best known construction of the time
was the preparation of the Camu and Yuna rivers for tobacco transportation from
the Cibao region to the Santo Domingo port in the south.

Economic activity

Increased, above all, in the city of Santiago and its rural communities (parajes)
of Gurabo, Egido, Buenavista, Licey, Moca, Limonal, Jacagua, Guazuma;.l, Quinigua,
and others (cf. Sanchez Valverde 1971:48 and 67).

Before the end of the century

tobacco production had spread from Santiago to La Vega and Cotui.
If production figures can be ·used to indicate a social organization and
the structural arrangements of a population, then a tobacco sub-culture can be
inferred from the following.

In 1800, Pedron reported that in Santiago and

la Vega there were not great tobacco plantations accounting for the high output
Of his commodity; nevertheless, the production increased and ranged from 12,000
to 14,ooo pesos because of the high number of small producers (1955:171).

During

the years of 1800 to 1845, the colony experienced some of its most turbulent
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economic, social and ideological years.
twentY
~na

Two Haitian invasions and

two years of Boyer's occupation, one French government,· the period of
la Boba, and the wars of independence against Haitian occupation.

However,

In 1821 Morillos wrote that although
la agricultura habia decaido por las guerras y la emigracion. El
escaso comercio se reducia al tabaco que se exportaba a traves de
puerto Plata; unos pocos cueros, caobas, mieles y aguardientes.
No habia nada de cafe, cacao,ni de algodon, ni del anil que se cultivaba en las pasadas estancias. La industria en esa epoca era nula
(cited in del Montey Tejada 1890:275).
And, furthermore, by 1845 the tobacco harvest increased to 30,000 qq. with a
corresponding revenue of 46,000 pesos fuertes (foreign exchange currency) (cf.
El oominicano newspaper, March 28, 1846; #14, p.54).
This increase in production for which a large number of small producers
was responsible occurred at a time in which agricultural production of the colony
was near a stand still.

Only the tobacco export, the cutting of mahogahy, and

some selling of livestock to Haiti provided some revenue to Santo Domingo (cf.
Pedron 1955:172; Lyonnet 1955:127 and 136).

Furthermore, as Morillos indicated

in his preceding cite, the tobacco production increased amid those same conditions which had eliminated production of other crops like coffee, cotton and
cocoa in traditional Dominican agricultural estates (estancias).

As a matter

of fact, analogous although more radical political and social conditions-independence from France, and freedom of the slaves--in Haiti destroyed in those
same years its colonial agricultural organization and the output of the former
colony.
The tobacco production boom did not only survive the unstable first half

Of the XIX century but it continued its expansion after a relative decrease in
output in 1844, through the tumultuous years of the First Republic, the succession
of the nation to Spain, the War of Restoration in 1864, and the struggle for power between Santana and Baez and their followers up to the time of Luperon and

!

I
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Antonio Lluberes (personal communication) estimated the tobacco
expor t

ed from the Dominican Republic in 1856 by the ports of Santo Domingo and

puerto Plata to be 2,034, 118 pounds.

Meanwhile, in 1860 the export production

ranged from 60,000 to 80,000 qq. with an approximate value of 650,000 to 700,000
pesos fuertes (cf. Alvarez 1955:97).

And for 1888, Hoetnik cited the tobacco

harvest in 175,636 qq. (cf. 1971: 117).
Thereby, the commerce resulting from the tobacco export plus the selling
of mahogany and some livestock still constituted the main source of revenue of
the newly born Republic after 1854.

As stated by a newspaper of the Republican

period:
Todo el que esta al corriente de la historia patria, no pondra en duda
esta verdad; la Republica ha visto siempre satisfechas sus mas urgentes
necesidades con los rendimientos de los derechos aduaneros, y estos han
sido producidos en mayor cantidad con la exportacion del tabaco, y esa
industria ha permitido que se han hecho para cubrir las cosechas enormes
importaciones, ya de mercancias, a todas las demas industrias que en
pequena escala se han mantenido en el pais (cited in Bono--1881--1964:
195; cf. Bono 1964:199; Pedron--1800--1955:172-173).
The expansion of the tobacco industry was associated and dependent upon
international demand of the Cibao leaves since production was neither consumed
nor processed in the colony.

During the eighteenth century, the Dominican tobacco

was mainly exported to Seville, Spain.

Regardless of colonial export controls,

producers from the vicinity of Santiago did customarily sell clandestinely their
crop in the form of andullos to the French in Haiti to be processed as rape in
their factories (cf.Sanchez Valverde 1971:63-68, 185-186).

The historical

record is not clear on when this Spaniard colonial monopoly was 1 iberalized;
some signs in this direction appear in a 1778 Ordenanza by which

11

se permitio

que, cumplidas las cargas de surtir las reales fabricas, pudiesen vender los
cosecheros los tobacos sobrantes en la colonia francesa (Haiti), pero aquellos
'que por su baja ca1idad no son de recibo en las reales fabricas', tomando por
Pago so 1amente di nero o negros 11 (Rodriguez Demorizi in Sanchez Va 1verde 1971 : 66) .

53
It se

1805

ems safe to maintain, however, that with the Haitian invasions of 1801 and

, plus the French government of General Ferrand in Santo Domingo, export

res tr

ictions of the Spanish government were lifted up and hardly re-established

under the decadent period of Espana la Boba.

In any case, when Boyer invaded

5antO Domingo in 1822, tobacco was already exported to Martinica, Ave de Gracia,
saint Thomas and Curazao; all French, Dutch and Danish Caribbean colonies (cf.
Hoya 1972:52).

Later on in 1860, Alvarez noted that Dominican tobacco was

exported to Puerto Rico, Saint Thomas and Curazao; in addition to these Caribbean
customers, merchants from Hamburg and Bremen in Germany bought the Dominican
leaf to manufacture cigars which they then sold as habanos (Cugan cigars of
high quality) but with lower prices ( --1860-- 1955:97).
The preceding export figures and commercial transactions are meaningless
unless we realize that the tobacco boom was taking place in the midst of an
economic vacuum, and most probably with little official guidance.

Emigration,

colonial political instability, and Boyer's occupation of the former Spanish
colony

and his abolition of slavery--all these circumstances reinforced an

almost implicit ideal in the colony:

a sedentary 1 ife characterized by the

absence of any strenuous labor or socio-economic enterprise and based on a subsistence economy plus a cultural valorization of social autonomy •
... yen una palabra, infinidad de menudencias que, aunque parezcan
despreciables, forman el fundamento de la verdadera fel icidad y
prosperidad de los pueblos, la cual no consiste en producir mucho
azucar y cafe a fuerza del sudor de millones de esclavos, sino en
tener asequrada la subsistencia con su propio trabajo y vivir y
buena policia civil y religiosa (Heredia y Mieses --1812-- 1955:
168; cf. Moya 1972:62, 88-89; Bonnet 1955: 276-277).
Whether or not this idyllic and non-industrious idealization of life
became a social reality, cannot be proven from the historical record.

Never-

theless, it seems that the striking experience of the Haitian domination (1822-

!844), following a colonial period characterized by apathy and lack of concern
towards the cultural organization of Santo Domingo from the part of its Spanish

·
inetropol is,
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disarticulated the incipient Dominican technoeconomic organization,

•t socio-economic initiative, and the Dominican self-confidence to protiarmfng ' s
nd develop an independent society. Within this politica~ economic and
ject a
• 1 environment the Republican projects of some elite trinitarios could not
5 oc1a
and did not find an echo in calm Republican periods among the rural and urban
sectors of the nation.
Describing the ruraJ and urban dwellers in the Dominican Republic after the
Haitian occupation of Boyer which ended in 1844, Guridi characterizes them as
lacking any interest and hope for the future; they seemed to be possessed of a
deterministic approach to cultural 1 ife.

''En una cosa es muy poco alterada la

mancomunidad que existe entre unos y otros campesinos y gentes de los pueblos,
asi como entre la mayoria de los que habitan en las ciudades:

a saber, en que

carecen de toda clase de aspiraciones; nose apuran por el manana 11 (--1864:
1955:411; cf. Soulastre --1809-- 1955:61).
According to reports from the period on the nature of the Repub1ic 1 s
social organization it should be concluded that there was not an agricultural
technoeconomy functioning in the nation.

Only the tobacco harvest had structural

significance in the eastern side of the Island.

Most probably, the informal

social arrangements at the tobacco plots in respect to labor, which was family
obtained and free, and in relation to commercial transactions, fundamentally
organized outside of the political structure, permitted the functioning and
expansion of the tobacco industry.

For instance, in 1860 Campomanes reported to

the Spanish government in Cuba:
La agricultura puede decirse que no existe, pues a excepcion de unos
sesenta mil quintales de tabaco que se recolecta en las provincias de
Santiago y Concepcion y una corta cantidad de cafe de superior cal idad en las del sur, que se exporta para el extranjero, no se cultiva
ningun otro producto a pesar de la facil idad que se obtendrian todos
con la mayor abundancia: no hago mencion del azucar porque escasamente
se fabrica el necesario para el consumo de la Isla pero si la merecen
los cueros al pelo y una cantidad considerable de cera que se exporta
para Europa (--1860-- 1955:106-107).
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Amid this cultural environment it should not be of surprise that the
center

of power in the newly born Republic was transferred from the eastern

cattle ranches and the political centers of the capital in the southern city of
Santo Domingo, to the tobacco Cibao region.

Ther~

local merchants and exporters

of tobacco not only integrated a new oligarchic center, but also were able to
heavily finance the War of Restoration against Spain from 1863-1865.

At the

same time, and most important, a popular movement articulated by small independent Cibao peasants took arms against Spain in the name of the nation; the cultural identity of an independent country previously expressed by the Trinitarios
was now materialized and fought for by countryside peasants and urban dwellers
of no special intellecutal preparation or in control of huge economic interests.
As ex-president Bosch has well understood:
Esa sociedad (intedgrated by tobacco producers, merchants and exporters)
iba a impulsar el desarrollo de la riqueza cibaena y la formacion de
una pequena burguesia comercial que llegaria rapidamente al mivel alto
de la pequena burguesia e iba a convertir al Cibao, por mucho tiempo,
en la region dominante del pais en el campo economico, en el social y
en el politico. Santiago fue la cabeza y el alma de la guerra Restauracion porque casi un siglo antes habia comenzado a organizarse en sus
campos la sociedad de los cosecheros de tabaco, y Puerto Plata se
fortalecio de tal manera con la exportacion del tabaco que el centro
de su aduana era de importancia vital para sostener un gobierno en el
poder (1970:168; cf. Garcia 1969, vol. I I 1:395-500).
Social and Structural Environment
The tobacco industry in thenneteenth century.became identified with the
Cibao region, just as the latifundist 1 s cattle ranches (hatos) to the East.
political, economical and social importance was widely recognized.

Its

Contemporary

Political writers speak of the Cibao 1 s "society of tobacco growers" (Bosch 1970:
159-171), and of its affluent middle class in opposition to other region's rural
Proletariats (Jimenez Grullon 1965:146-147).
How was it possible that amid political and economic turmoil in the
nineteenth century, the tobacco industry developed to such magnitudes as to
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t a sub-culture in itself in the Cibao?
c;onstitu e

No simple answer exists.

But

ly some of the industry's adaptive features contributed to this development.
·proba b
of these features are: the informal family labor organization sustaining

some

the tobacco harvest in contrast to complex plantation organizations; the favorable
profits obtained without great extensions of land by the growers; the private nongovernmental initiative it originated; furthermore, the structure it developed to
permit the flow of capital and tobacco from growers to international purchasing
merchants, and viceversa.
The tobacco harvest in the Cibao gave rise to a special type of agricultural life and to a special kind of national peasantry.

The tobacco society, in

sharp contrast to the prevalent social organization of the hatos (cattle ranches)
fn the East, did not employ great extension of land.
harvest is labor demanding and time consuming,

In addition, the tobacco

a~d augmen~ed

the personal rela-

tions of the grower and his economic networks while suppressing the idle life
of the hatos with social and economic initiative and risk taking.
hand, in the tobacco's regions
sugar plantations.

the~

On the other

is no great human agglomeration like in the

Besides, tobacco harvest does not require machinery, mills

nor elaborate physical and chemical equipment; not even railway transport systerns.

In other words, at least in comparison with other cash-crops 1 ike sugar,

tobacco was not a capitalistic venture dependent on great territorial and industrial scope and the size of its long term investments.
On the contrary, the cultivation of tobacco demands a yearly cycle of
steady work by persons who are skilled and specialized in this activity.

Tobacco

plots being small and family labored, time consuming, and able to guarantee the
economic needs of the family, probably developed a strong eco-system integrating
land-family labor-cash crop.

Only in this way the devotion and initiative of

the tobacco grower to his field and his crop, his constant concern with weather

I

1

and climatic conditions, the acceptance of the painstaking manual care the plant

I
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·res and the legendary responsibility and initiative of the Cibao peasant,
re<tU I
'
be explained. As Ortiz writes refering to the Cuban tobacco growers (1947:65),
can
rsonal element always predominated in tobacco growing; there is a patriarthe Pe
cha 1, •1 ntimate quality about its free work.
This seems to have been possible because the tobacco harvest in the
Cibao region developed two important characteristics.

First an early appearance

of small but privately owned plots of land to harvest; the only exception to
these conucos was the presence of sharecropping land which can be traced back
to the end of the XVIII century (cf. Lyonnet --1800-- 1955:131), and signals
the existence of big landholders also in this region of the colony.

Bono points

out that, in sharp contrast to the rest of the Republic where common lands
(terrenos comuneros and ejidos) and great private estates prevailed, and where
shifting agriculture was practiced from one plot to the other season after season,

in the Cibao

the landholdings are divided (deslindados) and privately

exploited thereby promoting private ownership and agricultural activity:
Podemos muy bien decir que la propiedad, salvo la deslindada del Cibao, no tiene leyes en la Republica, porque casi todos los terrenos
son comuneros, y esta es una de las faltas mas trascendentales en
legislacion. Mientras el propietario este convencido de que su propiedad no es sagrada, en tanto que nose le garantice lo suyo contra
usurpaciones, no habra agricultura, no puede contar ni aun con lo
suyo y por consiguiente no cobra amoral trabajo (Bono --1857-- 1964:
82; see Hoetnik 1971 :13-14, 17, 40).
Furthermore, Alcibiades Alburquerque emphasizes the process by which the Cibao
lands became divided among small producers:
El relative incremento agricola en algunas regiones del Cibao durante
los pasados anos (after the XVI I I century) y la densidad de su poblacion crearon la necesidad de que cada familia campesina buscase espacio
vital para cubrir sus propias necesidades. De esta manera se real izo
una natural y espontanea reparticion de las tierras, y se fundaron las
pequenas heredades y afincaron en ellas su bienestar. Esa adquisicion
de los derechos sobre la tierra, como resultado de ese desarrollo agricola, se efectuo sin graves interferencias, ni violentos desalojos. Centenares de familias pobladores de esas regiones, 1 imitadas en su pequena
heredad siguen viviendo de generacion en generacion del cultivo en sus
limitadas areas de terrenos asi adquiridas ... (1961 :30; see pp. 12-32,
and especially p. 31).
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t he

landholding system in the Cibao contrasted to that of the rest of the
In the latter, even with the low price of land (six francos per fan-

a--one fanega corresponds to 1293.84 square meters) at the beginning of the

.e g

XIX century, because of rural poverty, great extensions of land were in the
~n

ds of a few landowners forcing the rest of the agricultural population to

either sharecrop or work for an agricultural wage (peones); in either case,
rural dwellers went without a private plot of land (cf. Pedron 1955:171; Lyonnet
1955:131, 135, 194-195).

According to the Dominican historian Moya in his recent

book (1972:111-115, 163) not even Boyer's agrarian reform in the occupied Santo
Domingo W'as· able to break down the traditional control of big landowners over
the land in the eastern and southern provinces.

As a matter of fact, the Haitian

occupation was not even able to instaurate a landholding system of private lands
in the former Spanish colony where tierras comuneras and ejido lands had been
the customary practice; proper exception of the Cibao region where small tobacco
producers operated (cf. Moya 1972: 46, 57-58, 87-89).

Not until the introduction

of the sugar industry with its capitalist investments did the land acquire such
high prices as to transform the traditional use of the tierras comuneras and
cattle ranch land into a system of private landholdings in the eastern and
southern provinces of the Republic .(cf.

Hoetnik 1971: 29-30, 40).

The tobacco plots under harvest had little labor land resources; nevertheless, the tobacco profits of these small family plots were able to provide
for the economic needs of minifundist producers.

In fact, the mere presence of

tobacco in the plots was sufficient guarantee for financial assistance by local
merchants and a secure source of economic improvement in the agrarian environment (cf. Bono 1963:193-194, 363).

Randolph Kein (--1868-- 1968:29) estimated

an average plot of tobacco in the Cibao around six acres of land (38.64 tareas).
And back in 1800, Pedron reported that the high production of tobacco grew out
of a high number of small producers in contrast to coffee plantations in Haiti.
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These self-sufficient and resourceful growers, working amid a mixed
market
8

and subsistence economy, were most probably the first representatives of

national peasantry:

they had their own plots, worked for a market, and their

purposes were not prof it maximization but the sustenance of a household organfzation.

In other words, the tobacco peasants did not view their position

merely from an economic point of view, as if they were running a business enterprise for maximum profit with all inputs and outputs valued at market prices.
Rather, the tobacco peasant saw himself as, and in fact was and still is, part
of a familial household.

This household affords him additional labor services

which have no real market price.

On the other hand, he must try to provide a

subsistence from his plot for his household at all costs; he could not discharge
fts labor even if its retention might become noneconomic.
The second characteristic of the tobacco region was its free labor.
Although there were African slaves in the zone (cf. note #247, in Sanchez
Valverde 1971:186), nonetheless tobacco harvest did not require slave labor
like the sugar industry did or even Haitian coffee plantations.
Sin embargo, en las dos provincias de La Vega y Santiago, o sea en el
Cibao, siempre se continua cultivando el tabaco en tales terminos que
nunca bajo de ciencuenta mil quintales la exportacion de este articulo,
el cual constituye el primer ramo de su movimiento comercial, yes
causa de la riqueza comparativa de aquel hermoso departamento. Pero
eso se debe a que alli nunca hubo tantos esclavos como en el sur de la
antigua colonia: el trabajo libre producia las ventajas que le son
inherentes; y, por lo tanto, cuando Boyer abol io la esclavitud, ya
los hombres de la raza africana, los cuales no eran.muchos, habian
adquirido los habitos y el estimulo de quienes saben que trabajan para
su provecho (Guridi --1864-- 1955:410).
Furthermore, even the socio-economic dependence of sharecroppers from big landholders was not comparable to that of slaves and wage laborers in cattle ranches
and sugar estates.

Their semi-independent status granted them more freedom

Of operation than to the latter.

Tobacco sharecroppers had the opportunity to

discuss the price of their tobacco and their rents, to intervene in tobacco
transactions.

Besides they were in full charge of production activities and
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administere

d their own households independently from their landlords.

As a

of fact, they seem to have even been able to save from their reduced
matte r
•ts and could obtain production credits from their landlords. In overpro f ' ,
all their status approximated that of small independent tobacco producers more
e one of slaves and peones in other estates.
than th
Most interesting in the cultural perspective, the tobacco production

boom probably took place beyond official guidelines and advancement.

True that

the tobacco industry was regulated and at certain moments even controlled by
colonial and national governments; confer, Actas de Sesiones General del
Gobierno Restaurador: March 30, 1844, and July 7, 1857; Boletin Archive General de la Nacion #8, p. 420 and #9, p. 76; Aristy 1957vol.1:410; Bosch 1970:
205; Coleccion de Leyes 1864:290 and 338; 1890:448.
reproaches of official inefficiency seem

Nonetheless, the frequent

to indicate that the unstable govern-

ments of those years probably took advantage of the revenues of an industry which
they had not promoted, but because of the socio-cultural variables previously
alluded to, flourished; cf. Lyonnet 1955:126; Bono 1964:195-196, 198, 268-269.
One of the most significant, and at the same time revealing, interventions
of the national government with the operations of tobacco merchants, exporters,
and producers, took place in the 1856-1857 tobacco season.

When Baez took over

the government in 1856 the national currency in the form of paper money was
almost non-existent.

Under these circumstances the value of the peso fuerte

(the international exchange currency) decreased considerably forcing exporters
to introduce great amounts of gold and silver currency in the country on account
of the coming tobacco harvest.

As a consequence, the national currency--the

Dominican peso--became almost in disuse, especially in the Cibao.
Cuando el presidente Baez ingreso al poder en 1856 circulaba el peso
fuerte en la Republ ica a razon de 68 3/4 unidades, o Jo que es Jo
mismo, valia la onza de oro $1. 100 nacionales; pero como no habia
mucha abundancia de papel monenda, el oro acunado bajo de tal manera
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vlsperas de la cosecha de tabaco, que las transacciones llegaron
encelebrarse a cincuenta por uno. Como era consiguiente, los expor~adores del Cibao comenzaron a introducir plata y oro en tan grandes
cantidades, que el comercio en general optaba por el pago de sus
derechos en esas especies de preferencia a la moneda nacional (Garcia
1968'

VO 1 •

I I I : 226) .

At this time the Baez government supposedly in order to protect the
national currency and the transactions of the peasants, ordered a monopoly of
the tobacco export, and asked the Senate authorization to put into circulation
six million nominal Dominican pesos in paper money.

Of this amount two million

pesos would be employed to substitute former deteriorated paper money under use,
and four million only during the tobacco season to alleviate the strenuous situation of the scarce national currency during the tobacco season and its consequent transactions.

After the season the four million nominal pesos would be

reca 11 ed.
(Baez) dispone la creacion de un proyecto para la monopolizacion del
negocio del tabaco, el cual incluia un abierto despojo de comerciantes
y agricultores. Es por esto, que el mismo tiene como fin aumentar la
cantidad de moneda nacional circulante por el tiempo de la cosecha de
tabaco unicamente, para lo cual solicito del Senado autorizacion para
la emision de seis millones de pesos de los cuales teoricamente dos
millones se destinarian a sustituir el papel moneda deteriorado y
cuatro millones se pondrian en circulacion para rescatarlo tan pronto
desapareciera la necesidad de moneda fraccionaria creada por el aumento
de las operaciones de compra y venta de tabaco (Marrero Aristi 1957,
vol. I :410).
Actually, Jose Gabriel Garcia (1968 vol. 111:226-227) indicates that the
control of the tobacco business was only a political stratagem of the Baez government against tobacco merchants whom the president thought dissatisfied with
his political power.

In addition, it was a strategy to transfer the profits of

this lucrative enterprise to his own followers.
money became an ill monetary pol icy.

The emission of nominal paper

To the already gold and silver currency

introduced by tobacco exporters in view of the shortage of national currency, the
90vernment put into circulation in May, 1857 not four but eighteen million
b'l
-L.letes
(paper money).

The devaluatio.n of the national currency followed from

this over-surplus of nonsupported currency--from an estimated 60 to 70 Dominican
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er peso fuerte; in other words, an ounce of gold was paid at $1.43 national
pesos P
The value of exported tobacco descended in terms of international curren. pesos.
cy (pesos fuertes), and merchants and producers found themselves virtually ruined

amid payments in national currency and low prices.

Meanwhile, President Baez and

his followers, including the Spanish, French and British consuls, received the
gold and silver currency introduced by the exporters earlier {cf. Marrero Aristy
1957:

VO

1. I : 411) •

••. ampliada y extendida discrecionalmente por el senado consultor,
en 2 de mayo de 1857 la facultad de emitir papel moneda acordada
antes al gobierno, este en vez de cuatro hizo confeccionar diez
y ocho millones de billetes, que repartidos para su venta entre
diferentes comisiones encargadas de ofrecerlos al publ ico al precio
fijo de 1. 100 unidades por una onza, acabaron de precipitar la
bancarrota, pues que se vieron inundados del funestro agente todos
los mercados, con grave perjuicio del gremio agricultor, que era
al que se fingia proteger al impedir el estanco periodico con que
traficaban los agiotistas, porque habiendo principiado a vender
por papel su cosecha de tabaco, cuando el cambio estaba a cincuenta
por uno, vino a deshacerse de ese papel cuando ya circulaba a mas
de 68 3/4, esperimentando la perdida consiguiente a la fluctuacion
del ruinoso agiotage, que por otra parte fue productivo a los
partidiarios del gobierno, beneficiados en el reparto que se hizo
y que la opinion publ ica califico de bautismo (Garcia 1968,vol. I I I:
227).

It was not until 1859, that the tobacco production was partially reestablished in the Santiago and La Vega provinces, with a harvest of 60,000 qq. which
accounted, in additon to some coffee, for the national export of that year.

Mean-

while, Baez had enriched himself while paralyzing the tobacco production in the
Cibao, and occasioning the popular revolt of 1857 as a reaction of his tobacco
and monetary policies which resulted in the short lived Moca constitution of 1858.
Because of the export nature of the tobacco commodity, the development
of its industry is heavily dependent upon international markets.

Without good

field prices, financial subsidies to exporters coming from international merchants,
and the demands of manufacturer buyers, the tobacco boom would have been stopped.
Thus the tobacco production was virtually contingent upon the international
lllarket; especially since the tobacco national market was small, and rural
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b•tants constituting the greater percentage of the population c~uld very
tnha '
oduce their own andullo tobacco without need of a national tobacco industry.
well Pr
This contingency of the tobacco commodity upon international customers is best
eXPressed in the common remark of Cibao peasants: ei taibaco noi se come (tobacco
can't be eaten).
After the official lifting of the tobacco monopoly in 1864 (Coleccion de
Ley es 1864:290), Lluberes (personal communication) estimates that 15 export houses
--only two of them run by Spaniards, the rest by Germans, Dutch, Danes and Englishmen--started operating in Puerta Plata.

That market conditions had improved in

relation to the conditions existing during the Baez government and even during
the re-colonization of the Republic after Santana ceded it in 1861 to the Spanish
government, can be inferred not cnly by the increase in production and the number
of operating export companies in the Republic, but also from the high export
taxes with which the tobacco was being levied.

According to a July 1847 export

Jaw, tobacco leaves paid 50.00 pesos fuertes per quintal, while mahogany only
paid 5.00 pesos fuertes per thousand feet.

In 1853 and then in 1858, the 1847

law was revised, but while other commodity's taxes were augmented, tobacco was
not surpassed by any (cf. Coleccion de Leyes 1847:#1:424; 1853:#2:490).
The social organization between the peasant producers and the export
houses in the second half of the XIX century had two main characteristics: (i)
It is strikingly similar in its structure to the present one existing between
producers and buyers of criollo tobacco; and (ii) it was composed of multiple
networks of operating units.

In 1895, Bono noted that this social organization

Included members of al 1 social classes in the Cibao because the tobacco "va
del agricultor al corredor, del corredor al pequeno comerciante, de este al
~portador, de este al comisionista, qui en lo vende al fabricante 11 (1964:380).

The capital to finance and purchase the tobacco harvest was guaranteed
by international merchants from Germany, Holland, England and the Danish free

of Saint Thomas.
f uroP

They bought the tobacco to supply requirements from

ean manufacturers and in-between their purchasing and selling operations

produce a commission profit of their own.

As a matter of fact, the historical

record is not sufficiently clear on whether or not some of these merchants
{£2!!!erciantes or comisionistas)were at the same time tobacco manufacturers
(!!!.nufactureros or fabricantes); available evidence seems to support that they
were not with the sole exception of some German merchants who are reported to
elaborate (elaboraban) their own purchased tobacco (cf. Alvarez 1955:97).

The

export houses operating in the Dominican Republic were either dependent representatives or semi-independent associates of the European merchants; the latter
were in control both of the capital to purchase and pack the tobacco through
their local export organizations, and of the international manufacturers market.
Most of the local export houses were staffed and run by foreigners and
~dwell

established political and economical influence in national politics

(cf. Hoetnik 1971:121).

Once the capital was transferred by the international

merchant houses to their organizations in the Dominican Republic, or at least
was secured, the operations of the export merchants started.

They had local

merchants, most of them living in the cities, who moved to the countryside near
the tobacco peasants.

These local merchants by themselves, or usually with the

help of middlemen (corredores) and small local business establishments, advanced
money among neighboring peasants and friends to finance their tobacco harvests
and help in any other need the growers might have.

Through this strategy local

lllerchants guaranteed clients who will sell their crops to them.
Loque proporcionaba el capital (era) la certidumbre en el capitalista
de que habia una riqueza comercial sobrante en los conucos de facil venta
Y queen cuatro o seis meses estaria a su disposicion ... Habido el avance
en San Thomas, lnglaterra, Alemania u otra parte, cade comerciante al por
menor, por si o por corredores y sucursales se establece cerca de los
agricultores a hacer un servicio parecido al de Courcelle Seneuil de los
Bancos Escoceses. Da dinero, lenceria, quicalleria, u otros valores al
labrador, mediante un agio consentido y este aplica este dinero y demas
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b'etos a sus necesidades personales y a las de sus cultivos con mas

~ ~enos juicio, mas o menos fortuna (Bono --1881-- 1964:196-197).

This advancement of money encouraged the circulation of money for small business
purposes.

Because of the absence of any financial security of the peasant other

is crop, and the informal character of the transactions, high interests
than h
were a dJ'oined to the advancements with harmful consequences for peasants and
small merchants.
Ninguno de los contratos toma seguridades para evitar o castigar la
mala fe reciproca, no hay titulos hipotecarios ni quirografarios,
todo se reduce a cuentas corrientes al descubierto, muy mal llevadas
por el comerciante que ni siquiera doble ni copia da al agricultor.
Esta falta de seguridades mutuas, ponen la operacion avance al tabaco
en la categoria de los prestamos a la gruesa, hacen por lo menos muy
subido el interes de los valores avanzados que al fin son su ruina y
la del pequeno comerciante ... A pesar de sus muchos defectos el
avance da un empuje extraordinario al cultivo del tabaco y a las
demas industrias que concurren a su extraccion ... el (avance) es
quien ha interesado a la clase mas ilustrada que hoy preside a su
apartado, seleccion y enfardelaje (Bono 1964:197).
The local tobacco merchant, or sometimes his middleman, buys the tobacco
from the peasants who transport it to the former 1 s warehouse.

There it is

Inspected by the local merchant himself, and loosened and classified by women.
Formerly the peasant classified the tobacco in his own plot before selling and
delivering it to the warehouse.

But peasant's harmful commercial practices

forced the export houses to transfer these obligations to their dependent warehouses thus further sub-dividing tobacco labors on them.

Under the risk of

losing European markets, because of frequently received rotten tobacco, the
operations of classification were left in charge of urban workers under the direct
responsibility of the local merchant.
Reflecting upon the new practice of inspecting and selecting the tobacco
in the warehouses, and justifying the new division of labor between peasants and
the Warehouse laborers, and within the latter itself, Bono noted:
El comerciante veterano hoy compra el tabaco en tongadas y bajo su
inspeccion inmediata, jornaleros urbanos casi todos mujeres proceden
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las clasificacionnes como en taller profesional regulado. Esta
8
nueva combinacion ... esta empleando grupos antes ociosos por falta
de demanda de trabajo apropiado a sus aptitudes y que se ofrecen
por salaries baratos; ha ensanchado el tiempo del agricultor que lo
aprovecha en otros trabajos; emplea mano de obras mas obedientes,
mas inteligentes, inspeccion severa de personas conocedoras de los
gustos o exigencia del consumidor europeo, de los desperdicios de
las taras, de los de embalaje, de las fermentaciones o curas que
la rama necesita despues de las de troje ordinaria, de los falsos
gastos, de la susceptivilidad de las hojas, etc. (--1881--1964:198).
It seems probable to infer, although there is no conclusive proof from
the historical record, that once the tobacco was classified, cured, and packed
tn the warehouses, the export firms took over once more directly.

Arrangements

to transport the tobacco to the ports (Puerto Plata or Santo Domingo) and for
later shipment abroaq were made; market possibilities and tobacco prices were
discussed and agreed upon with their international firms and with European
manufacturers; pending business with the tobacco merchants solved, and relations
with the capitalist international firms preserved.
In all, Bono estimated for the 1882 tobacco season the figure of 150,000
persons directly involved in the tobacco industry (1964:269).

This tobacco

population seems inflated since in 1871 Hoetnik (1971:20) cited the total population of the Republic ranging between 150,000 and 207,000 inhabitants.

Never-

theless, it can safely be said that the labor population of the tobacco industry
was high.

It included the main operating units of the industry: (i) agricultural

and warehouse peones (wage laborers); (ii) peasants and middlemen; (iii) big
landowners (very rare mention of them is made on the historical record); (iv)
local tobacco merchants; (v) export merchants of the export houses.

And beyond

the national geographic limits, the international merchants monopolized both
capital and market thus selling their locally purchased tobacco to buying
European manufacturers.
The effective transformation that the tobacco industry brought about in
the Cibao region can be seen above all in its own peasantry.

Contrasting the
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·nhabitants with those from the South, Guridi noted in 1884 that the latter

CfbaO

·

gave

.

Cf baO

I

·ndications of economic misery, labor apathy, and laziness.

Meanwhile,

1

peasants enjoyed an over all economic wel-1-:-being with even signs of luxury

and material comfort.
Pero por el sur, es decir en las jurisdicciones de Santo Domingo y
Azua, pues la provincia del Seybo fue siempre mas ganadera que
agricola, acontecio todo lo contrario. En vez del movimiento,
lujo y hasta comodidades de los campos del Cibao, apatia, holgazaneria,
miseria y casi desnudes: en vez de la limpieza y el orden de los
conucos y alrededores de las casas de viviendas que se observa en
aquellos --desarreglo, montes de arbustos y yerbas silvestres, asi
como una curiosa variedad de bejucos entrelazados en los platanales,
cafetos y demas arboles utiles (1955:410).
Apparently, the striking exception to the relatively prosperous and
active tobacco peasantry were the agricultural and urban wage laborers working
for big landowners and in the tobacco warehouses.

Without their own conucos to

crop, they were only one step away from animal life, and in total dependence
on their masters and employers.

Their injurbus poverty contrasted with the

well being of big landowners and of export and local merchants.

Keyn graphically

described the poverty of some of these rural wage laborers in relation to the
affluency of one export merchant, don Jose M. Glass, of Santiago (cf. 1968:29-30).
As a consequence of the affluency of the tobacco industry, regional
differences grew in the nation.

Santiago and other Cibao cities like Puerto

Plata and La Vega, on the one hand, challenged the social, political, and economic
prerogatives of Santo Domingo, the capital, and the southern region of the Republic.

The preponderance of the Cibao region became outspoken and virtually un-

challenged until the boom of the sugar industry at the end of the nineteenth
century which coincided with the decline of the tobacco industry (cf. Hoetnik
1971, for the gradual transference to the sugar economy).
Already in 1812, Heredia y Mieses referred to the striking poverty of

!

I

I

the capital city (1966:165).

And in 1871, Hazard observed the tragic economic

impass of Santo Domingo in which "no hand of progress" was observable thus leaving

11

'',
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•t 1 in similar conditions to the ones prevailing there during colonial
the caP' a
times (cf. Hoetnik 1968:31). It was during the Constitutent Congress of Moca
In g57, that Bono proposed the federal system of government for the Republic.
1
Although there was no differences of religion nor of language or laws, the
different he argued·, it is not that the Cibao does not want to
lnteres t s Were
cooperate with the southern provinces, but that in this way emulation and competence will be fostered (1857--1964:105-113).

By 1860, the Cibao supported by

Its tobacco industry was referred to as the most productive province in the
Republic and the only one with a commerce enjoying the privileges of international
credit; these circumstances "despertaron en los habitantes del Cibao la idea de
separacion y el deseo de constituirse bajo un sistema federal ... y se establecio
la diferencia entre dominicanos y cibaenos (Alvarez 1860:16 and 20).
Tobacco Dec 1 i ne
Approximately 100 years after its origin, the tobacco industry declined.
In 1879, Luperon attributed the decline in tobacco production --from an estimated
125,000 to 35,000 qq. -- to crop failure because of excessive rain.

But in 1882,

President Heureaux seemed to discredit this opinion and to agree with other
observers by blaming the producers for the critical situation of the tobacco
crop in international markets.

He commented in a private letter:

11

•••

le dire

que el tabaco dominicano hubiera conservado su fama y supeditado al brasilero
Y colombiano si les cultivadores del Cibao hubiesen side mas celosos de su
pervenir 11 (cited in Hoetnik 1971 :27).

Paradoxically, tobacco's national social

and economic advantage turned to be its greatest international hinderance:

the

I'
i
I

I I

complex network of units involved in its harvest and care.

I I

One of the greatest and most difficult problems of tobacco producers

I
I''

1

is to maintain an unchanging standard in the quality of their product.

The
11I

constant variety of flavor and aroma of the tobacco leaves guarantees the buyer

manufacturer its blending.
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The standard quality of the tobacco relies upon

variables of the natural environment (soil, rain, and weather) as well as the
soc

'ral environment in such activities as selecting, curing, and packing the

tobacco.

But the social organization of the tobacco industry in the nineteenth

century augmented considerably the number of independent hands caring for the
tobacco.

This technoeconomic feature is probably associated with two dependent

variables.
First, the fact that the tobacco production came from small plots and
not from tobacco plantations like in Virginia, U.S.A.

The coordination of these

plots became more strenuous and complex by the mere disarticulated force of the
great number of units to be integrated in the national distributive organization.
Second, the absence of great capital investments in processing equipment
by the tobacco manufacturers like in the case of the sugar industry.

The Cibao

exported tobacco as raw material to be processed in European countries.

Thereby

the presence of huge capital investments on a long term base were not necessary.
They would have implied the elimination of small producers and their subsequent
substitution by large tobacco estates which could guarantee both the necessary
supply of the commodity and the protection of the investments to capitalist
organizations.

In addition, it would have also signified the elimination of all

independent units in the distributive system of the tobacco industry.

In any

case, the complex procedure of internal marketing continued and opened up opportunities for fraud and price speculation which finally ran Dominican tobacco out
of European markets~
The national operations of the tobacco industry were insightfully classified by Bono as socially and economically 1 ~emocratic 11 in nature because of the
large labor force required for its harvesting and processing, and the profits
it provided to all those involved in the industry's operation.

At the same

time, the national government in 1889 recognized that besides the economic
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factors so
crop
c;ada

beneficial in the tobacco harvest, the harvest and marketing of this

11c;rea verdaderos ciudadanos libres por sus costumbres y educacion, porque
Cosechero

es propietario y aun sus empleados subalternos conservan el prin-

c;fpio de ciudadano en el genero de ocupacion que tienen en la elaboracion de dicho
fruto" (cited in Hoetnik 1971 :27-28).

Meanwhile, the cocoa ( and to a certain

eXtent the coffee) was characterized.by Bono as oligarchic since it required few
laborers and great extension of land and capital to provide adequate profits to
the producer (cf. 1895 --1964:363).
been classified by Hoetnik as

11

Recently, the Dominican sugar industry has

imperialist 11 because of its great extensions of

land, the proletarization of labor, and the dependence on huge foreign capital
Investments (1971:119).
Nevertheless, it was this labor democracy which seems to have brought
the tobacco decline.

Not only by the careless labor of the producing peasants,

but above all by the treatment tobacco leaves received during classification,
curing, and packing by warehouse laborers, local merchants and export merchants.
As previously mentioned, European merchants and manufacturers lost their confidence in the Dominican tobacco and discontinued their transactions with the
export houses.

Export and prices went down, and peasans started planting their

plots with cocoa, coffee and other crops.

Tobacco supremacy lost ground to

these booming products, and in a few years to the ominpotent sugar industry in
the south.
Los selectores, empacadores, enseronadores y exportadores de tabaco
abusaron de la paciencia de nuestros marchantes alemanes, y estos al
fin cansados de nuestra malicia, se negaron a reconocerle al tabaco
cibaeno las sobresalientes cual idades que la naturaleza, ayudada del
esmero, le habian dado (Bono --1895-- 1964:361; cf. 197-198, 269, 279,
380).
In this perspective, the decline of the tobacco industry coincided but
~as not caused by the beginnings of the sugar industry whose development took

Place in the southern and eastern provinces after 1870; especially around the

: I
I
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cities

of Santo Domingo and San Pedro de Macoris.

For instance, Hoetnik (1971:

_ ) reports that from 1875 to 1882 thirty sugar estates (haciendas de canas)
22 23
ed operations in the Dominican Republic. Twenty seven of the thirty estates
sta rt
were located between Azua and San Pedro de Macoris in the south coast of the
country, while only three of them, the smallest according to the writer, operated
in Puerto Plata.

The capital investments came from Cuban families (i.e., Ros)

emigrating from the neighboring Island because of the independence war being
fought there, and from Italian (i.e., Vicini), German (i.e., Bass, Smidt, Hachtmann), and English (i.e., Read, Fowle, Hatton, Stocks) firms.

These investors

were not those formerly running the tobacco export houses (i.e., Roth, Waltading,
Zeller, Bothet, Dubocq, Breffit, Stubbe art!Jandes), nor were they investing in
the same zones or

the same amount of capital (cf. Hoetnik 1971 :32).

On the contrary, while sugar production increased in the south and eastern
region of the country, in the Cibao itself production was diversified with the
presence of coffee and cocoa.

With the decline and fluctuation of tobacco prices,

peasants came to consider the sole dependence upon this crop as an excessive risk.
The advice of Luis Castillo overran the social

cons~~rations

of Bono about tobacco

harvest 1 s democratic nature:
Ya lo hemos dicho. Siembrese tabaco pero siembrese mas cacao, mas
cafe, y vease el tabaco no como fruto de principal importancia, ni
de primera necesidad para el desarrollo del comercio, sino como una
pequena arteria que contribuye al sostenimiento de la agricultural,
que contribuya al sostenimiento de los agricultores que laboran en
pequena escala (Castillo 1895, in Bono 1964:402).
But neither the loss of confidence in international markets in relation
to the Dominican tobacco, nor the diversification of agricultural production in
the Cibao erradicated the tobacco production.

Still in 1890, it was considered

the "principal cormoodity 11 of the Dominican agriculture.

For that reason the

national government invested $30,000.00 for the establishment of model farms
for the harvest of both tobacco and cotton.

(Col leccion de Leyes 1890:448).

I
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still

the previous year, the government approved a project to Farensbach by means

of whic h
1ugares,

lleste se comprometia a fundar dincas o granjas modelos en cuatro o mas
a experimentar con nuevas semillas de tabaco ya dar instruccion sobre

estos experimentos.
cua

Farensbach recibiria 75 centavos por cada quintal exportado;

ndo el precio subiera a 15 pesos por quintal, gracias a las actividades de
.

Farensbach, el gobierno levantaria un derecho adicional que seria entregado a
Farensbach 11 (cf. Hoetnik 1971:27).

And in 1894, President Heureaux trying to

further protect the quality and the European markets of the Dominican tobacco,
approved a decree in which both technical and agricultural guidelines were

fi

I

legislated upon peasants and warehouses,

(Coleccion de Leyes 1894:281).

After the temporary loss of its European markets in the late 1870's and
early 1880's, the tobacco now with official help was able to recuperate its
markets.

For instance, from 1878 to 1879, the tobacco exported descended from

120,000 to only 35,000 qq.,

(cf. Camacho y Tejada 1971:21).

But by 1886 once

again the export figures are up to a record high of 175,636 qq.

Seed uniformity,

and standard classification and processing, probably were the main reasons for
this revitalization of the industry.

Nevertheless, the sugar era had begun and

the tobacco boom became stabilized; meanwhile, the Cibao divided its lands
among tobacco, cocoa, coffee and other agricultural products.

I.
I

I

I.

CHAPTER I II
PRODUCTION AND EXPORT OF DOMINICAN TOBACCO
Ecological Base
Natural Environment
The tobacco habitat is highly dependent upon ecological factors such as
temperatures, rains, soils, and plagues.

In fact, these variables are more deter-

minants of its flavor, perfume and combustion than handling methods and fertilizer
treatments.

The tobacco plant is not only sensitive but also conservative:

it

adapts to temperatures neither too hot nor too cold; to soils neither too sandy
nor too clayish; it needs water, but not too much nor too little.
The Dominican tobacco commerce both for the national and the international
~rket

is derived from Nicotina tabacum.

Its market value depends essentially on

its variety, and on the quality and texture of its leaves.

These elements deter-

mine the flavor, and the combustion of the tobacco leaves, and thereby its market
value as well.
In the Dominican Republic, the main tobacco harvested whether for national
consumption (9.49% of the national production for 1971), or for export, is of the
dark air cured class.

The former includes tabaco de olor (smell tobacco) with

its most important sub-varieties, Chago Diaz and Quin Diaz; in addition in the
last three years the harvest of Burley tobacco has increased for national consumption not without political turmoil.

On the other hand, the export tobacco

embraces two varieties, the traditional tabaco criollo (creole tobacco), and
starting in 1962, tabaco piloto cubano (Cuban seed tobacco).

The former includes

a number of sub-varieties such as Amarillo parado, Punta de lanza, and Amarillo
Planchado.
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It is pertinent to notice at this point, that the present study is based

·on the

export tobacco production and its manufacture exclusively; in other words,

he production and packing of criollo and Cuban tobacco. The volume of the
.,1th t
t industry is evident when looking into the statistics. In 1970, for instance,

.xPor

·nternational market received 86.26% of the 446,370 qq. of tobacco harvested
the I
In the Dominican Republic. Of the total national production the amount exported
was: 329,781 qq. of criollo tobacco (73.88%); and 45,632 qq. of Cuban tobacco (10.22%}.
Of the remaining 70,957 qq. of the tobacco harvested during that season corresponding
to olor tobacco, only 2. 16% was also exported and the rest consumed in the national
market.
Production and Export of Criollo and Cuban Varieites of Tobacco:

The Formal Aspects

This sub-section includes a detailed consideration of agricultural and
market factors of both Cuban and Criollo tobacco.

In this way a clearer picture

will appear hopefully of the social organization resulting from the flow of the
tobacco from the fields to the international market.

Interestingly enough, this

process is known as cuidados culturales (cultural cares} in the Dominican Republic,
for they embrace all those activities which the tobacco receives from man in its
productive and market stages.
(I): Cuban Tobacco:
The Cuban seed was introduced in the Dominican Republic in 1962 with the
help of planters and processors from ~uba who transplanted its relatively complex technology to the neighboring Republic after Castro took over in Cuba.

The

interest of the Dominican national government and of the at the time subsidied
Fetab Inc. Cooperatives, was to capture the Cuban tobacco market lost by the
Cuban government in the United States.
In 1970, the production of approximately 350 Cuban seed harvesters,
ascended to 45,632 qq. (1 quintal= 50 kilos= 100 pounds} in an estimated

"

, 12 5
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tareas (in 1963, the production was only 3,500 qq. --0.27% of.the national

,
production-~ in 890 tareas of land, cf. table 12).
Thus, the estimated
tobacco
·
d s 1 5 qq. for tarea of land. Dominican planters have absorbed the elabylel wa
.
technology of planting and preparing this tobacco due to the benefits on
orate
of the high prices which are paid for this tobacco. However, the market
account
Is very

restricted because of the high quality and prices which the Cuban tobacco

receives; this constitutes a limiting factor to its production.

The principal

exportations are made to the United States, where buyers cannot get the tobacco
from Cuba, and to the Canary Islands which processes and re-exports it to the
United States.
Production:
Although the planting and harvest cycle is less than the one of criollo
tobacco, peasants have to work harder with Cuban tobacco.

Seed beds should be

watered from the second half of September to the last days of October in order
to make transplantation from the first days of November to the middle of December.
Planting is made in rows at an average distance of 32 inches between the rows by
11 inches between the plants, which permits a population of 2700 plants for each
tarea and will secure under ideal conditions a production of two quintals for
each tarea of 1and.
When planting, first application of fertilizer is made, determining the
quantity and the formula

a;

per soil type.

Twenty days after planting, weeding

takes place and then another dose of fertilizer is applied.

Immediately, aporque

(hilling) follows, meaning to clot the plant's trunk, applying irrigation.

Forty

days after planting the tobacco, unbottoning is made and a week after that picking out suckers, starting crop 55 days after planting.
Harvest:
Harvest starts with the two first leaves, the lower ones, which constitutes the class denominated Jibre pie. A week after that harvest continues with

I

11,1

'I
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the next two leaves dominated uno y medio.
are

Then, each week, the central leaves

ut out until finishing with the last two leaves in the top called coronas.

C

The field price of Cuban tobacco remains the same during the tobacco
season.

usually it is directly stipulated between the producing peasant and

buying export houses in the form of a contract; the agreement also specified
technical and financial assistance.

While some companies pay the same price

for all classes of leaves, others prefer to pay a different price for each
class of 1.eaf.

The rationale behind this is one of selection according to

different types and yielding capacity of the harvest they buy; the export house
will sell the tobacco classified at different prices and its profits will depend
on this.
Curing and Bulking:
After the crop, the tobacco is tied up with strings (sartas) in leaves
which are hung up in the curing house, remaining there during 45 days, after
which the leaves are expected to be completely dried.

When tobacco is completely

dried it is taken down and bulks (trojas) are prepared.
days more of cure, or fermentation.

It remains there for 40

Further tobacco is classified and packed in

hampers and transported to warehouses where it will be the object of the processes
of selection, curing, stripping, drying and packing.
Production Costs:
Cuban tobacco harvesting costs and prof its per tarea vary from community
to community and depend on whether the tobacco is harvested in dry or irrigated
fields.

The ·robacco Institute and the Agricultural Bank have estimated for the

1973 season, the following average costs and profits per 1area in the Cibao towns
of Villa Gonzalez, Navarrete, El lngenio, and La Canela;

While Cuban tobacco

cost for an irrigated tarea of land from preparation of the land until packing
ls estimated to be $50.00 and the net prof it of $24. 25,~~ in the same zone profit
estimates decreased considerably for non irrigated fields:

production per tarea
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fs l.5 qq; expenses per tarea $41.21; average sale price $40.00 per qq., and pro-

fits per tarea $16.73.

A sensible loss of $7.52 per tarea (cf. Institute del

yabaCO 1972 b:67).
TABLE 9
FINANCIAL COST PER TAREA OF IRRIGATED CUBAN TOBACCO
,_
....-

1
2
3
4

5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
lZ

COST

ACTIVITY
Land preparation
Seed bed costs or seed buying
Planting
First watering
Purchase of combustibles
75 pounds of fertilizer ($4.00/qq.)
10 pounds of pesticide ($16.00/qq.)
Use of cultivadora
Hilling
Second watering
Unbuttoning
Three suckerings ($0.40/each)
Purchase of 150 strings ($1. 00 per 100 strings)
Third watering
Recollection of 150 strings
Tying up 180 strings ($0.25)
ReQairs of curina house
sub totals. .
..... .......

.

.

$ 3.00

........

18 Repol los
cleaning of repollos
pesticides and its applications
purchase of 50 strings
harvestingz !fing U~z hanging u~
sub totals .

.......................

19 Peasant contribution--five pesticide applications
pulling out of seeds and watering
transplanting of 300 small plants
two fertilizer applications
two suckerings
-repollo's expenses
hanging up, b l:J_l~!--~..'!IP_~!"_i__!:l.9_
sub totals.

.........

.....

Summary:
total production in quintals
average sale price per qq.
total production in RD$
expenses per tarea
loan interests (8% for seven months)
-.Profits
.
Source.. Tobacco Institute
1972 b:69 •

.........

. 2.30
3.00
2.00
1. 75
3.38
1.60
0.50
3.00
1. 50
0.30
1.20
1. 50
1. 50
6.00
3,75
2.00
$40;00.

$ 1. 50
0.25
0.50
2.75
$ 5.00
$ 0. 10
~ o. 20
0.20
0.20

o.3o

2.50
1.50
--·---·-------

$ 5.00

1. 70 qq.
45.00
76,50
50.00
2.25
24.25
--
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The cost of the curing house for Cuban tobacco is the single most expen5 fve

investment facing the producers.

A curing house of 42 x 36 feet ranges in

'ce from $200.00 in Cotui, La Vega, and Dajabon to $571.50 in Bonao. As a
pr•
matter of fact, it is most relevant to analyse the economic pressure of this and

other producing costs upon the producers.

Although no statistics are available,

there is sufficient evidence to sustain that the great majority of Cuban tobacco
producers are not minifundist peasants, but middle, entrepreneur, and latifundist
landholders.

The lack of production credits among minifundist peasants and the

following variables seem to explain this significant phenomenon.
are:

The variables

(i) the high cost of a Cuban tobacco curing house (an average criollo tobacco

shading house (rancho) does not normally exceed $100.00; (ii) the higher cost of
production per tarea of Cuban tobacco when compared with criollo tobacco (cf.
tables 9 and 14); (iii) the lack of irrigated land among minifundist peasants
shrinks the expected profits from a tarea of non-irrigated Cuban tobacco below
that of a non-irrigated tarea of criollo tobacco; (iv) the additional time and
labor that the Cuban tobacco requires during harvest and curing time relative
to that of the criollo tobacco; (v) finally, the fact that criollo tobacco is
traditional in the Cibao region and also requires less labor expertise and crop
risk than the Cuban tobacco.
Precessing:
The processing of tobacco piloto cubano is a very delicate and costly
operation.

It requires much technology and supervision and abundant employment

of labor.

It starts with reception in warehouse in hampers previously selected

by classes, under the supervision of buyer's technicians.

In this phase class

and quality are examined and then tobacco is received paying to the grower as
agreed on the contract previously signed.

At this moment the operation of loosen-

ing starts; the inferior types are taken out of the strings and taken to the
bulks in leaves and each group in its class, where the process of fermentation
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starts.
Loosening and pre-selection is another operation by which the upper
tYP e

s--libre pie, uno y medio, centro,· corona-- are taken out of the cerones

an d

are removed from the strings.

Specialized workers make a sub-classifica-

tion of each type according to the size of the leaves, to its measure from 7
to 9 inches, from 9 to 12 inches, or more than 13 inches.

Leaves with less

than 7 inches, which usually are few, or those which are ruined or spotted,
fall within the classification of colas and placed in bulk just as the capadura
(suckers) and the sandleaves (first leaves), according to class and in leaves,
to be fermented.
Fermentation of all classes is done in bulk well identified bearing cards
where it is indicated the zone where the tobacco comes from, the class and also
periodically is written on it the temperature of the bulk.

The trojas are turned

over whenever tobacco temperatures increase (coge fiebre).

This process lasts

for approximately 40 days, after which tobacco is ready for selection.
ly, tobacco had been wet

Previous-

because of the field moisture; by the bulking process

the moisture evaporates by the heat resulting from the leaves grouped together.
Selection process is very laborious and classification is made for leaves
and classes.

When classified, women workers strip the tobacco leaves through a

series of delicate manual operations.

At the end of this process, the tobacco

is dried and then packed for port shipment.

Normally, the packs ~acas) go by

trucks either to Puerto Plata in the r.orth coast, if the shipment is for Europe,
or to Santo Domingo in the south, if the shipment is for the United States.
With this bulking process, the tobacco suffers a shrinkage (merma) in
weight of approximately 10% and another 20% with stripping.

After packing

shrinkage is a minimum, if it is exposed to a good process of fermentation.

The

reduction in weight is taken care of in the selling prices.
Handling process costs are high.

From a number of interviews it can be
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estimated to be oscillating between 45 to 50% of the green tobacco cost.
costs

Other

raise the total expenses to an 80% of tobacco's final cost; among them,

field price and transportation are important.
price Structure:
For sales purposes Cuban tobacco is classified usually into two types
which are sold to different markets: centros and capaduras.

Within the category

of centro the following sub-types are sold separately:
(i} Bandas: the leaf divided in two bands starting from the stem, without stripping.

It is generally a long leaf with thin veins and good texture.

It is prin-

cipally exported to Canary where it is stripped and used as binder for cigars.
(ii) Colas, leaves with less than seven inches or ruined or spotted, used as
cut-tobacco for cigars or cigarettes.

It is sold to Canary and the United States;

in some cases to local markets.
(iii) SHS, this is the cut-tobacco which is taken out from stripping of good
quality as it comes from a very cured tobacco, and is sold for cigars or cigar-

!

ettes manufacturing to Canary of the United States.
(iv) The long-fillers (largos), which is the long leaf, well cured and of the
best quality; like previous ones, it is sold in the United States and the Canary
Is 1ands.

1.

I.
I

Centros generally constitute 70% out of the total Cuban tobacco production.
Its average sale price for a quintal of 100 pounds ranges between $100.00 to
$122.50.

The type reaching the highest price is the long-filler which is sold at

a price that goes from $130.00 to $160.00 for a quintal of 100 pounds.
fil lers constitute approximately 75% of the centres.
other sub-types 5% of the centres.

Long-

The colas embrace 20% and the

The lowest prices are paid for the colas which

are quoted at prices under $44.00 for a quintal of 100 pounds.
The centres constitute 70% of the tobacco production, the rest is named
capadura.

Capadura tobacco is used as cut-tobacco, for cigars or cigarettes and
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'· f s place don the Canary Island principally, reaching average quotations from vt30.00

· tO ·$45. oo

per quintal of 100 pounds.

Capadura is convenient for manufacturers who

to make the stripping. The advantage of capadura is that as the stern is
have
Jfttle it has a good yield when stripped by machine, depending on the machine, and
ft introduces a 75% of ready filler.

It is aromatic tobacco very good to give

ftavor to cigars blended with other types of filler (centros).
Financing:
Most Cuban seed harvesters receive financing from some processor companies,
which guarantee a fixed price by contract, even before the planting of the tobacco.
Others receive financing from the Agricultural Bank through the Tobacco Institute,
or from commercial banking generally with the guarantee of the buyer companies.
Loan interest ranges between 8~ and 9 % annually according to the financial source.

Financing is generally made under the supervision of qualified

agronomists and based on the estimates of the crop's value; they vary from 50 to 75%
of the crop's value.
It is safe to maintain that all Cuban seed growers are receiving financial
assistance in some way or another.

This situation contrasts with the one prevail-

Ing among criollo tobacco growers, among whom financial assistance is practically
unknown because of lack of guarantees for the loans.

Also differing from what is

usual with criollo's tobacco practices, middlemen and local packers are non-existent between the producer and the export companies dealing eith Cuban tobacco.
TABLE 10
PRINCIPAL SOURCES OF FINANCE FOR CUBAN SEED PRODU CERS, 1970
ORGANIZATION

# OF GROWERS

TA REAS

Agriculture Bank
Secretary of Agriculture
COPATA (private processing company)

62
99

108

6,490
3, 168
9,831

TOTALS

269

19,489

Source:

Casals Victoria 1972: 14.
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TABLE 11
SHARE OF EXPORT COMPANIES IN CUBAN SEED EXPORTS (ESTIMATES) 1970 (;'•)

'

.

COMPANY

QUINTALS

fETAB
QUI SQUEYA
p, T.M .•
Leon J 1menez
E.T. Tropicales
COP OTA
Hobeeka
Han ipul adora de Tabaco

6,661
1 ,487
4,283
463
2,875
2,082
615
1,388

(33.6)
(7.5)
(21. 6)
(2.2)
(14.5)
( 10. 5)
(3.2)
(7.0)

615' 786
152,326
350,026
24,307
145,844
242,453
98,850
56,717

( 1. 5)
(9. 0)
(14.9)
(6. I)
(3. 5)

19,827

( 100. 0)

1,620,489

( 100.0)

TOTAL

%

US$

%
(38.o)
(9.4)
(~1.6)

(*Note: At the time of the field work (1972) the situation had changed considerably. Copata seems to be the leading buyer company while a number of these export
houses like D.T.M. have gone out of business.)
Source: Roques 1972: 12
Market Situation:
The principal problem for the exportaion of tobacco piloto cubano is that
long fillers are used in the manufacturing of expensive cigars which are sold to
consumers at prices from $0.50 to $1.00.

Hence, its principal market is the

United States, where the high income and the symbol of success or prestige that
those cigars represent is very esteemed within certain high income groups.
In Europe, the principal buyers are in the Canary Islands, where because
of the low cost of labor, tobacco is manufactured and re-exported in cigars to
the United States.

England and Switzerland are practically the only two European

·markets for Dominican long-filler, but they buy it from Cuba.

Opinion runs that

on a matter of quality and prices the Dominican long filler could compete with
the Cuban one in those markets.

But it initially faces two difficulties: (i)

manufacturers do not stop good commercial relations already established; (ii)
besides, they do not like to change suppliers because of the risk of receiving
different flavor tobacco affecting their blend.

Blending is a matter of vital

importance to the manufacturers to whom the export companies through their
international firms sell their tobacco.

The manufacturer is contingent upon
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the c l
prote C

(II):

ient•s desire for their tobacco flavor blends in order to maintain and
t a market for their final products.
Criollo Tobacco:
Criollo tobacco represents a number of social contrasts with the Cuban

tobacco.

First, contrary to Cuban seed tobacco only a decade old in the Cibao

·region, tobacco criollo is identified with the Cibao region as far back as early
XIX century, if not earlier (cf. Camacho y Tejada 1971:2).

Second, while the

Cuban seed tobacco is the work of an estimated 350 producers, most of them middle
or big landholders --34, 125 tareas were harvested in 1970 which gives an approx.imately minimum average of 97.5 tareas per producer-- criollo tobacco is the minifundist peasant's cash crop; among other reasons, because (a) it may be cultivated
profitably on small plots; (b) it does not ;equire technological expertise nor
does it require as large a labor force as the Cuban tobacco harvest; (c) family
labor may virtually supply all thelabor needs of a conuco or a parcela; (d) small
plots may yield a relatively high return {cf. table 31).
This variety of tobacco, like the Cuban variety, is usually called dark
tobacco (tabaco negro) because of its dark leaves.

Its vegetative cycle normally

runs from 60 to 65 days after planting in contrast to the shorter cycle for Cuban
tobacco (50 to 55 days after planting).

The leaves on becoming dried present a

dark brown color with poorer texture and different aroma than the Cuban leaves.
Its lesser quality will produce for it a

European market, mainly Spain, and will

have to compete with Philippine, Colombian, and Brazilian dark tobacco in those
markets.
In recent years the criollo tobacco production dropped from 433,751 qq.
(95.813·· of the national production) in 1963 to 329,781 qq. (73.88%) in 1970;
and in surface dedicated to its harvest from 315,710 tareas (96.50%) in 1963 to
240,034 rareas (74.40%) in 1970.

This drop is explainable in relation to the
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•fjcation of production because of the beginning and expansion.of the Cuban
divers•
tobacco in 1963, and the increase of the national market and therby the boom
see d
of the olor tobacco production (cf. tables 12 and 13).
TABLE 12
TAREAS HARVESTED ACCORDING TO DIFFERENT TOBACCO VARIETIES: 1963-1970
VEAR

TOTAL

CRIOLLO

DE OLOR

%

1963

327' 145

315,710

(96.50)

10,545

(3. 22)

890

(0. 27)

1964

23,593

221,474

(93. 87)

9,208

(3.90)

5,251

(2.22)

1965

246,795

220,240

(89. 24)

16' 159

(6.54)

10,396

(4.21)

1966

292,788

255,963

(87 .42)

22,208

(7.58)

14,617

(4.99)

1967

298,766

241,919

(80. 97)

33,714

(11.28)

23' 133

(7.74)

1968

237,062

173,411

(73.15)

37,302

(15.73)

26,349

(11.11)

1969

306,484

230,862

(75.32)

44,417

( 14.49)

31'205

(10.18)

322,614
240,034
(74.40)
48.455
(15.01)
34. 125
Source: elaborated from unpublished cata of the lobacco institute.

(10.57)

-

1970

%

CUBAN

%

TABLE 13
NATIONAL PRODUCTION ACCORDING TO TOBACCO'S VARIETIES:
YEAR

TOTAL

CRIOLLO

1963

452,693

433,751

1964

326,438

1965

1963-1970

DE OLOR

%

CUBAN

%

(95.81)

15,422

(3.41)

3,500

(0. 77)

304,282

(93.21)

13,484

(4. 13)

8,672

(2.65)

341 ,467

302,586

(88.61)

23,663

(6.92)

15,218

(4.45)

1966

405, 103

351,666

(86.80)

32,522

(8.02)

20,915

(5. 16)

1967

413,371

332,250

(80. 37)

49,371

( 11. 94)

31 '750

(7.68)

1968

328,000

238,248

(72.63)

54,624

(16.65)

35' 128

(10. 70)

1969

424,053

317' 180

(74.79)

65,044

(15.33)

41 ,829

(9. 86)

446,370
329,781
(73.88)
70.957
(15.89)
45,632
Source: elaborated trom unpubl rshea cata ot the lobacco rnsi::ri::ute.
(in quintals of 50 kilos).

(10.22)

_!270

%

I

I
[11

I

I

I,
I

1 I:
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The decreasing trend of criollo 1 s production will probably stop in coming
seasons.

As a matter of fact, in recent years, demand of criollo tobacco from

ean buyers --especially Spaniards-- has increased. Accordingly, the Tobacco
Euro P
institute proposes for the 1972-1973 tobacco season (cf. 1972 b:4 and 7) an in. se in the dark tobacco production of 100,000 qq. in reation to the 1971-1972
crea
production; of this increase, at least 80,000 qq. correspond to criollo tobacco.
This yielding increase is expected to be accomplished through the addition of
50

,ooo

tareas to the

ha~vest

of these two varieties of tobacco, mostly fallow land.

Following preliminary estimates of the lnstitute•s director, the 1971-1972 season,
ending in August 1972 yielded 420,000 qq. of criollo tobacco (cf. El Sol newspaper,
September 7, 1972, pag. 1) with a revenue of $31 million dollars including Cuban
tobacco export revenues.

The number of tareas dedicated to criollo crop through

the same season was approximately 236,530 tareas of land.
Production:
As Cuban seed beds, criollo 1 s seed beds are prepared at the beginning of
the rainy season, usually the end of September or the first week of October.
Watering, shade, covering, and fertilizing care of the seed runs from 35 to 40
days until the plant is from 4 to 5 inches in height in the seed bed.
Planting starts at peasant's discretion in November and generally each
seed bed provides plants for eight tareas.

While a worker in one day uproots

and waters new born plants (posturas) from the seed beds for an average of three
to five tareas of land, another worker harvests one tarea in 4/5 of a working
day.

Planting is made in rows at an average distance of 39 inches between the

rows by 20 inches between the plants, thus a tarea will include 25 rows with

48 plants each or 1200 plants.

The average yield is ~ qq. per tarea, but in some

tobacco zones even 3 qq. per tarea have been reported.
After planting, aporque (hilling) is made and the soil is immediately
\rlatered; it normally takes a worker one day for the hi 11 ing of one tarea.

If
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fertilizer is available, the first application is also made at this time.

Irrigat-

ed tobacco harvesting requires two applications of fertilizer but on dry conditions (secano) one application suffices; on any conditions, one worker applies
fertilizer to ten tareas in ore working day.
planting, weeding (deshierbe) labor starts.

Fourteen to twenty days after
The first weeding of one tarea will

take approximately 1 1/5 working day to a worker.

The second weeding, following

four or five weeks later and according to field conditions, only one day.
Around the fifth week after planting the tobacco unbottoning (desbotone)
starts and is shortly followed by one of the two picl:ings out of suckers (deshi-

j!). A worker unbottons 11! tareas of criollo tobacco in one; but he deshija
only 7! tareas in one day.

Fifty to sixty days after planting the tobacco crop

starts.
Harvest
Harvest starts with the lowest leaves of the plant denominated barresuelo
(floor sweeper).

Normally two weeks after the barresuelo, harvest continues with-

out leaves selection as in the case of Cuban tobacco.
leaves) are the last leaves harvested.

Repollos (second born

While barresuelo leaves will receive the

lowest prices, the rest of the crop, without making distinction of leaves, receives the same price from the warehouses; proper-exception of the repollos which
receive prices as low as those of the barresuelo leaves.
Some agronomists estimate that 10% of the plants harvested become unproductive.

Thus, a tarea of criollo tobacco has 1,080 productive plants at crop

time; each plant having 22 leaves with a total of 23,760 leaves.

If each string

includes 150 to 165 leaves, then a tarea of tobacco crioJJo produces 145 strings
(Cuban tobacco produces with irrigated fields 230 sartas; if the land is dry only
175 sartas).

It is also estimated that three peasants collect 175 strings a

day at harvest time.
Curing and Bulking
After the crop, the tobacco is tied up with strings by women working on
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the floor of a nearby shading house (rancho).

Each string is 6 to 8 feet long

with an average of 50 rings holding from 150 to 165 leaves of tobacco recently
taken from the field.

Each sarta is then hung up by men in the shading house

ceiling, thus permitting the leaves to dry out while naturally aired for at least
three weeks.

The shading house, owned by the peasants and located in their own

plots, are like huts without walls and wide open.

The men hanging up the tobacco

strings are normally the same that have harvested it earlier in the day.
When the tobacco is completely dried it is taken down and trojas (bulks)
are prepared.

The bulking process, taking place under the shadow of the ranchos,

lasts for about 40 days producing a little cure, or fermentation to the leaves.
When a price is accorded with a middleman --who has normally been checking the
harvest and lending money to the peasant-- the tobacco is packed in hampers;
very rarely, does the peasant classify his own tobacco in order to sell it at
different prices.
The middleman transports the tobacco to the warehouse subsidizing his
operations during the tobacco season.

In the warehouse, or in the local packer,

the tobacco will be selected, cured, cleaned, dried and packed for export shipment.
Productton Costs:

i

Crio11o tobacco production costs and profits per tarea vary from community

l1

I

to community and depends on whether the tobacco is harvested in dry or irrigated

I

fields.

I

But while it is safe to affirm that Cuban tobacco is most frequently

irrigated, criollo tobacco is not.

Table 14 includes the estimates of costs and

)1•.
1

profits from the Tobacco Institute and the Agricultural Bank for the 1972-1973
tobacco season; it refers to a dry tarea of land harvested with criollo tobacco
in the towns of El lngenio, Villa Gonzalez, Navarrete, La Canela, Tamboril, Licey,
Moc a

' Guazuman, and La Torre.
The criollo's shading house normally ranges around the 14 x 12 field yards

(.Y._aras conuqueras ; 1 vara conuquera

= 2.5077

m).

Its capacity might cover 12

~
~

'

tar
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of
tobacco
and
its
presence
is
essential
for after crop operations like
s
ea

bulking, air curing (la colgada), hampering, and sun protection of the tobacco.
TABLE 14
COST

o.-LABOR
i..--

1 Land preparation

2 purchase of 1,380 seeds
3 Harvest of 1, 200 sma 11 plants
4 50 pounds of fertilizers ($4.50/qq)
5 5 pounds of pesticide ($16.00/qq)
6 Two weedings
7 Unbuttoning
8 Two suckerings
9 Purchase of 75 strings
JO Recollection of 75 strings of tobacco
11 Tying up of 75 strings
12 Shading House repairs
sub-to ta I.

......................

$ 1. 50
1.38
2.00
2.25
0.80
4.50
0.20
0.25
0.75
3.00
1. 12
2.00
$19.75

13 Repol los

pesticide and its application
harvesting, tying up, hanging up
purchase of 50 strings
sub-tot a 1.

......................

14 Peasant's contribution
pulling out and watering the small plants
transplanting 180 sma 11 plants
fertilizer application
pesticide application
suckerings
hampering
repo 1los 1 s expenses
sub-total.

......................

Summary:
Total p reduction in quintals
Average sale price per qq. (':':)
Total production in RD$
Expenses per tarea
Loan i nterst (-'-'·)
Profits
.......__
l\l'o

$ 0.25
2.50
0.50
$ 3.25

$ 0.25
0.20
o. 15
0.30
0.20
o. 15
2.75
$ 4.00
2.00
$23.00
46.00
27.00
1.62
17. 38

(*) During the 1971-1972 tobacco season the average sale price per quintal was
higher: $26.00/qq.
(;';;':)Most peasants receive loans without financial interest from middlemen.
Source:

Tobacco Institute 1972 b:58 and 59.
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processing:
The processing of criollo tobacco is not as laborious nor as expensive
hat of Cuban tobacco.
as t

Although a delicate operation, it does not require

much technology --as the presence of independent local packers selling packed
tobacco to export houses proves; nevertheless, it does require abundant labor,
but not specialized.
Middlemen, at their own risk, bring the tobacco to the warehouses or,
in some cases, to the local packers.

At this time the hampers are weighed (norw

mally each hamper weighs one quintal with 60 kilos, but only 50 kilos are paid;
the weight difference is attributed to the hamper itself plus dirt, moisture and
stems of the tobacco) under the supervision of the warehouse owner or his equivalent.

Supervision is tight for dryness of the leaves, and rotten tobacco.

The

operation of loosening the leaves from the strings is taken care of by women.
Sometimes a pre-selection is made at this point between different types of leaves
according to their length and texture.
Loosened and/or pre-selected tobacco goes into huge bulks.

Fermentation

is done in these bulks just as in the case of Cuban tobacco by turning the bulks
over whenever tobacco temperatures increase.

This process of forming the trojas

and turning them over, lasts approximately 40 days or three turns.
the tobacco

~

At the end,

supposedly dry and ready for selection.

The selection process is laborious and requires tobacco expertise.

During

the field work some clasificadores (classifiers) in two different warehouses,
emphasized that they could distinguish 17 types of criollo tobacco leaves; another
one said he could go up to 21 classifications.
seven types of leaves are selected.

But normally, five or at most

Once classified, the tobacco is dried and

packed for shipment through Puerto Plata (90 miles from Santiago to the northeast); all export shipment costs are taken care of by the manufacturers just as
in the case of the Cuban tobacco.
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With the bulking process the criollo tobacco shrinks almost 12% of its
field weight.

If well treated in the warehouse, shrinkage during shipment overseas

ts expected to be minimal.

Cuban tobacco.

Handling process costs are not as high as those of

They can be estimated to fluctuate around 10% of the tobacco cost

to the export companies.
Price Structure:
Sale practices of the export houses vary from one to the other, and normally strict secret prevails in their business transactions with manufacturing
buyers.

.

Nonetheless, more frequently than not, the criollo plant with its 22

leaves is classified as producing three categories of leaves:

barresuelo or

lowest leaf (6% of the plant's leaves); centre or center leaves including the
rest of the leaves (94%); and repollo or leaves born after the first harvest
(normally 75 pounds of repollo leaves are harvested per tarea ).
Most of the criollo leaves are used as cut-tobacco and as tripas (entrails)
in cigarettes.

They have become well known for their mild flavor resulting from

soil exhaustion; the customary mal-practice of harvesting without fertilizers
affects the presence of nitrogen in the soil which in turn affects the presence
of nicotine in the leaf.
by European

This mild flavor makes criollo tobacco highly requested

manufacturers for their blendings and tobacco mixing.

The central leaves are further classified for commercial purposes into
sub-types 1, 2 and 3 depending on their length, texture, combustibility, elasticity,
and aroma.

Criollo's number 4 and number 5 sub-types come from barresuelo and

repol lo leaves, plus some central leaves of lesser quality.
estimates vary significantly from one zone to the other.

Yield average

Normal returns prob-

ably are: 5°/o of #1, 30% of #2, 30% of #3, 25% of #4, and 10% of #5, per quintal
of tobacco.

In some cases a simpler division is employed by distinguishing only

three sub-types of leaves; in this case the average yield per quintal will be:
lO% of #1, 50% of #2, and 40% of #3.

Furthermore, in other instances criol lo
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tobacco is classified in four sub-types thereby yielding agerages
might be expected to be:

10% of #1, 25% of

#8. 25%

~hich

of'#4; and 40% of #5.

The type reaching the highest prices in all cases is #1, which in 1972
normally was quoted from $100.00 to $110.00 per 100 kilos; under special
circumstances it has gone as high as $125.00.

Sub-types #2 and 3 are normally on

the average of $90.00 to $100.00 for 100 kilos; finally, sub-types #4 and 5
fluctuate around $80.00 for 100 kilos.
''•

Commercially, the selling price has to cover the tobacco costs and leave
a profit margin.

A conservative estimate of tobacco's cost to the export

house and to the local packers is presented in Table 15.
TABLE 15
ESTIMATE OF TOBACCO'S COST TO EXPORT COMPANIES AND TO LOCAL PACKERS
EXPORT HOUSE

LABOR
Tobacco cost in the field
Primary labors
Shipment to warehouses
Middleman's commission
Shrinkage in warehouse
Handling process
Administrative expenses
Shrinkage after packing
Financial expenses
Selling and shipping expenses

60.0%
2.5

LOCAL PACKER

60.0%
2.5
1. 0

1. 0

2.5
9.0
10.0

2.s~·~

9.0

4.o

3.0
1. 0

1. 0

9.0
2.0

9.0

(figures represent per cent of final cost)
(q

Local packer's dependence upon middlemen is not as common as with export houses.
Financing:
Most financial help for the growing of criollo tobacco comes from unoffi-

cial and informal sources, mainly corredores (middlemen).

They provide mini-

fundist producers and sharecroppers from small landholders with advanced money
on their crop for any use they decide pertinent, no matter whether it is a
personal, family, or production use.

Rarely does a middleman grant advanced

money above 10 to 15% of the estimated value of a peasant's crop.

Thus, they do
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no t

sufficiently cover production costs or other household expenses of the

peasants.
Another financial source for peasants is the Agricultural Bank, the
Agriculture Department through its supervised credits, and the Office of Community
Development.

All of these are official organs channeling their production credits

mainly through the Tobacco Institute.
ti~e

For reasons such as bureaucratic procedures,

delays in payment, and value perceptions on the side of the peasants, the

efficacy of these programs is limited.
Market Situation:
The criollo tobacco crop is mainly exported to European manufacturers.
The principal problems facing the export of this tobacco are: (i) its price
increase; the Dominican tobacco has augmented its cost from 1963 to 1970 35.2%
while in the United States its costs have gone up 26.2%, in Europe 45.7%, and in
Africa 30.5% (cf. Casals Victoria et. al., 1972:31-32).

This upward trend in

its average cost is best exemplified by looking into one of its affecting variables,
the tobacco cost in the field.

While in 1962 the average sale price per quintal

paid to the producer by the export houses through the middlemen was $13.00, in
1972 it is $26.00 per quintal; in other words a 100.0% increase in only ten
years.

If this upward trend continues Philippine, Brazilian, and Colombian dark

tobaccos might displace Dominican tobacco from European markets.
(ii) The criollo export, as well as the Cuban tobacco export, is concentrated in two main markets, Canary Islands --with 42.35% of 1971 total tobacco
export and 40.91% of the tobacco revenue-- and Spain
export and 16.99% of the revenue.

--with 20.69% of the

Especially the Canary Islands manufacturers

are known to be unstable buyers for they move from the tobacco of one country to
that of another depending on low prices.
The most important requirement demanded by European manufacturers from
local export houses of criollo tobacco are:

low content of nicotine in the
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Ves· homogenous

•

dard quality and

processi~g

te~ture;

and packing of the leaves in order to obtain stan-

low or even the absence of pesticide clorhine; low

degree of moiture; and standard prices.
TABLE 16
TOBACCO LEAVES EXPORTED IN 1971
%

KILOS

COUNTRY

VALUE

%

AVERAGE PRICE PAID
PER 50 KILOS RD$

2,392,550 9.31

253,739

12.53

53.03

91 ,424 0.35

92,304

o.45

50.48

3,023,739 11.76

2,395,875

11.83

39.62

32,945 o. 12

31 '731

o. 15

48. 16

2. 11

404,013

1.99

37. 14

Belgium

2,779,894 10.81

2,622,474

12.95

47. 16

Denmark

359

---

47 .21

16.99

32.34

8,280,356 40.91

38.04

83,776

o.41

38. 19

1,416

---

40.74

United States
Jamaica
Puerto Rico
Uruguay
W. Germany

543,932

---

5,317,789 20.69

Spain
Canary Islands

10,883,895 42.35
109,680 o.42

Holland

---

339
3,439,078

England

1'738

Portugal

5,000 0.01

3-,600

0.01

36.00

1. 95

338,500

1.67

33.73

12,000 o.4

8,880

0.04

37.38

100

20,239,733

100

39.38

North Africa
Equatorial Africa
TOTAL

501 '793

'

25,696,747

(includes Cuban and Criollo tobacco)
Source: unpublished data from the Tobacco Institute.

CHAPTER IV
PRODUCTION LEVEL OF ARTICULATION
Operating Units
During the last decade the tobacco industry in the Dominican Republic
has increased its export revenues from 14.7 million pesos (1 peso= 1 dollar),
to 31.0 million pesos in 1972.

At the same time, more than 70% of the national

tobacco production is still being cultivated in the Cibao region.
fs a special interest in the study of this crop's production,

Thus, there

mani~ulation,

and

packing since it is one of the three high ranking export commodities of the
rountry.

The data for the analysis comes from the Cibao region where histori-

cally its production has been concentrated.
Any classification of rural operating units established upon the division
and holding of land is arbitrary for it overlooks three basic aspects of agricultural operations: (i) the ferti 1 ity and topography of the land; (ii) its abi 1 ity
to produce the chief cash and credit crop; (iii) and the presence of any landless
unit like day laborers.

Nevertheless, the study of a crop production, not in a

community but on a regional basis justifies such classification.
Following the results of the 1971 census for 4, 168 tobacco farms in the
Esperanza, Villa Gonzalez, Bisono and Santiago municipalities, the most important
operating units involved in the harvest of tobacco in the Cibao region seem to be:
(i) Minifundist conugueros: operating units in privately owned plots ranging
from one to 32 tareas of land.
(ii) Minifundist parceleros:

operating units in privately owned plots from 32

to 80 tareas of land.
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(Jii) Peasant middle owners and agricultural entrepreneurs:

their landholdings

from 80 to 800 tareas of land; the difference between them residing above
ran9 e
in business interests.

811

(iv) Latifundists:

operating units in possession of more than 800 tareas regard-

less of their entrepreneur interests.
(v) Colonos:

operating units sharecropping nomially small plots under infomial

rent contracts.
TABLE 17
LAND DIVISION OF 4,168 TOBACCO FARMS IN THE CIBAO REGION, ,971
FARM AREA
(tareas)

# OF
FARMS

%

1-32
32-80
80-800
800 and more

2,716
799
577
76

(65. 16)
(19. 16)
(13.84)
(1.82)

TOTAL

4, 168 ( 1oo.00)
385,508 (100.00)
100.0
92.5
Secretariado Tecnico ae la Presidencia 19 72: g rou p IV ' p • 1•

Source:

# OF
TAREAS
37,417
39, 155
131,416
177,520

%

(9. 70)
(10. 15)
(34. 08)
(46.04)

AVERAGE SIZE
OF FARMS
( tareas)
14
49
228
2,336

% TOBACCO

PRODUCTION
34.0
25.0
30.0
11. 0

TABLE 18
LAND HOLDING OF 4,168 TOBACCO FARMS IN THE CIBAO REGION, 1971
FARM AREA
(tareas)

TOTAL
FARMS

PRIVATE

1-32
32-80
80-800
Boo and more

2,716
799
577
76

1, 136
327
411
66

TOTAL

4, 168
(46.30)
1, 930
(30.42
970
1'268
Secretariado Tecnico de la Presidencia 1972: group IV, p. 9a.

Source:

%

(41.82)
(40.92)
(71.23)
(86.84)

RENTED

%

OTHER FORMS

925
246
92
5

(34.05)
(30. 78)
(15.94)
(6. 57)

665
226
74
5

Obviously, the classification presented above is arbitrary.
been proposed.

%

(24.48)
(28.28)
(12.82)
(6. 57)
(23.27)

Others have

For example, the categories proposed by the Partido Socialista

Popular (PSP) considers owners of 0 to 75 tareas as a poor peasantry; from 75 to
300 tareas as members of a middle class peasantry; from 300 to 1000 tareas members
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of a

bourgeois peasantry; and those owning more than 1000 tareas as 1atifundists

. (cf. El Nacional de Ahora newspaper, March

15, 1972; p. 7).

The main difference

between these classifications is based upon the cultural variables employed in
the classification of operating units; for instance, the peasant's own distinction between a conuco and a parcela.

In addition, a difference between a middle

class peasantry and agricultural entrepreneurs (the P.S.P. 's bourgeois peasantry}
is recognized.

But although the difference between them is probably connected

with the 300 to 350 tareas division mark, there is no available data to argue
satisfactorily in this direction.

Furthermore, it seems that the difference is

not so much associated with landholding division as with cultural values: land
exploitation with a purpose of profit maximization as opposed to a family subsistence enterprise.
Minifundist Peasants
Land as a Core Energy Resource
The plots of minifundist tobacco producers account for the highest percentage of the tobacco harvest in the Cibao; especially of criollo tobacco.

If

the figures from Table 19 are representative of tobacco farms in the Cibao region,
minifundist plots represent 84% of the tobacco farms and control only 20% of the
area harvested.

Fallow and pasture land accounts for 66.44% of the land considered

in the census, but non-agricultural land among minifundist peasants only represents
22.433 of their controlled surface. Tobacco harvested on small plots represents 59%
of the national tobacco production, which indicates an intensive land use in sharp
contrast with latifundios with only 11% of the tobacco production.

Latifundios

control 46% of the land surface, and account for 2% of the number of farms.
Minifundist peasants' main core energy resource is the land.

Without

either a plot or sufficient land to harvest they find themselves forced into
being a dependent unit either as sharecroppers or as day laborers; especially
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they operate amid a cash market economy and are contingent upon the crop's

• lds and the extension of the plot for their income. When production returns
y1e
·are not enough, because of scarce labor land and/or poor technical means of
the peasant has to subsidize his income by resorting to middlemen,
pro dUC t ·on
I
'
to usurers, and to other operating units in control of financial resources.

This

ends any opportunity he had of maximizing profits.
TABLE 19
LAND USE OF 4, 168 TOBACCO FARMS IN THE CIBAO REGION, 1971
TOTAL AREA

FARM AREA

(tareas)

AGRICULTURAL
LAND UNDER USE

31,818
27 ,579
37' 162
32,834

37,417
t-32
39' 155
32-80
131,416
80-800
800 and more 177,520
385,508

TOTAL

%

THER
CROPS

% OF AGRI

55.99
47.03
42.05
17. 13

14,001
14,606
21,312
27,209

44.00
52.96
57.34
82.86

40. 13

77' 128

59.60

TOBACCO
LAND

% OF AGRI-

85.03
70.43
28.27
18.49

17,817
12,973
15,850
5,625

33.56

52,265

CULTURAL
LAND

CULTURAL
LAND

Secretari a o Tecnico de la Presidencia

Source:

The most common way to obtain a plot among minifundist peasants is by
inheritance.

Formally, all recognized (legitimos) children inherit equally and

no distinctions are drawn between boys and girls.
picture is more complex.

In actuality, however, the

How much each child inherits seems to be a function of

the particular family situation as well as of the cultural ideal.
of land, is frequently not effected.

Equal division

Furthermore, in some cases the land remains

undivided and is either granted to a common trust (una sucesion) or to the oldest
male son once he has received an arbitrio from his father to take care of family
affairs.

In any case, custom calls for the land to be divided among the sur-

viving member of the family.

And it is widely recognized that the division of land

among inheritors is the single most significant source of family conflict among
minifundist peasants.
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Another important means in obtaining a plot of land is to pu~chase it.

rhe

elling of land is usually done by peasants moving to urban places or emi-

S

grating to New York; by older peasants unable to work the land or in need of
cash; or even by urban settlers willing to guarantee some cash from their land
tn sight of peasant's illegal occupation of land or the 1972 government's
agrarian code.

Because of demographic pressure, and the fact that minifundist

peasants under normal conditions do not sell their family labored plots, the
price of land has increased considerably in the last decade.

For instance, in

pontezuela,don Gregorio's mother bought in 1962 35 tareas for RD$600.00; today
he is selling his eight inherited tareas at $375.00 per tarea.

From zone to

zone the price of land varies, but in any case the region wide value of land is
increasing from $5.00 to $8.00 per tarea of land in the 1940's to $250.00 to
$500.00 today.

The price increase of land contributes to the inaccessibility

of purchased land to small subsistence peasants.
The government land reform program and the peasant's illegal occupation
of privately owned fallow land offers another opportunity of land acquisition.
Slash and burn agriculture (hacer tumbas) on state owned land

is also practiced

in the Central Hills, especially in the parajes of San Jose de las Matas and
Janico.

This practice continues because the government does not consider its

lands illegally occupied as long as the peasant does not reside in the plot after
one season or more.

If he does, the Army is expected to intervene and force him

off the land (desalojo).

Another reason that this practice continues is that

the quality and erosion of the hill land does not pe•rmit stable settlements on it.
Even with these alternatives to acquire land and work plots of land, sharecropping
remains the most common option open to peasants unable

to control sufficient

labor land.
Significantly, the control and ownership of a plot (not the mere access
to the land) is one of the most inner cultural values of the tobacco peasantry,
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all peasants.

115 minifundist parceleros from Pontezuela, Jacagua,

Licey al Hedio and Jose de· las Matas were asked if they would prefer
·Guazuma 1 '
r the ownership of 40 tareas of land, a steady wage earning $2.50 per day
elthe
c1otng agricultural work, or having a steady urban employment doing 11 anything 11
~lguier

cosa).

The responses

were as follows:

77 opted for the first

·alternative, 9 for the second, 24 for the third; five of the peasants were unable
to make up their minds although all of these discounted the second option.
The minimum average extension of a plot desired by peasants to sustain
their families and fulfill their cultural aspirations, varies considerably from
one zone to another.
.0 f

a tobacco plot.

In all, probably 75 tareas is the average ideal extension
91 minifundists of the peasant's group previously mentioned,

estimated that a parce 1a of 50 ta reas is

11

good 11 enough for them when harvested

with tobacco as the main crop, while 75 tareas was "very good" for them.

Mean-

while, 12 of the remaining 24 considered 40 tareas of tobacco "good for the maintenance of the family''.

Two presidents of export firms; and five officials of

the Tobacco lnsitute and of the Dominican Agrarian Institute estimated 75 to 100
tareas of tobacco will be the minimum landholding required for an

11

average"

(undefined) peasant life.
Harvest Strategies
Minifundist plots are harvested thoroughly.
nllllber of strategies followed by tobacco peasants.

In doing this there are a
They either seed their plots

exclusively with tobacco or divide the land by sowing a portion of their tareas
With tobacco and plant the remaining land in secondary crops.

In the second

Option, tobacco is either intermixed with the secondary crop or isolated from
it.

The choice of having a second crop in the plot is the most common:

the

tobacco plant is contingent upon many natural environmental variables thus making
its exclusive harvesting too risky.

The other crops not only counter balance the
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.

• k involved in the tobacco harvest, but also supplement a subsistence household
r1s
Among the most important of these secondary crops are corn, pineapples,

economy.
·ce

rI

tomatoes, yuca, bananas, coffee, cocoa, and coconuts.

'

It goes without say-

ing that amid a market system, minifundist tobacco peasants are not economically
self-sufficient.

Tobacco production not only provides a source of income, however,

but it also reinforces the traditional peasant ideal of obtaining goods for direct
consumption from the land.
TABLE 20
MINIFUNDIST LAND USE IN 3,515 PLOTS IN THE CIBAO, 1971
FARM AREA
(tareas)

TOBACCO
LAND
(tareas)

BY ITSELF
(tareas)

1-32
32..:80

17,817
12 ,973

12,006
9' 181

(67.38)
(70. 77)

5' 811
3,792

(32.61
(29.22

14, 001
14,606

TOTAL

30,790

21 '187 (68.61)
---

9,603

(31.18

28,607

Source:

J

•

-

....

%

I

INTER-

%

Ml 1XED

THER CROPS
(ta reas)

(tareas)

data elaborated from Secretar i ado Tecnico de la Presidencia
1972: group IV, p. 3.

Secondary crops are selected for harvest according to three main criteria:
First, their growth cycle, and the time and labor investments in the crop must be
considered.

During the tobacco harvest it is almost impossible for a family

working a tobacco plot to dispense time and labor care to any other. crop.

Secondly,

the supplementary home diet value is important since some of these crops are not
market but family oriented.

Thirdly, the market price is considered in order to

supplement tobacco's cash returns.
Although these tobacco farms consider it their main cash crop, there are
other producers for whom tobacco is the secondary crop.

A few tareas of criollo

tobacco used as a secondary crop are very frequent in Cibao's farms to improve
income returns.

The tobacco harvest, a temporary crop, has the advantage of

Providing cash only three months after seed beds are made.

This money is secured

through middlemen advancements, the selling of barresuelo leaves,

or the
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economic practice of venta a la flor (early sell).

.

Tobacco is also a

harmful
. d credit crop especially in the country side store houses (pulperias).

This

goo

"'°neY
debts
"'°re,

is normally most helpful for household expenses and payments of store house
between seasons of other permanent or temporary principal crops.

Further-

tobacco's profits per tarea is among the highest of minifundist crops, and its

sole ha rvest is a secure source of community credit.
During fieldwork in Cutupu and Rio Verde Abajo in La Vega province, the
21 banana conuqueros and parceleros interviewed justified the presence of a few
tareas of tobacco in their farms as necessary to solve their lios (debts) in the
store houses.

For them tobacco represented both instant credit and easy cash.

As long as the tobacco price remains above $20.00/qq. they considered its harvest a good investment.
tro lo infelice.

As an informant said:

11

e i ta i bako e 1a co i se i cha de noj o-

Ella maita lo lio, sobrei too ahora que pagan ei ceiron pei

encima de lo' veinte peisos ••• "
Labor Organization in the Plots
While tobacco peasants economically rely upon their plots for subsitence,
the key to their production arrangements lies in its low cost of labor.
especially true since .they labor on their own land.

This is

Normally the father admin-

isters the economic resources of the family and the work is performed by the
nuclear family as an economic unit.
workers.

No cash payment is made to any of the family

The object of this family enterprise is subsislence and not individual enrich-

mentor profit maximization.

The tobacco minifundist does not value all inputs and

outputs in his plot in relation to market prices.

Rather he sees himself as a

Part of a nuclear family household for which he must provide subsitence at all
cost.
On some occasions the labor arrangement varies from the above.

The

nuclear family is used as a labor pool to take care of the harvest while the
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father goes out to echar dias (day labor) on a nearby larger farm or sharecrop
plot with the assistance of a few day laborers ..

Under these circimstances

8

the father will probably supervise labor in the family plot and work extra hours
on it.

If the nuclear family is not large enough or the youngsters are not of

working age, agricultural laborers on a daily basis are hired.
TABLE 21
PEASANT ECONOMIC DEPENDENCE IN 3,515 TOBACCO FARMS IN THE CIBAO, 1971
NON-AGRICULTURAL
ACTIVITIES

%

%

OTHER
FARMS

%

NOT
WORKING

%

FARM AREA
(tareas)

TOTAL
FARMS

HIS OWN
FARM

1-32
32-80

2,716
799

1,960
695

(72.16)
(86.98)

383
51

(14.10) 328
( 6. 38) 47

( 12. 09)
(5.88)

45 ( 1. 65)
5 (0.62)

TOTAL

3,515

2,655

(75.83)

434

(12.34) 375

( 10. 66)

50

( 1•42)

from ecretar 1a o Tecn1co de la Presidencia
p. 1Ob.
TABLE 22
LABOR FORCE EMPLOYED IN 3,515 TOBACCO FARMS IN THE CIBAO REGION, 1971

FARM AREA
(tareas)

TOTAL
FARMS

1-32
32-80

2,716
799

1,584
366

(58.32)
(45.80)

816
253

3,515

1,950

(55.47)

1,069

TOTAL

Source:

ONLY
KIN
MEMBERS

%

ABOVE ALL
KIN
MEMBERS

WAGE
LABORERS

%

(30. 04)
(31. 66)

316
180

(11.63)
(22.52)

(30.41)

496

(14.11)

%

rom Secretar 1a o Tecnico de la Presidencia
p. 11 a.

Estimates vary but it seems safe to maintain that a family of seven (five
men, the male children's ages ranging from 8 to 18 years of age, and two women)
can labor from ten to fifteen tareas of criollo tobacco.

Family labor is not

Compensated by wages regardless of how time consuming it becomes.

Agricultural

laborers are employed either because available family labor is scarce or during
transplanting and harvest time when labor requirements increase.

Day laborers
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• average payments of $1.50 per day plus breakfast and lunch ($1.00). But
receive
.
labor wages vary from zone to zone. For instance, in San Jose de las Matas

'daY

nico actual payment goes down to $1.00 per.day plus the food, while in Villa
and J a
lez and El lngenio daily wages are $2.50 plus breakfast and lunch. In some
Gonza
Instances, agricultural labor takes the form of an etagio: a price is estimated
for a specific job regardless of time requirements.

In this fashion the owner

of the plot compels the employee to do the work in a restricted time period instead
of stretching it out with the hope of augmenting his daily pay.

Usually etagios

are arranged with one laborer who is then responsible to employ any extra help he
requires and pay day laborers from the etagio money.
In addition to the labor of the nuclear family and the payment of day
laborers, there are two other sources of labor available to tobacco minifundist
peasants.

The first one springs out of the peasant• s 'Inner-adapt ional network'

and results in a labor pool integrated by immediate kin, in-laws, and compadres.
The second source of labor is commonly referred to as juntas.
The inner-adaptational network is a closely knit and well structured
social network through which the individual peasant secures control over. hi·s
environment and multiplies his adaptational resources and thus his chances of
success.

While in the case of other operating units to be analyzed later on this

is not true, in the case of the minifundist peasants their social networks seem
to be limited virtually exclusively to this inner-adaptational network.

The

members of this intensive and effective group integrate a wider adaptational
network in the peasant's own environment beyond the labor services they provide.
The members of the inner-adaptational network are normally distinguised by
peasants by referring to their kin members --above all brother and father's brother's
sons-- as mi familia which a restricted generational implication contrasting to
his own nuclear family.

In addition to his own family, his in-laws --above all

sister's husband~- are referred to as parientes and are considered to be the

104

ersons to the family itself.
closes t P
.

cOITIP

ca 1

.

Finally, the dyadic relationship of

adres (godfathers) established mainly through baptism may either be symmetrior assymetrical depending on the status of both members.

con St

The assymetrical

itution of compadrazgo or fictive ties are characterized as a patron-client

relationship.

In the case under study, a labor pool integrated by the inner-adap-

tational network of the minifundist peasant, the symmetrical compadre is more
likely to cooperate in tobacco harvest labors.

In some cases, the peasant might also

consider as a member of this inner-adaptational network an amigo (a friend), in
contrast to a conocido

(a known peroon upon a superficial and sporadic basis).

Friends are normally those non-kin persons who were born in the peasant's own
corrrnunity, or whose presence has been taken into consideration through a person
to person relationship from way back in time.

For this reason they are normally

also considered members of the inner-adaptational network.

In fact, most friends

are frequently selected to be symmetrical godfathers.
Members of a peasant's inner-adaptational network are expected to freely
and spontaneously cooperate among themselves under an ideal pattern of generalized
reciprocity.

Within this circle of the peasant's adaptational network a flow of

favors and services strengthens the unit; these might range from the granting of
their labor, or their advice, to financial and community support when needed.

Most

of these favor exchanges will not be obtained if it were not through this adaptational mechanism.

In fact, this fbw of services integrates not only a defensive

mechanism but it also grants a sense of security in the peasant himself since he
knows that when he might require any service from the members of his inner-adaptational network it will be granted to him.

This cooper~tion within the network

ts reinforced both by environmental pressures as well as by regional tradition.
The inner-adaptational network becomes more significant and demanding with
geographical proximity.
The consequence of this mutual dependence for services and favors within
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inner-adaptational network is an attitude of both confidence and respect growthei r highly personal relations.
essistance
perso

This confidence is in both

the

they will receive from other members when needed, as well as in the other

n himself; the respect embodied in the social relations existing in the netfonnalizes their exchanges and preserves the authority of the members.
Paradoxically, relations in the inner-adaptational group do not call for a

union of economic interests; i.e., common ownership of plots, crops, or other forms
of capital.

It is commonly agreed upon that one's first responsibilities are to

his own family ("la fami 1 ia es la sangre y la sangre pesa mas que el agua").
Individualistic pattern seems to prevail under normal daily conditions.

This

Thus,

every peasant knows that he is supported and protected by the members of his inneradaptational network; but daily responsibilities rely upon him and he is expected
to handle them with the cooperation of his nuclear family without constant appeal
to his adaptational network.
The second source of labor assistance are the "juntas".
to use nuclear family labor on their lands whenever possible.

Peasants attempt
But sometimes in

tasks which require labor beyond the capacity cf both his nuclear family and his
lnner-adaptational network labor pools,they attempt to obtain labor primarily
through "juntas":

a cooperative labor balanced exchange sysem.

Historically the

system was associated with a scarcity of labor related to a sparse population, but
today it seems to be a product of the inability of some peasants to lay out cash
for wage labor.

The "juntas" are not paid in cash; a certain amount of labor on

one man's field is exchanged for a given equivalent amount of labor on another
junta member's field.

The worker's food is provided by the owner of the field.

This junta practice seems to be rapidly decreasing under the more profitable practice of wage labor employment.

For instance, during the time of field-

Work only six tobacco juntas were reported altogether in the towns of Gurabo,
El lngenio and Villa Gonzalez.

Nevertheless, with the appearance of peasant's
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iaciones" {associations) and cooperative, and the Tobacco Institute advance-

Oc
''.:,:---

rnent of community labored seed beds, labor juntas arrangements are present but
onlY in an analogous form.

Instead of members laboring in other plots or even

Jn the seed beds, they usually pay a day labo(re- to do the labor he was expected
to have contributed.
Minifundist peasants have to compete with day laborers to employ themselves as agricultural workers or to harvest a plot under the sharecropping arrangement.

The day laborers are a group of landless workers forced to sustain

selves and their families through wage laboring on a daily base.

them~

They approximate

Mintz's description of a "rural proletarian" (1953-1954). They make a living by
selling their labor and live in callejones (rural roads connecting different plots).
Their houses are normally owned by a
might be theirs.

nearby landowner; although in some cases it

Frequently each callejon has seven or eight houses together each

one occupying less than one tarea of land.

In every "cal lejon" a family of three

or four brothers, their in-laws, and perhaps one or two friends establish residence.
Survey data from 35 day laborers from Pontezuela, El Rubio, and Rio Piedras Abajo
Indicates that their two main aspirations are:

to own a plot of land and/or to have

a permanent employment in an urban settlement.
Technology
Minifundist peasants make scarce utilization of technological means to
produce tobacco in their plots.
fertilizer and pesticide use.

Nineteenth century practices are intermixed with
Efforts from the agronomists of the Tobacco Institute

and from private export houses are gradually improving conditions.

These are dir-

ected toward seed beds construction and care, the use of pesticides and fertilizers
and care of leaves

with respect to humidity.

The crop yield increases and thas

the increased profits which these practices represent are stimulating the abandonment of both malpractices (like drying the tobacco leaves outside the tobacco
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and under the sun) and superstitious customs.

An example of the

·· .
r was the presence of a crucifix at each end of the plot to force insects
.11tte
es from the soi 1. As a peasant from Tambori 1 said: "If with ferti 1 izer
,pd p1ag U
the p1ant 1 s yield increases, I will make it drink that rum".
TABLE 23
TECHNOLOGICAL PRACTICES IN 3,515 TOBACCO FARMS IN THE Cf BAO, 1971
MECHANIC
FORCE

TOTAL
FARMS

456
228

2, 716
799
3,515
Source:

I

ANIMAL
FORCE

%
(16. 78)
(28.53)

1, 177
302

%
(43.33)
(37. 79)

BOTH

%

813
128

(29.93)
(16.02)

684
( 19.45)
(42.07)
411 ( 11. 69)
1,479
941
ata elaborated from Secretariado Tecnico de la Presidencia
1972: group IV, p. 12.

(26. 77)

A Mfnifundist Annual Income:

270
141

NONE

%
( 9.94)
( 17 .46)

An Estimate

One of the most arduous problems during field work was to estimate the
·present day income of a minifundist peasant.

While it is difficult to obtain

adequate aggregate statistics on the amounts of different crops produced, the
output and revenue of one such parcela unit may serve as an illustration.
Don Pedro G. lives in the municipio of Moca with a nuclear family of
seven; five of these are twelve years or ol:ler and none is married yet.
~rcela

His

comprises 40 tareas and it is valued at RD$14,450.00; of this amount,

$450.00 represents the value of the house and $14,000.00 the surrounding land.
The farm is in debt with the Agriculture Bank and interest payments may run between
$50.00 and $150.00 per tobacco season.

The parcela produced in 23 tareas 49 qq.

of criollo tobacco which he sold to a compadre middleman for $28.00/qq.; in ten
tareas he harvested 24 thousand bananas (two thousand monthly) and later sold
them for $14.00 per thousand; and some other minor crops 1 ike yuca and batatas •
. If labor costs are not considered, profits on the sale of the tobacco comes to

$843.oo,

on the sale of the bananas approximately $226.00 and from the minor
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an estimated

$150.00.

Don Pedro's parcela cash income is then roughly

$l,o19.00 a year once interest payments are paid.
During the month of August, don Pedro spent in the nearby store house

$64.63.

This bill includes such items as rice, beans, spaghetti, salt, cheese,

oil, bread, sugar, and onions; but excluded meat, chicken and eggs, for which
record was not able to be kept from a nearby country meat shop.

If this

monthly bill is representative of the year around food expenses at the puleria, then $775.56 for a household of eight persons

per year can be estimated.

This leaves roughly $243.44 --$20.28 per month-- to take care of all other
needs of the nuclear family throughout the year.
Obviously, if don Pedro's income is representative of other small tobacco
producers, it shows that the cash resources of minifundist peasants are very
scarce.

Occasional illness, or even expenditures on rum, cock fights and lottery

tickets will reduce them even more.

Harvest income drains itself into the re-

payment of seasonal debts acquired with the pulperia and other commercial units
of his environment.

With their present day control and access to land, tobacco

peasants can only hope to maintain a subsistence economy.

Meanwhile, entrepreneur-

ship is realistically out of their reach and they become contingent upon any unit
in control of financial resources.

On the other hand, there is no surplus from

which to buy products of handicraft or of domestic industries; ironically, the
growth of the latter is contingent upon an expanding internal market mainly
represented by these peasants who are the great majority of the rural population.
Financial Resources:

Cash and Production Credits

A critical aspect of tobacco peasant operations is their lack of capiresources, and thus their limited access to credit.

Amid a market system,

is not enough for peasants to control some tareas of land.
have access to a second core energy resource:

They also need

production credit and financial

Ii

I
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capita 1.
not a

In other words, the ownership of land, although a cultural value, is
m~ifundist

self-sufficient source of power for

peasants.

To offer a most evident example of their contingency upon production
credits and financial resources, two market strategies might be considered.
criollo market prices normally start for
Jn late January and early February.

11

barresuelo 11 leaves at $10.00 to $14.00/qq

As the season advances until the end of

August, market prices rise sometimes as high as $28.00 and $30.00/qq.
very end of the season they decline once more to an average $24.00/qq.

At the
Custom

calls for tobacco sales to take place once it has been bulked by the producer in
his tobacco shading house ("rancho") and before it is hampered.

The transactions

are expected to be negotiated according to the public market prices at that time.
In view of this, the peasant's strategy calls for holding the tobacco crop to
sell at higher prices before the end of the season.
In many cases, minifundist peasants find themselves in hard need of cash.
They might be either pressured by a small store owner to pay their seasonal debts,
or by the sickness of a kin member, or by similar other circumstances.

In this

situation the peasant has to sell his crop earlier in the season at lower prices
than would be obtained from a sale at a later date.

Another practice known as

"venta a la flor 11 (flower or early sale) may take place.

By this the peasant
'i

sells two or three quintals of his tobacco while the plant is still in the field.
The price is

set by the current market price.

The middlemen pay him and will

receive the tobacco ater when it is harvested and cured by the peasant.

Thus,

if the producer sells two quintals of tobacco at $10.00/qq early in February,
by the time he delivers the tobacco to the middlemen the market price will

Probably range from $24.00 to $28.00/qq.
net loss of $28.00 to the peasant.

This early sale represented a minimum

And the middlemen profited by a 130% interest

on the money advanced for less than five months.
As previously said, available field data indicates that production

I
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credit is the single greatest need of minifundist peasants in additbn to greater
tand control.

Our data also supports the assumption that the distribution of

accumulated financial resources is considerably more unequal than the mere
distribution of land resources and income.

Furthermore, fixed and operating

capital, in additon to land, is practically entirely in the hands of other units
which exclude the minifundist peasants.

The most common sources of cash and

production credits to peasants in their urban environment are: fi) various
forms of loans and financial credits; {ii) and the popular community "san" which
will not be considred

here because of its urban character and irregular employ-

ment among peasants to afford harvest and household expenses.
lnner-Adaptational Network Loans:
The most informal credit practice among minifundist peasants is the
interest free financial help coming from a member of his inner-adaptational
network.

In financial pools, older brothers and assymetrical compadres are

normally expected to cooperate promptly.

While relations with a brother or a

peasant's relatives are more open and egalitarian, exchanges with assymetrical
compadres are usually of the patron-client nature.

It is not unusual to hear,

when in private, prominent figures in the rural communities complaining that
they are looked upon as compadres (assymetrical in this case).

This is because

the flow of services and facbrs attached to that fictive kin relationship is
also assymetrical.
Undoubtedly, not only does the peasant receive gratification from these
assymetrical compadre relationships {either in cash, loans, employment and labor recommendations, protection from community law enforcement and the like)
but the compadre also grants favors.

The latter maintains the needed peasant

as his client for whatever reason he might desire, and normally the peasant
represents a guarantee to his compadre's social, political, and economic
community status.

For instance, 19 of 25 sharecroppers interviewed in Villa
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lez and Pontezuela who could benefit from the newly passed agricultural

Gon Za

laW #289, maintained that they will not occupy nor buy the land from their
landed elite compadres even when legally possible.
being

11

Their common argument

how could I do that to my godfather who has taken care of me for so

many years now ... ? 11 ; "after all". one of them reasoned, "hasn't Mr. D. given
me the food for my children all these years?"

Two of the remaining six doubted

on how to proceed while only four sharecroppers were planning to buy the land
as provided by the law.

It is only fair to observe that the sacredness of the

assymetrical compadre ties does not seem to hold for the children of the interviewed

share~roppers

--probably because of the

emergence of new adaptational

alternatives-- especially when it is at the expense of adaptational advantages.
Non-Commercial Credit:

11

Store House

Trueques 11 and Food Credits:

A form equivalent to cash acquisition among tobacco minifundists is
the

11

trueque 11 {exchange) of the kind with a store house owner.

Through this

strategy, the peasant exchanges some tobacco strings {sartas) for food, rum,
or any other res ired good.
price.

The sarta 1 s price is usually lower than market

This provides a profit to the

11

pulpero 11 who frequently resells the

tobacco when market price increases thereby obtaining a further profit margin.
In still other cases, the peasant is paid according to the market price but
the sartas are weighed in the pulperia 1 s balance --which uses an American
scale by which one pound

=

16 ounces-- while the peasant weighs his tobacco

as any other unit operating in the tobacco business in a French scale --in
which one pound

=

18 ounces.

Thus, the

1

sarta 1 show an artificial weight

decrease when sold to the pulpero which works to the merchant's advantage since
middlemen will buy the tobacco from him using a French scale.
Practice has encouraged peasants to take
houses at night hours.

1

The

11

trueque 11

sartas 1 from nearby tobacco curing

This has forced middle and big tobacco producers to

employ night watchmen in their tobacco 'ranchos {shading houses).

TABLE 24
ALTERNATIVE RESOURCES EMPLOYED BY 230 CIBAO TOBACCO MINIFUNDISTS DURING THE 1971-1972 SEASON
FARM AREA
(tareas)

TOTAL # OF
GROWERS

INNER ADAPTATIONAL NETWORK
LOANS

%

STORE HOUSE
NON-COMMERCIAL CREDIT

USURERS

%

%

PRODUCERS
JRGANIZATIONS

%

1-32

115

91

(79.13)

104

(90.43)

18

(15.65

27

(15.65)

32-80

115

88

(76.52)

106

(92.17)

15

(13.04

49

( 13. 04)

10

( 8.69)

39

(33.91

230

179

(77. 82)

210

(91.30)

%

bTHER

33

( 14. 34

76

(14.34)

103 (89.56) 18 ( 1~
98 (85.21) 26 (2:
----------

-

TOTAL

MIDDLEMEN

-

---·----

-

BANK
%
PROD UCTION
CRDITS

49

(21.30

----------- --·--------·--------·---- ------ -·----·--·------·----- -

201 (87.39) 44 ( 1~
-------

---- ----

(Note: These minifundist producers were verbally asked to identify the financial alternatives actually
employed by them during the tobacco season regardless of the amount received and the number of times
they resorted to the same source. Every alternative was separately recorded. The figures in the table
represent the number of peasants which resorted to the various sources of finance. Although some middlemen are also members of the peasants inner-adaptational network, they were distinguished according to the
role for which the money was granted. The figures in parenthesis refer to percents of peasants in each
category).
Peasant's geographical origin is: Guazumal (22), Jacagua (25), Gurabo (33), Pontezuela (44), Cutupu (16),
San Jose de las Matas (35), Licey al Medio (12), Tamboril (12), and Moca (26).
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peasants normally find a source of credit for household food consumption
In the store houses near their plots.
since

Peasant-store owner relations are complex

each must pursue an interest hostile to the other.

The store owner must

often extend credit to a peasant merely to tide him over until harvest time.
If he stops credit, the peasant will simply switch his patronage to another
J?!:!lperia and the entire amount he owed might be irrevocably lost.

On the other

hand, the peasant debtor knows that if he does not pay a little on account from
time to time, he can lo longerb.Jy there, and his bad reputation will spread to
nearby stores.

In this fashion, minifundist peasants and store owners maintain

a season long relationship intermixed with credits and small reimbursements.
For instance, available

information for a pulperia in La Vereda, Rio Verde

(La Vega), indicates that it had at the moment of fieldwork the sum of RD$1P51.38
in the customer's debit side, meanwhile, its total fixed and operating capital
was RD$3,411.65.
Frequently peasant seasonal debts are repaid to the store owner with
tobacco instead of cash money.

At the moment of harvest pulperos receive tobacco

from the peasant debtors to repay their individual debts (lios).

For this rea-

son, and because of previously mentioned "trueque" practices, store owners
normally work as

11

comines" (second middlemen) to tobacco middlemen.

They either

receive half the middlemen's commission ($1.00/qq.) or instead of a division
of the purchasing commission they realize the profit margin growing out of the
price differences between the one paid to the peasant and the one obtained
from the middlemen when transferring the tobacco to him.
The study of commercial practices of 20 store houses randomly selected
from rural communities in Gurabo, San Jose de las Matas, Jacagua, Tamboril,
Moca, and Cutupu, showed that 18 of them practiced the

11

trueque 11 exchange,

and all of them accepted tobacco for the repayment of seasonal debts.

Evidence
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is also available that at lea~ 14 of these store houses served as comines (second
middlemen) to middlemen.
Prestamistas (usurers):
One of the

mo~

unfavorable options available to minifundist peasants

in order to obtain cash is the appeal to a usurer or prestamista.

Their money

is normally loaned with a 15 to 20% monthly interest rate; as an informant jokingly
said, al modico 20.

In some cases, local usurers depend upon city loan houses

thus operating as middlemen themselves, but in other instances, they just borrow
money from them at a 3% monthly rate.

Most frequently usurers start lending

some cash which comes from the selling of inherited land, or from the operations
of some commercial enterprise.

With the passing of the years they consolidate

and expand their clientele and capital.
The operations of two of these usurers studied in the town of Villa
Gonzalez, and of another one from San Jose de las Matas, showed each prestamista
--two of them being women-- having lower middlemen usurers working for them thus
establishing a more complex network between them and the peasants and sharecroppers clientele in the community.

Another case from Gurabo, indicated a

middle food store owner lending money on a weekly basis.
There is sufficient evidence to maintain that in the last decade, at
least some middle and big landowners have also started lending money to minifundist peasants, although with lower monthly interest than those of the traditional usurers (5 to 10%?).

Since they are in possession of better financial

resources than m1nifundist producers, they augment the range of their rural
environmental control through this strategy.

In one of the reported cases, a

landowner of 210 tareas in the proximities of Moca is said to have sold 120
tareas of his farm in order to procure sufficient liquid capital to get him
into the lending business as a more secure source of profits than agriculture.
Regardless of whether these cases are representative or not, the fact seems
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to be that in the absence of financial credits minifundist peasants are vulnerable not only to the high rates of interest of traditional usurers but also
to the financial control of middle and big land owners.
peasant Organizations:
During the last years peasants have organized either by themselves or
with outside help a number of tobacco growers associations (asociaciones), and
they have created a number of savings and loans cooperatives.

The main purpose

of these organizations is to enable and improve peasant's production, financial and
~rketing

Ing.

potentialities through structural arrangements of cooperation and plann-

some of the tobacco associations, in contrast to the cooperatives, are more

Informal in nature and locally oriented.
spontaneous origin and organization.

In fact, they show characteristics of

Their composition, as is probably also

true of local cooperatives, is integrated by members of the peasant's inneradaptational network.
From a total of 11 peasant local organizations visited and studied, the
composition of two of these tobacco associations in La Vega province was analyzed in more detail.

The first had 17 members, the other 24.

operations by local initiative in 1969 and 1970.

Both had started

Presently, in 1972, they were

receiving some limited advice from the community services of the privately owned
Santa Maria Radio in the Santo C~rro, and from agronomists from the Tobacco
Institute, in matters ranging from credit record keeping to construction of
tobacco seed beds.

Their minimum objectives were to cooperate in labors of

tobacco crop; provide some limited credit assistance to members by enforcing
some saving practices; and to market their own tobacco (and other crops) without
the interference of middlemen.
being accomplished.

At the moment of the fieldwork the first goal was

The other two, lacking the necessary capital assets and

thus financial resources, were not being realized.
Member composition of the two associations seemed representative of other
local organizations because of the formal integration they accomplished
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with the peasant's inner-adaptational network.

For instance~ the composition

of the firs association studied was, taking the informant as ego:

four brothers

of ego, his father, two brothers-in-law, and three symmetrical and one assymetrical compadres of ego.

The remaining five members were neighbors of ego and

all but one were related through compadre and relative ties with some of
ego's brothers.
These small peasant's organizations, although still small both in scale
and in number, seem to have a fair chance of breaking present day financial
control of prestamistas, middlemen, and other units over them.

If these mini-

fundist peasants accomplish the mastering of formal group association techniques; if they are able to over-run the influence of local economic and political
bosses; finally, if non-peasant concerns, like those of political nature from the
national government and of the army, do not block the operations of these groups;
then, these socio-economic organizations will widen individual peasants• social
range of operations and their available credit resources, thus improving the
financial standing of peasant members.
Furthermore, if they accomplish the local marketing (from the peasant
group to the tobacco criollo warehouse) of the member's harvested tobacco, they
will probably obtain better prices by increasing thar bargaining power through
the volume of the harvest.

The control of the marketing operations by these

organizations, instead of present day middlemen, will further increase their
profits with the possible transfer of the latter's purchasing commission to the
producer organizations.
Were this to happen, export houses could then institute a new purchasing
Policy.

Instead of depending upon middlemen to guarantee them the necessary

supply of criollo tobacco, exporters could transact directly with the producer
organizations.

This could be done through a contract stipulating first that

Previously advanced money delivered to producers by means of middlemen, will
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In return, they might agree to

sell their tobacco to the patronizing export house fixing prices according to
market conditions after the harvest is ended.

This procedure would not only

rationalize purchasing operations, but it probably would eliminate middlemen
marketing practices at least in some tobacco zones; contribute to the organization or producing sector, and also guarantee exporters their share of harvested
tobacco in advance.
In any case, the Tobacco Institute has called upon the Agriculture Bank
(Bagricola) to grant tobacco production credits to small grower's associations
starting with the 1972-1973 season.

This will break an old policy by means of

which production credits were not extended to non-legally recognized peasant
organizations.

This financial support, if effective, will increase association

members capacity in obtaining credit from their own organization and thus
accomplishing one of their most urgent functional needs.

On the other hand,

this practice will augment the range of credit services from official organizations to minifundist peasants which today seem almost non-existent.
Bank Production Credits:
The most formal source of production credit available to tobacco minifundist
producers is that of the Agricultural Bank and of the Agriculture Department; both
credits are channeled through the official Tobacco Institute with an annual interest rate of 8% normally, it becomes 10% once administrative expenses are included.
These credits cover all production costs as presented in tables 15 and 20; under
special contracts the construction of tobacco curing houses.

Besides they pro-

vide for technical assistance guaranteed by the agronomists of the Tobacco Institute.
The credit program of the Agriculture Department known as supervised
credit, favors those peasants who in previous seasons have failed to comply with
credit reimbursement requirements of the Agriculture Bank.

When this happens
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an d

the peasant applies for a new credit his case is sent to the Agriculture

Department where his petition is studied by officials of both

the Department

an d the Tobacco Institute.
Another source of official credit available to the peasant is that of
the community Development Office (O.D.C.).

Their credits are channeled in

coordination with the Tobacco Institute, but the range of these credits is
normally wider since it embraces community programs as well.

According to some

informants, this source of credit is the one most politically oriented among
the three official organizations providing production credit to peasants.
The process of obtaining a loan from the Agriculture Bank is complex
and time consuming.

The Bank requires a number of documents, the most signifi-

cant of all being the land ownership certificate, and a contract of technical
assistance between the peasant and the Tobacco Institute.

The former require-

ment automatically excludes all sharecroppers and many small peasants without
proper land documents, from credit eligibility.

But because the land is the

creditor's best guarantee, this requirement is not overlooked; even when there
is no sign on the part of the Bank or any other official organization of being
interested in expropriating small plots.

Other requirements embrace the signa-

ture of the local mayor (alcalde pedaneo} if the land occupied by the peasant
is owned by the State.

A two years' lease is required if the land is rented;

but if the loan is for the construction of a tobacco curing house then the
lease must be for a minimum of four years.

Peasants older than 60 years of age

have to accompany their signature with that of a close kin member who will
guarantee the credit in case of illness or death of the elder man.

In additbn

to these documents and requirements, the Bank demands that the peasant be free
of debts, and that he has never evaded or failed to reimburse previous credits.
Once the peasant has complied with these necessary requirements he becomes
involved in a highly bureaucratic procedure which starts by visiting the Tobacco

119

itute and the Agriculture Bank, or any of their local branches. From the
ins t
. ning of the credit application form to the first disbursement, an average

s•9

of 35 to 45 days elapse.

In contrast to the procedure to obtain an Agricultural

sank credit, the Agricultural Department supervised credit requires only from
20 to 25 days for its approbation.

The Secretary requires that the peasant be

the owner of the land and be able to reimburse the credit.

In order to determine

his solvency an official of the credit department of the Secretary will visit
his plot and estimate his land and other equipment values.
All official credits are based on the Tobacco Institute production cost
estimates per tarea.

But for each specific peasant these estimates are re-elabor-

ated between the peasant and the Agricultural Bank credit experts.

The Bank's

experts normally try to reduce the approved credit release below the amount
corresponding to the Tobacco lnstitute's estimates.

According to various lnsti-

tute officials their estimates try to provide a margin between the harvest
expenses per tarea of tobacco and the approved credit disbursement for any
occasional need the peasant might have during the season.

The ratbnale behind

this is that if this money is not guaranteed to the peasant for household expenses
he will have to go to a middleman or to a usurer to secure his money.

In either

case, the reimbursement of the production credit to the financial source will be
endangered and the economic independence of the peasant handicapped.
In order to control credit expenditures, money disbursements are made
according to specific labors as the season advances. Each disbursement has to
be signed both by the peasant and the regional agronomist of the Tobacco lnstitute.

The latter checks into the money employment and the specific financial

needs of the peasant's crop at each time of the harvest; if necessary, he can
lONer the actual disbursements below the amount approved by the Agricultural
Bank credit expert.

The requirement of his signature and his authority to

determine the final figure of each credit disbursement has occasioned some abuses

.

~ Pr
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essures on the part of the agronomists according to some peasant informants .
The most difficult task in relation to bank production credits is the

procurement of its reimbursement.

Formerly this task was taken care of by the

Agriculture Bank itself; but presently it has been transferred to the Tobacco
institute which in this

way monopolizes credit operations furthermore.

Most

of the small peasants are economically insolvent and they prefer to pay

deb~s

to a nearby store owner or to a middleman for instance, before taking care of
their more formal debts from outside their own communities.

For this reason,

according to some officials of the Tobacco Institute, even when the approved
credit for the 1971-1972 tobacco season was RD$2,571,482.07, only RD$1,551,988.02
was actually spent.

According to the informants, this was the only way they could

control its employment and final reimbrsement.

Presently, the Institute is claim-

ing an almost 100% credit reimbursement; in previous years it seems that the
Agricultural Bank by itself could never get repayments for more than 60 to 70%
of the money.
The 1971-1972 official production credit financed, according to unpublished information from the Tobacco Institute, only 9.4% of the estimated
25,000 tobacco growers of all varieties.
28.5% of the 336,000 tareas under harvest.

In tobacco surface this amounted to
There are no estimates available to

know how much of this finance went to minifundist, to middle or to big landowners.
However, the fact that the 9.4% of the financed landowners had 28.5% of the
tobacco land suggests that a high proportion of these tobacco growers are not
minifundist but middle and big landowners.
The Tobacco Institute credit proposals (cf. lntabaco 1972 b:7, and 48-

49) for the 1972-1973 tobacco season calls for a total disbursement of
RD$3,4SO,OOO.

Of this amount the Agricultural Bank is expected to contribute

RD$3,000,000; the Agriculture Department with its progam of supervised credit
With RD$250,000; and the Community Development Office would add RD$200,000.
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curing

iollo tobacco harvest would receive RD$1,600,000 of the approp"riated money;
tobacco RD$450,000; and olor tobacco RD$900,000.

Meanwhile for tobacco

house and mechanical equipment RD$500,000 would be employed.
Interestingly enough, the approximate actual disbursement for this

tobacco season has been once again lower than predicted by the official Tobacco
institute.

Until January 31, 1973 when official financing operations normally

end 340,549 tareas of tobacco have been financed with RD$4,326,382.

To this

amount the Agricultural Bank actually contributed only RD$1,945,852.35; the
Agriculture Department only RD$156,062; and the Community Development Office
RD$198,076.

The remaining credit came from the private Dominican Development

Foundation --RD$40,468.48-- and not surprisingly from private export houses:
RD$2,184,000 (cf. El Sol newspaper, Thursday, February 15, 1973; second section,
p.1).

Official credit output increased in respect to the previous tobacco

season RD$748,632.33, although being RD$1, 149,379.65 short from the proposed
goal.
Peasants are still unaccustomed to and unsure of the benefits resulting
from the employment of bank credits.

A number of complaints and prejudices are

frequently formulated againstthe official credit program.

Some of these are:

(i) the complex and impersonal bureaucratic procedures to be followed to
guarantee the credit. ("it) The normal delays of money disbursements. (iii)
Credit restrictions in money employment, especially for non-harvest uses.
(iv) fearfulness of not being able to pay the credit interest.

And

As a matter of

fact, minifundist peasants seemed most reluctant to use bank credit facilities
primarily because of fear of losing their plots which is the only asset guarantee
they have to cover the credit.
Although a minority of

minifundi~

peasants who are taking advantage of

the official production credits seem to be pleased with this alternative, 44 of
49

11

conuqueros" and

11

parceleros 11 of criol lo tobacco from Burende, Gurabo, Pontezuela
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ua and Licey al Medio, when asked whther they will apply for their bank

or s Up

erivised credit during the 1972-1973 season, answered affirmatively.

Their main reason being that with the production credit they are able to evade
the middlemen pressures thus selling their crop under the most favorable market
conditions; besides, it helped to organize their economies.

When asked whether or

not they took some money from another source, 41 acknowledged they had done so,
and 34 frankly admitted receiving the money from a middleman.

Their explanation

being that they needed the cash for household needs, including medicines and
food and other pressing debts.
Export Houses

r

M"oney .•.

Middlemen Advancements:

Undoubtedly, the most common and customary cash loans available to the
criollo tobacco minifundist during the tobacco season is that coming from the
private export houses through their warehouse middlemen.

The operations and

importance of the middlemen will be considered when analyzing the second level
of articulation of the tobacco industry.
that middlemen's

11

At this point it suffices to mention

dinero regado 11 (distributed money) has a number of advantages

over any production credit in the eyes of the peasant.
Some of the advantages are:

first, that this money is provided for

whatever purposes the peasant might consider convenient; it is not a production
credit in a strct sense, but a money loan.

Second, the money does not have to

be reimbursed in cash nor does the peasant have to pay any interest for its
use.

Third, the money is home delivered and granted on a personal basis.

Fourth, the middleman grants the money at the moment of request without weeks
of delay and bureaucratic interference.

Fifth, the only condition attached to

the money is that the peasant will have to repay the advanced cash by offering
the middleman preference over competing buyers to purchase his crop at public
market prices when the transaction might take place.
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Relations between peasants and middlemen are very complex in nature
and structure since each one knows he is pursuing an interest which might become
hostile to the other.
ba;is.

First of all, they normally know each other on a personal

Minifundist peasants, if presented the alternative, will not sell tobacco

to a strange middleman {personas or cualguiera); but to a member of, or at most
to one related to, his inner-adaptational network.

On the other hand, the middle-

man prefers to advance money and depends on for his clientele, peasants he knows
as a result of a person to person relationship.

But, secondly, they both are

well aware that the other might try to take advantage of him thus converting
a balance of reciprocity exchange into an unbalanced one.

Significantly enough,

during the adual tobacco transaction the inner-adaptational network ties, if
existing between the buyer and the seller, do not prevent tension and the pursuit
of individual interest at the expense of the other.

Thus, this situation is

analogous to the division of inherited land among kinsmen.
For instance, the peasant knows that the middleman might try to be unfair in matters of price and/or weight.

In the former strategem the middleman

is able to take advantage of the peasant's ignorance .of the warehouse fixed
purchasing price and its fluctuations.

In the latter, by weighing the tobacco

at the time of the sale in a fixed balance.
On the other hand, the middleman has to keep vigilance on the moisture
of the hampered tobacco, and the content of the hampers themselves; in some
cases stones and dust will be included in them to augment the tobacco weight.
In other cases, the minifundist peasant, especially if he is only a conocido
(a social category standing between a friend and a stranger) or a "persona"
(a stranger) to the middleman--might try to evade reimbursement of the advanced
money (cruzarse) by not sel 1 ing his crop to hi>m.

If this were to happen, the

middleman will probably lose the advanced money and for sure the expected
Purchase commission.

Besides, he will have to reimburse the advanced money

124

tO the

export house warehouse from his own profits.
Regardless of actual tension and even conflicts growing out of these

pra

ctices, middleman and peasant are contingent upon each other under present

day marketing arrangements.

The small producer needs the advanced money and

has to sell his tobacco to the warehouse.

On the other hand, the middleman

depends upon the peasant to obtain a clientele which will justify his commercial
enterprise in front of the warehouse.

Also, since his profits are formally

conditioned by a purchase commission, he has to increase his clientele in order
to augment the final volume of purchased tobacco.
Up to the present time, minifundist peasants have not organized themselves significantly as to minimize the middleman's role.

On the other hand,

because of the high number of independent small tobacco producers, warehouses
cannot deal with them directly and thus discourage peasants' presence on their
premises.

This they do by neither offering to advance the peasants money

directly nor granting the middleman's purchasing commission to them if they
sell their tobacco to the warehouse directly.

Besides this policy, peasants

themselves rarely like appearing in front of an export firm warehouse.

Among

other reasons, they do not want to risk the rejection of their tobacco at the
inspection gate of the warehouse, nor can they affort the transportation costs
from the plot to the warehouse, or to lose income returns because of therormal
tobacco weight shrinkage (merma) resulting from the time elapse between the
moment the tobacco is purchased by the middleman and when it is weighed and
received by the warehouse.

These risks the peasant will leave for the middle-

man to take, thus conforming himself with the sale of his crop in his own
tobacco shading house.
Other Independent Production Units
Besides conuqueros and parceleros

peasants there are three other
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endent operating units in the production level of the tobacco lndustry.

TheY are:

middle owner peasants, latifundists, and a newly arising agricultural

tobacco entrepreneur.

In an over all generalization, the most significant

diffence between their adaptational network and that of minifundist peasants
are: (i) the size and the agricultural exploitation of their farms; (ii) the'
tabor social organization in their farms; (iii) and their sources of production
credit and f iAancial assistance.
Landholdings:
According to table 23, the number of enumerated tobacco farms with more
than 80 tareas is only 653 (15.66%) of 4, 168 farms, but they control 80% of the
tobacco surface.

The average size of a latifundist farm is 2,336 tareas in

sharp contrast to a conuco averaging 14 tareas and a parcela with 49 tareas.
However, the agricultural exploitation of their estates is not as intensive
as that of mhifundist plots.

While the middle and entrepreneur group comprises

131,416 tareas of land, only 37, 162 (28.27%) are presently harvested: 15,850
tareas with tobacco (67.44% by itself, and 32.55% intermixed with other crops),
while 21,312 tareas are harvested with secondary crops.

On the other hand,

the landed elite has 177,520 tareas of land with only 32,834 (18.49%) tareas
under harvest: 5,625 tareas with tobacco (96.03% by itself and 3.96% intermixed with secondary crops), and 27,209 tareas of tobacco (cf. Secretariado
Tecnico de la Presidencia 1972: group IV).
Not surprisingly, the conucos with only 10% of the land in the census,
produce 34% of the tobacco harvest, while parcelas with another 10% of the
area add 25% to the national tobacco production.

In all, minifundist tobacco

production accounts for 59% of the national harvest, compared with 11% from
J!tifundios, and 30% from middle owner peasants and tobacco entrepreneurs.
This intensity of land use is, in fact, so much greater on the small plots
that it outweighs all thar disadvantages in terms of poorer soils and lack of
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nical and financial resources.

tee h

The low level of agricultural exploitation and of productivity, specificallY in the landed elite's estates, is usually explained in the association
with three variables.

Although some of these are highly questionable, they are:

(i) technological means of production (cf. table 25') which do not significantly
vary from the one employed by minifundist producers (cf. table2})).

(ii) Harvester

income contingency upon land yieldings which is not so high among large landholders as in the case of n:iinifundist peasants (cf. tables '21and26:).

(iii)

The presence of pasture land in big estates with its characteristic eco-system
of extensive land use:

the minimum yearly average ratio

pasture land is 10-20 tareas for every cow.

between criollo, cattle and

Frequently the cattle are rotated

from one potrero (pasture land portions) to another as the pangola (cattle grass)
grows.

A rough estimate indicates 150-250 cattle heads in the big estates.
TABLE 25
TECHNOLOGICAL PRACTICES IN 653 TOBACCO FARMS IN THE CIBAO, 1971

l==========F=====::;===-=-=--=-======;==============;===============;=============i
FARM AREA
(tareas)

80-800
800 and mor

OTAL
ARMS
577
76

MECHANIC
FORCE

%

ANIMAL
FORCE

122 (21. 14)
18 (23. 68)

198
23

%

(34. 31)
(30.26)

BOTH

%

NONE

%

126
23

(21.83)
(30.26)

131
12

(22. 70)
(15.78)

....._TO_TA_L_--c---'--"65-=-3
140 (21.43)
221 (33.84
149
22.81
14
Source: cfata efaI>oraTecT--from Secretariado Tecniao de la Presidencia
1972: group IV, p. 12a.
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TABLE 26
ECONOMIC DEPENDENCE OF 653 TOBACCO FARMERS IN THE CABAO REGION, 1971
FARM AREA
(tareas)

TOTAL
FARMS

HIS OWN
FARM

%

NON-AGRICULTURAL ACT IV ITV

%

OTHER
FARMS

%

NOT
WORK I NG

~

!

,11
1

1

1,I
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Whatever the explanatory value of these variables, low agricultural
yf e !

dings and low levels of land exploitation also seem to be connected with

big land owners attitudes towards agricultural operations.

For them agricul-

ture is often a sideline; as a matter of fact, to a large number of big estate
·owners there seem to be few economic incentives to imporve traditional land
uses and farm management methods.
and credit--just do not work.

Traditional economic incentives--i.e., prices

Their impact also seems to be minimal since other

factors governing farm management and production strategies are much more impertant.

The best guarantee for maintaining economic returns, which may be entirely

adequate for the owners, is the mere control of large extensions of farm land.
Total returns can remain quite substantial, even if the yields per tarea are
low and declining,

if large areas are under cultivation.

Any management

improvement which they introduce or any change in their scale of operations must
not sap the basis of the traditional economic, social and even political relationship prevailing between them and their sharecroppers and day laborers.

New

farming techniques are probably likely to be adopted only if they do not disturb
in any fundamental manner the rural environment's social stratification and
traditional labor relations.
Among the factors which affect the growth of the agricultural sector in'
general is capital investment.
known and explored.

Although crucial, it seems to be one of the least

No adequate statistics are available on private investments

on a regional or national scale.

But according to our data, based on private

'I
1'

I;,

interviews with 10 big landowners from Villa Gonzalez, La Canela and Jacagua, a
good working hypothesis is that tobacco latifundios

are starved of liquid

capita 1 funds.
Probably one of the reasons for agricultural stagnation is the lack of
Private investments.

Obviously, minifundist holders and most of the middle

Peasant owners involved in a family enterprise earn incomes which preclude

I
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·ngs and thus investments since their capital resources are low or non-existent.

5 av•

Although the total fixed and working capital on the large estates is considerably
larger, it does not seem necessarily adequate.

This is primarily because of lati-

fundists' tendency to spend their profits on consumption goods or in other ways
no t

related to tobacco or other crop's harvests.

The few cases examined indicate

that the big landowners keep little of their income for investment in their properties, thus supporting this hypothesis.
Few exceptions to this generalization may be found in the Villa Gonzalez
municipality.

Here the landed elite numbering from 8 to 12 maintain a business

{negocio) like attitude towards their tobacco harvest.

Efficient management,

plus technological advancements, and even capital investment and financial undertakings, contribute to higher yields and bulk tobacco operations.

In addition,

several of them control a number of criollo tobacco local packers thus augmenting
their range of operations from the production to the packing sphere.

Nevertheless,

their control of great extensions of land plus the following factors have created
a conflict situation in the zone.

The factors are:

the utilization of traditional

labor arrangements and social forms of relationship (for instance, sharecropping
and the compadrazgo networks) for their business enterprises; and their landholdings
forcing the development of a rural proletariat contingent upon wage labor either
in their fields or in their local packers.
Labor Organization
Sharecropping Arrangement:
With the increase in landholding extensions, the most culturally significant difference between minifundist plots and their counterparts is the frequent
alteration in farm social organization.

Minifundist peasants and most of the

smaller middle owners--those whose farms range from 80 to 150 tareas--conduct a
,)

family enterprise.

This, however, is not the case between tobacco latifundist

'II'·.'il' .I

Ii
·I''
,1··1'·

;i

I
I.
Ii,,
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her production units.
and Ot

They can not work their own land on a tamily base,

o they maintain a subsistence economy.
nor d

On the other hand, this is the

case with the sharecroppers in their fields.
TABLE 27
LABOR FORCE EMPLOYED IN 653 TOBACCO FARMS IN THE CIBAO REGION, 1971
FARM AREA
(tareas)

TOTAL #
FARMS

ONLY KIN
MEMBERS

%

577
76

156
5

(27.03)
(6.57)

so-Boo

800 and more

ABOVE ALL
KIN MEMBERS
161
9

%
(27. 90)
( 11. 84)

WAGE
LABOR

%

260
62

(45.06)
(81. 57)

,,
11

TOTAL

Source:

161
(24. 65)
322 (49. 31)
170
(26.03)
653
data e lao-orated froiii-s·ec:-r:e-tarTado-Tecnlco de la Presidencia
1972: group IV, p.1 la.

The most common labor organization among middle and big tobacco growers
is the special form of land renting known as aparceria (sharecropping).

Although

this arrangement is practiced by all production units it is most frequently
employed by middle and large land owners.

Ironically sharecroppers, normally

landless and minifundist peasants, are not able to afford the normal lease
contracts of $10.00 to $20.00 annual average lease per tarea.

Thus, ironically,

they pay 50% of their crop sale to the landowner for the use of the land.
Sharecroppers, known as colonos, or medianeros, or aparceros, normally
find two main problems in obtaining the land under a normal lease contract.

First

of all, landowners prefer the aparceria system in contrast to the leasing of their
land.

This is primarily because it increases their profits even when it is more

time consuming.

Secondly, that the lease contracts have to be paid in full at

the time of their signing; but the lack of financial resources of a normal
sharecropper precludes his control of the total lease money at the beginning of
the season.

The contract, if accepted, is usually signed in the Agricultural

Department and offers freedom to the lessee for harvesting whatever crop he
considers best.

TABLE 28
SHARECROPPING PRACTICE IN 294 TOBACCO FARMS IN THE CIBAO REGION DURING THE 1971-1972 SEASON

FARM AREA
(ta reas)

TOTAL #
FARMS

SHARECROPPING IN OWNER'S LAND
NO
%
YES
%

OWNER WORKING A PLOT AS SHARECROPPER
NO
%
YES
%

1-32

115

17

(14.78)

98

(85.21)

69

(60.00)

46

(40.00)

32-80

115

36

(31.30)

79

(68. 69)

74

(64.34)

41

(35.65)

80-800

55

48

(87. 27)

7

(12.72)

6

(10.90)

49

(89.09)

9

9

( 100. 00)

--

--

--

--

9

(100.00)

149

(50.68

145

(49.31)

800 and more
TOTAL

294

-

110

(37.41) 184

(62.58

(Note: 294 producers were verbally asked whether or not they had given some of their land
under the sharecropping arrangement, and whether or not they themselves were working in
another plot under this arrangement. The percent figures correspond to the number of
producers in each category. The geographical origin of the minifundist producers is
given at the bottom of table 24. That of the remaining middle producers in this table
is: Villa Gonzalez (9), La Canela (7), El lngenio (6); Pontezuela (9), Licey al Medico
(10), Jacagua (9), Meca (5). Finally, the ten big landholders come from Villa Gonzalez
(4), El lngenio (2), Moca (1).
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To offer an example of the economic disadvantages of the sharecropping
arrangements in comparison with land leasing, let us consider the case of a 35
careas aparcero from Tamboril.
with a yield of 58 qq.

Don Genaro harvested 27 tareas of criollo tobacco

Seven tareas of secondary crops --yuca and beans-- were

Intermixed with the tobacco along with eight tareas of bananas having an annual
yield of approximately 19,200 bananas.

He sold the tobacco at $30.00/qq., and

J4 thousand bananas at $18.00/the thousand (the remaining platanos were consumed
In his household with the explicit authorization of the landowner).

The secondary

crops intermixed with the tobacco were given to him to supplement his household
diet.

Thus, his produce amounted to $1,740.00 and $2,500.00 respectively.

Of

the total $4,260.00, 50% was given to the landowner in compliance with sharecropping stipulations.

The remaining money --$2, 130.00 went to Don Genaro for

payment of production costs and household annual expenses.

If the land had been

rented at $15.00 per tarea, then the lease would have been $525.00; a net difference of $1,995.00 with actual sharecrop payment.
Aparceros of minifundist and smaller-middle tobacco landowners usually
receive a plot of land varying in size from five to 30 tareas.

Probably small

landowners turn some of their already scarce tareas to the colono either because:
,I

(i) he is trying to help the aparcero by providing him with some land to work;
(ii) the owner cannot afford the cost of harvest production bylimself; or (iii)
he has a non-agricultural source of income in a nearby town or in a city; and
(iv) still another possibility is that the landowner's old age impedes him from
directly working the land.

The first alternative is frequently verbalized among

symmetrical compadres and kin members.

Economic reasons working to the owner's

advantage might also interfere in their decision of conceding sharecrop land
besides social and traditional practices of generalized reciprocity.
evidence of this was not found during field work.

But

1"
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Sharecroppers from minifundist and smaller-middle owners
members of the owner 1 s adaptational network.
a medias or an a tercias arrangement.

an-~...;:.:.;;.~-

ar~

normally

They receive the land either under

In the former option, which is the most

widely practiced, the arrangement calls for a 50-50 division of the income
returning from the sale of tobacco, but not of production costs.

Out of his

share, the aparcero pays all production costs except the construction and repair
of the tobacco shading house.
is almost disappearing.

The second alternative, the a tercias arrangement

It calls for two thirds of the income returning from

the sale of tobacco to be given to the sharecropper who then will be responsible for all production costs.

Of the 35 sharecroppers --30 a medias and 5 a

tercias-- asked which alternative they preferred, all agreed that the a medias
system is most beneficial for the worker.

The extra one third share from the

tobacco sale allocated in the a tercias arrangement does not cover the extra
costs under the sharecropper's responsibility, thus further shrinking their
already scarce profits.
The sharecrop arrangement does not grant the aparcero the freedom to
cultivate the crops he might desire.

They are either told to plant all the

land in tobacco, or are allowed to use some tareas for market or for household
secondary crops.

In the second alternative, they will be told whether the

sharecropping arrangement applies to the income returning from all the crops
or only to that of the tobacco production.

Sharecroppers who also happen to

be minifundist owners would 1 ike to harvest most of the tobacco in their own
plots and the secondary crops in the sharecrcpped land.

The rationale behind

this is that tobacco is the best income resource they have and thus will not
have to divide it if harvested in their own lands.

This opportunity is not

granted to them.
There might be some variant arrangements in sharecropping deals.

For

instance, in Janice and San Jose de las Matas sometimes aparceros are given the
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or a period ranging from two to three years and they are asked to retain
1and f
the 50% income share of the landowner.
~r

Meanwhile, they are expected to take

e of all production costs and to replant the sharecropped land with pasture

grass (.e.angola) for future cattle raising.

Some agronomist informants estimated

that the value of the land duplicates with pasturage.

On the other hand, labor

requirements will decrease with cattle ranches thus forcing the peasants and
sharecroppers out of the zone.
Generally, sharecrop arrangements among all production units are basically
the same.

Only the high frequency of sharecropping among big landowners, and the

division of some production costs will vary.

Specifically, tobacco entrepreneurs,

contrary to traditional practices, will try to maximize their profits through
irrigation and the employment of pesticides, fertilizers, and better quality
seeds.
cropper.

Thus, they usually divide the cost of these investments with the shareThe rationale being that in this way they guarantee the use of these

ingredients by the sharecropper thus increasing their tobacco yields.
According to our data, minifundist tobacco peasants seem to accept
sharecropping because they need to supplement their own plot's income returns.
A result of this income I iabil ity on their part is the attachment of strategic
adaptational importance to the access of land, and the maintenance of face to
face relationships with landowners.

Inevitably, in the case of landless and

minifundist peasants sharecropping for big landowners, this organization of
labor compels individuals to become dependent on others in a hierarchical
fashion.

In this structural arrangement, patron-client relationships predom-

inate behind the highly personalistic labor and favor exchanges taking place
between the units.

From this arises a scale of structural networks by which

agricultural units are differentiated.

At the same time, sharecroppers become

involved in labor transactions which cripple their financial resources with the
Payment of a 50 % of the crop's return.

TABLE 29
SOCIAL ORIGIN OF 80 SHARECROPPERS OF TOBACCO LAND OWNERS IN THE CIBAO, 1971-1972

'
FARM AREA
(ta reas)

TOTAL
SHARECROPPERS

STATUS SHARECROPPER
Minifundist
Other

SOCIAL RELATIONS OF SHARECROPPER WITH
Member of owner's
or of owner 1 s
inner-adaptational foremen and
network
other farm sharecroppers inneradaptational net.

LANDOWNER
not
previously
acquainted

Otner

1-32

9

6

(66. 66)

3

(33.33)

9

(100.00)

--

--

32-80

26

22

(84.61)

4

( 15. 38)

21

(80.76)

--

--

5 (19.23)

SUBTOTAL

35

28

(80.00)

7

(20.00)

30

(85.71)

--

--

5 (14.28)

80-800

15

11

(73.33)

4

(26. 66)

7

(46.66)

6

(40.00)

2 (13.33)

800 and more

30

24

(80.00)

6

(20.00)

14

(46.66)

15

(50.00)

---

SUBTOTAL

45

35

(77. 77)

10

(22.22)

21

(46.66)

21

(46. 66)

--

--

1

(3.33)

3

(6.66)

(Note: The sharecroppers were verbally asked whether or not they owned privately some land besides
the sharecropped one. In addition, whether or not they knew their landowners before starting their
present day arrangements with them. If they answered affirmatively, they were further asked to
identify the ties uniting them if any.
Minifundist sharecropers 1 geographical origin is : Tamboril (11), Pontezuela (4), San Jose de las
Matos (9), Moca (11). The 45 sharecroppers from middle and big landowners belong to a group of seven
farms· 5 from Jacagua and El lngenio, and two from Villa Gonzalez.)
134
-:::_-

-----

135
Big Landowners Sharecropping Arrangements:
sharecropping arrangements in large farms normally follow this pattern:
the land is divided into independent colonias (colonies) with a sharecropper in
charge of each one.

Each colono receives from 30 to 100 plowed tareas plus the

necessary tobacco shading houses.

Frequently there is a colono who is also con-

sidered the farm's foreman encargado.

His prerogatives run from recommending

other aparceros to the landowner (el patron); to supervising other sharecropper's
labor and harvest, to collecting debts for the landowner among the workers on the
farm.

For these extra labors he receives a monthly cash payment which might range

from $75.00 to $150.00.
The social origin of sharecroppers for large landowners seem to be the
same as that from minifundist and smaller-middle owners.

They are normally

minifundist owners in need of extra income or landless laborers.

The main

difference between the tvo sharecroppers is that on some occasions those working
for a big landowner are introduced to him by the foreman of the estate or by
another sharecropper and do not have a closer relation with the owner at

the

·moment of starting to work.
On his sharecropped land each colono is the equivalent of an owner.

He

contracts day laborers, buys the necessary food for them, determines their
daily wages and administers the production money.

The colono will usually

employ as day laborers members of his inner-adaptational network plus members
at large from the community.

In addition, he will feel free to call upon his

own nuclear family for free labor.

In the midst of this operational freedom they

Will be supervised by the landowner (or his foreman) in each phase of tobacco
cultivation.
Middlemen do not advance money to aparceros of big landowners, nor do
they buy their crops from them.

Instead, any advanced money they might r~quire

either for production costs or for household needs, is weekly provided to them
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he landowner.
bY t

The latter obtains the money from a bank in the form of a

credit or, in fewer instances, from his own savings.
produc t ·on
1

He will re-

distribute the money to his sharecroppers without any interest attached to it.
ouring the tobacco season an individual record is kept of the money each colono
takes in advance from his 50% share of the income of the tobacco sale.
The money advanced for household needs
normally ranges from $10.00 to $15.00 per week.

--food, sickness, clothes-This advancement is analogous

to a weekly income under wage labor conditions in an urban environment; and in
itself it is more than what the colono will make day laboring even if he were
able to find work seven days a week at $1.50 per day for a whole season.

For

many sharecropper peasants the security of this weekly advancement -- which is
optional-- will be the main motivation behind being a colono to a big landholder.
As they usually say, even if there is no profit from this labor at the end of
the harvest, at least they have subsisted one more year.

Landowners are well

aware of this fact.
At harvest time, the landowner, or one of his nuclear family members,
directly contacts an export house and proposes his farm harvest.

Because of the

bulk of tobacco being transacted, higher prices than those at the market are
obtained, benefiting both the aparcero and the owner.

The tobacco is then

transported to the warehouses at the buyers• risk and expenses.

During the

transaction, the colono does not normally intervene nor does he receive the
money from the sale immediately.
Once the transaction has taken place, the sharecropper record is consuited for 1 iquidation.

The advanced money and the crop's expenses are sub-

tracted from his 50% share of the income obtained from the sale of his tobacco.
The remaining amount of money is given to him as the season's profit.

When good

Prices favor the sales, it is frequent for owners to offer an extra cash bonus
(!egalo) to those colonos who ended the year with some profit on their record.
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Not all colonos' records show profits at the end of the season.

Those

who were not able to cover the debts with their tobbaco sale share present a
relative risk to big landowners.

Because of the last figure in these colonos'

record will be in the debit and not in the credit
referred to as cruzados (crossed over).

~olumn,

they are commonly

If the colono does not reimburse the

owed money, or if for two consecutive years he is in the debit column, he will
probably be told to leave the farm and thus be replaced.

In most cases, the

debts are not recovered and have to be borne by the landowner.

The main reason

for this is that the colonos normally lack capital resources to reimburse or be
forced to reimbuse the debt.

In order to evade cruzados sharecroppers at

liquidation time, landowners maintain a close supervision of each colono's
harvest and control of their seasonal debt accounts.
An Estimate of the Operations of a Sharecropper and His Big Landowner:
In order to provide a clearer picture of big land owners' and aparceros'
operations, an example from a big tobacco estate follows.

A.E. is a sharecropper

of don X who harvested more than 1,800 tareas of Cuban, criollo and olor tobacco
during the 1971-1972 season with the assistance of 48 colonos. A.E., being a
brother-in-law of one of don X's compadres who already was his

colon~

was offered

68 tareas of land with 3 shading houses of 14 varas conugueras each (1 conuco's
yard= 2.5077 meters).

To harvest this parcela he received the free assistance

from his wife and three male children.

In addition, he contracted day laborers.

The arrangement with don X stipulated an a medias contract.

From his share, A.E.

will have to cover all production costs with the following exceptions:

(i) the

cost of land plowing and of the shading house repairs which will be covered by
don X.

(ii) The cost of fertilizer, water and soil poison, seed beds, and irri-

gation water, plus the food and wages for laborers during tobacco hampering
labors (enceronada), and the hampers themselves (cerones).
Will be divided between A.E. and don X in equal shares.

The payment of costs
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From September 11, 1971 to July 22, 1972, A.E. recedived RD$2,712.48

from

don X for production costs and personal and household expenses; the latter

averaged $12.00 per week.
tobacco yielded:

The 68 tareas solely harvested with criollo and olor

46.48 qq. of criollo tobacco; and 87.98 qq. of olor tobacco.

The olor tobacco was classified by don X thus yelding: 16.92 qq. tobacco.

The

olor tobacco was classified by don X thus yielding: 16.92 qq. of type FF; 10 qq.
of type F; 18.71 qq. of type A; and 42.35 qq. of type P.
In La Tabacalera factory, one of the two leading factories manufacturing
tobacco for the national market, olor tobacco prices were:

$65.00/qq. for type

FF, $55.00/qq. for type F, $45.00/qq. for type A, and $30.00/qq. for type P.
Meanwhile, lnetab, a criollo tobacco export company, was buying criollo tobacco
at the market price of that time:

$30.00/qq.

Don X decided to offer these two companies the bulk of his criollo and
olor crop --3,521 qq.-- but only if they improved purchasing prices.

Final

sale prices were agreed at $47.00/qq. of olor tobacco, and $33.00/qq. of criollo
tobacco.

The logic behind the one price for all olor tobacco types being that

from previous yield tests in his own farm, don X knew that 55% of his olor
harvest (1,380 qq.) was type P tobacco at that time only $30.00/qq.; and 45%
of the remaining types.

The sale·of the tobacco at these high prices repre-

sented only for don X an extra profit of $6,007.50.
The sale of A.E. 1 s olor tobacco provided an income return of $4, 135.06;
and that of criollo tobacco amounted to $1 ,533.84.

But because he had already

asked don X for $2,712.48 in advanced money for household expenses and production costs, his profits for ten months of work were $121.97.

Because he was

granted a $50.00 liquidation bonus, his final profits were $171.97.
Don X tobacco income estimates are:

If the farm yielded 3,745 qq. of

tobacco --2,510 qq.-- of olor, 1,011 qq. of criollo, and 224 qq. of Cuban
tobacco-- the total sale would have been $160,000.00; thereby his 50% share
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being $80,000.

.

His expenses might be estimated as follows: . if he had a $50,000.00

·on credit from the Agricultural Bank, the credit's interests might well
produc t '
have risen up to $2,270.00.
$!8,000.00.

His share of production costs may be estimated at

Of this amount $4,000.00 would correspond to land preparation and

another $4,000.00 might be estimated for shade house constructions and repairs;
the remaining $10,000.00 of production expenses account for those specific
costs which were agreed to be paid by both don X and his sharecroppers (such as
fertilizer, hampers, irrigation water).

Finally, if six of the 48

colonos

ended the season cruzados, don 'i> losses could have been increased by an extra
$1,500.00.

In all don X's expenses amounted to $21,770.00, thus leaving him

an estimated prof it of $58,230.00.
Sharecropping

~mong

Rig Landowners and Labor Alternatives:

The sharecropping organization is preferred by landowners to any other
labor organization such as the por adminstracion system which provides for every
worker in his estate to be a wage laborer.

Several other advantages in the

aparceria organization are frequently mentioned.

First, the sharecroppers find

themselves in a person to person relationship with the owner.

Secondly, the

aparcero is not a mere worker selling his l3bor, but a semi-independent unit
which maintains a direct relationship with both land and product, thus increasing
his interst and initiative under the aparceria arrangement.

Thirdly, the apar-

cero is in a co-responsibility position with the landowner himself; hence, the
bigger the crop's yield the higher his

final returns.

For these reasons it is

expected that the sharecropper will take more interest and care of the delicate
tobacco leaves just as if they were his own.
In spite of these advantages some landowners complain that under the
aparceria arrangement they have to provide colonos with some tareas of land to
harvest household crops.

Thus available terrain is lost for the main crop.

But

even in these cases landowners know that the aparcero's nuclear family labors in
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the tobacco fields without any payments at all in a variety of labors.
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The

on for not asking a wage for their labor hours is that this practice will

increase the production costs which the colono will have to cover.

But in a

por administracion arrangement they will ask for a wage just as any other day
laborer.
A greater advantage of this sharecropping organization resides in
economic terms.

Under this arrangement sharecroppers help the owner to finance

a share of the harvest; if the owner were running his estate under the alternate
por administracion arrangement, his prof its would be lowered.

The por adminis-

tracion arrangement calls for all workers in the farm to be day laborers with
a proportionate number of encargados {foremen) who are paid weekly for their

services on a year round basis.

All production costs are paid by the land-

owner and profits return only to him.

In some cases prof its are divided with

the foremen according to liquidation arrangements --ranging from two to five
per cent of the prof it from the tobacco grown in each foreman's plot.
Returning to the example of A.E. and don X, let us imagine that they
were working on a por administracion arrangement and the former was one of the
foremen with a weekly pay of $15.00 --normal wages for foremen range from $15.00
to $20.00-- plus breakfast and lunch during six days of work.

In the actual

case we have seen that A.E. 's 68 tareas yielded $5,668.90 of which he received

$2,834.45 corresponding to his 50% share.

Production costs running on A.E. 's

share can be calculated by subtracting from the $2,712.48 which his record
showed as withdrawn for household use and production costs.
used for household expenses:

The amount he

roughly $504.00, estimating that he received an

average of $12.00 per 42 weeks (from September 11 to July 22 when the tobacco
Was sold).

Thus his share of production costs for 68 tareas of tobacco amounted

to $2,208.48.
If don X were running the farm under the por administracion arrangement

th•is

$2,208.48 would be his own debt plus the other costs normally covered by

him under the a medias arrangement.

He would also have to pay A.E. his weekly

salary, which only for the tobacco season amounts to $630.00.

Thus, the 68

tareas of land harvested by A.E. under a por administracion arrangement would
cost don X $2,838.48 besides the normal production costs which he already
finances under the sharecropping arrangement.
This new cost differs from the 50% A.E. actually received under the
aparceria contract to cover costs by only $4.03 on the deficit margin.

In

other words, under the por administracion arrangement the 50% share normally
allocated to A.E. under the sharecropping organization does not provide a profit to the landowner nor is it even able to cover production costs.

This

situation would be more critical if he has to pay the latter's nuclear family
labor.
The perception of large landowner's sharecroppers of the aparceria
organization has been phrased by a Villa Gonzalez informant:

Ei traibajo dei

apaiceiro e como un eclavo; poi ei raincho, airada i insecticiida, me quiitan
ei sudoi.

This informant, however, and 29 other sharecroppers of a large

landowner in V·illa

Gonzalez, El lngenio and Jacagua, when asked whether they

would prefer day laboring to sharecropping, all answered negatively.

Both

for economic and social reasons the aparceria labor arrangement is better for
them than day laboring.

Economically, they not only have a weekly income

normally higher than that of a day laborer, but they have the opportunity of
obtaining an end of the season 1 iquidation profit.

At the same time by share-

cropping, they maintain a steady employment in· contrast to the day to day living
of the agricultural laborers.

Furthermore, they maintain a direct contact with

the land and a personal relationship with the landowner.

From the links with

the latter, they expect a number of favors protecting them throughout the whole
Year.
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This is not to say that their position is
,,ot

co~fortable

like any change in their adaptational network.

f s mO

re secure and stable than that of day laborers.

and

t~at

they will

But only that their condition
Among the changes they

would like to see taking place in their present day environment they mention
· desire to own the sharecropped land, or to increase the size of the plot
their
already owned by them if this were the case.

At this time it is too early yet

to predict if the agrarian law #289 recently approved by the National Government
(March 1972), will actually change the fate of colonos and change the sharecropping system.

It does provide for the illegitimacy of any sharecropping

contract which might propose

to the colono to harvest less land than the

necessary for subsistence (60 irrigated tareas, or 100-150 non-irrigated tareas?).
It offers them the option to purchase the sharecropped land, under certain conditions, with the financial help of the Dominican Agrarian Institute.

This

purchasing option if accepted by the sharecropper is unappealable by the landowner and will take place whenever both sides agree to it at a price determined
by the Agrarian Institute and approved by the landowner.

At the same time,

aparceros are granted use of the land as long as they maintain their status of
sharecroppers.

In other

word~

under normal conditions they cannot be removed

from the land as long as they maintain the agreement--thus freeing them from
any arbitrariness from the owners.
At the end of fieldwork, aparceria contracts were signed in the presence
of officials from the Agrarian Institute under similar conditions to those
existing in previous years.

The two main differences were that now the contracts

Were written and public agreements including an optional purchasing clause
favoring the sharecropper.

The landowner was free to sign the contracts or

not, but in any case the sharecropper could at any time choose to purchase the
land if so desired; by signing the contract a fixed date of the land sale is
established unless the sharecropper signs renouncing his privilege.
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If this law is enforced, new sharecroppers will probably not be taken
by landowners in order to evade the colono's option to buy the land
legally granted access to the land.

':

and his

I I
I

In this situation, the por administracion

ern will probably become more popular among large landowners. Evidence of
sys t
this was obtained in Villa Gonzalez where members of the landed elite were
trying to dislodge old sharecroppers and re-organize their labor organization
by introducing the por adminstracion system.
One of the labor arrangements most dear to sharecroppers, in contrast
to the aparceria and the por administracion organizations, is the por liguidacion
agreement ..

Although not being presently implemented, it is usually mentioned

by both aparceros and landowners.

The liquidation organization is a variant

of the aparceria arrangement, but would produce higher profits for the sharecropper if implemented.

Formally, it calls for all production costs to be

covered by the tobacco income returns, and the prof its to be divided in equal
shares (50-50) between the sharecropper and the landowner.

The colono's

rationale behind this labor strategy is that they presently have to pay more
production costs than the landowner does.

If the net profit is equally divided,

instead of the money returning from the tobacco sale, then the aparcero prof it
share will increase.

This labor organization would work on the assumption of

an equal partnership between laborer and owner.
Harvest Finance
As

in the case of minifundist tobacco peasants, middle and big land-

owners' tobacco operations are also contingent upon production credits.

Their

ability to control and have access to financial resources will affect their
farm production.

Without production credits they would be unable to crop their

lands or would have to reduce their operations to their own saving abilities.
Usually, the capital asset of their lands is a sufficient guarantee for bank
I'

I

II
i

I ,
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credits

and other forms of financial assistance.
On the other hand, by controlling the finance money and administering

1t'

they maintain a closer supervision upon the sharecroppers.

This super-

vision, indirectly, is a guarantee to obtaining credit since most banks, and
even middlemen, do not extend production credits to a sharecropper because of
the financial risk they represent.

To do this, the bank requires from the

landowner responsibility for the credit reimbursement.

The landowner would

not assume this responsibility, which he needs to take in order to secure the
credit, if he were going to administer the credit himself.

The consequence of

this is a tighter control upon the sharecropper, and financial responsibility
for the landowner.
Normally, a smaller-middle criollo tobacco peasant (controlling roughly
80 to 150 tareas) will receive financial assistance from a middleman like other
minifundist peasants, or from the Tobacco Institute.

If he were harvesting Cuban

tobacco on his land, he would probably be financed directly by an export house
or again, by the Tobacco Institute.

Criollo transactions are taken care of by

the peasant landowner and the purchasing middleman in the farmer's shading house.
Since all the curing and bulking of the tobacco takes place in the landowner's
shading house this fact gives him an extra source of direct control over the
last phase of tobacco production and its transaction.

With the small harvests

and the resulting reduction in bargaining power, market price prevails in these
negotiations.

The tobacco is considered to be sold once the middle man author-

izes the owner to mojar (wet) the bulked tobacco and hamper it at an agreed price.
Sharecroppers, if existing, once they have indicated to the landowner that the
tobacco is ready for sale, will not normally intervene in the negotiations.

The

middle landowner will liquidate him once the middleman transports the tobacco
out of the shading house and pays for it.
On the other hand, big landowners and tobacco entrepreneurs do not deal

;I ,I
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with middlemen.

They recerve financial support from private banks or through

the official production credits channelled by the Tobacco Institute;

thus

t hey will sell their crop directly to an export house trying to take advantage

of their purchasing power.

If harvesting Cuban tobacco, the export houses

dealing with this tobacco variety will also offer the producer another source
of credit normally under the form of a contract providing for production credits
and stable sale prices.
Curiously enough, export firms do not want to finance big landowners
producing criollo tobacco because of the strained relations resulting from the
transactions with these more independent production units.

On the other hand,

big landowners prefer the marketing freedom they achieve through a bank credit
to the restrictbns tied to the financial arrangements with an export house.

In

contrast to this situation, good relations seem to prevail between the export
house and big landowners harvesting Cuban tobacco under contract arrangements.
The difference probably resides in the price fluctuations between the two
markets:

while Cuban tobacco prices are more stable and even fixed in some

Instances in the contracts regulating relations between producer and buyer, the
criollo market prices fluctuate throughout the season according to the supply
and demand of the product.

Under these circumstances it is more important for

the big producers to maintain their freedom to bargain their product.

I

CHAPTER V

I'

MIDDLEMEN LEVEL OF ARTICULATION
One of the most enigmatic presences in the criollo tobacco industry
is that of the middlemen (known as corredores or intermediarios).

Although

peasants themselves, they are looked upon by outsiders as the originators of
minifundists and smaller-middle peasants stagnation.

On the other hand, it

is not uncommon for export houses to blame them for harmful marketing practices and dubious personal reputation.
Middlemen are commonly known as corredores (runners) not so much
because of their broker's role, but because of their geographical mobility.
They go from a field parcela to the warehouse and back to another conuco,
always being on the go for a tobacco harvest.

They are small-scale merchants

operating with the financial support of an export warehouse.

With purchasing

money obtained from the latter, they buy tobacco from minifundist and middle
land holding peasants and transport it to the warehouses.

As a dependent

unit of the warehouse they are not expected to resell the tobacco nor to
speculate on its price, but only to procure the crop on a commission basis.
Social adaptational network
The social origin of middlemen is exclusively fran the peasantry;
furthermore, they are overwhelmingly minifundist and small-middle tobacco
Producers in need of supplementing their income and/or aspiring to a better
living.

In some cases they also occupy official posts in their own communities
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has local mayors (alcalde pedaneos), or members of a reli~ious lay organ.
•
or even officials from a peasant organization. These cases, however,
rzat1on,

s~

are not the norm.
The average landholding control of 63 peasant middlemen from three
different warehouses -- in Gurabo, San Jose de las Matas, and Cancas - was
of 89.7 Tareas of land.

All sixty three expressed as their main reason for

being involved in middlemen operations the need to increase their plot's
Income (hacer dinero).

Only seven of them had other sources of income in their

communities; three were local mayors, one was president of a Catholic communJty parish organization, and the remaining were involved in peasant's cooperatives.

This group of 63 sharecroppers was part of a larger group of 70

middlemen.

Surprisingly, two of them were not landowners but landless day

laborers, and the remaining five were sharecroppers of minifundist peasants
who have left their nuclear families in charge of production.
In relation to their own lands, middlemen have three main alternatives.
These are as follows:

(1) they will crop them with tobacco and leave their

nuclear families in charge of production; (2) transfer the land to share-

:
I

I
111
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croppers; or (3) produce in the plots some crops which do not require as much

!
!

I'.
I

labor and time as tobacco itself thereby freeing them of agricultural duties.
In any case, once their middlemen operations begin, their time will be fully
pledged to the acquisition of tobacco.
In possession of wide social networks, middlemen are normally well
known in their local communities because of their inner-adaptational networks
and resourceful personalities.

The personal relations maintained during

the year with tobacco growers and/or some members of the latter's inneradaptational networks will determine his middleman role.

These social

TABLE 30
MARKETING BEHAVIOR OF 120 MINIFUNDIST AND SMALLER-MIDDLE TOBACCO PRODUCERS IN THE CIBAO REGION, 1971-1972.
PREFERS TO SELL TO

PRICE DIFFERENCE OF BUYER.

ACTUALLY SOLD:

TO MIDDLEMAN

Middleman warehouse

$29.00/qq. but

KIN

GOD- I FRIEND I
FATHER

FARM
AREA
(tareas)

TOTAL

1-32

50

47

3

34

16

19

6

15

9

32-8

50

42

8

31

19

18

4

18

7

80-150

20

10

6

9

11

8

2

4

4

TOTAL

a compadre.

1120 I

(NOTE:

103

I 17

I

74

$30.00/qq but

RELATIVE

a conoc id(:>.

46

JO OTHER

··---·---- - - - ·

STRANGER I

PARTY

1----·--· -,----- ---

45

12

37

20

3

t +
3

This group of producers was presented with the following set of alternatives:

(i) 11 lf at selling ti~e you are given the opportunity of selling your tobacco either to a middleman or directly
to the warehouse; and both offer you the same prices, to whom will you sell your harvest?''
(ii) 11 lf at selling time a compadre of yoursoffers $29.00/qq., but a person known to you (a conocido) is
offering a higher price of $30.00/qq., to whom will you sell your tobacco?"
(iii) The final section of the present table identifies the relation existing between peasant and the person
to whom he actually sold the tobacco. At least in six cases the middleman was both a kin member and a
compadre. These instances were reported under the kin category. In seven other cases· he was both a friend
and a compadre, but these cases were reported under the etter,s category).
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rivate relation of trust and confidence within this kin network is
I

urallY translated into respect and cooperation in the more public realm of

na t
the inner-adaptational network.

This adaptational system is most effective

and self-assuring in market relations where the customary practices of cooperation and public laws give way to economic interests and advancement of selfinterests.
In this context, the middleman becomes a culturally significant unit.
He is something like a transformational system in itself integrating both the
peasant social organization and the outside market world.

In this perspective

they are cultural brokers for they stand guard over the crucial junctures or
synapses of relationships which connect the local system to the larger whole.
The middleman provides a way out to the peasant's tobacco without disturbing his
adaptational networks cr·exposing him to impersonal market relations.
his social networks the broader his commercial operations.

The wider

If local peasants

know him on a personal basis and are able to identify him in the context of
an inner-adaptational network, then they will permit business-like transactions
to take place between them.
Warehouse environmental handicaps.
Warehouses also require from middlemen the maintenance and expansion
of their social networks within the community.

For them, peasants in contact

with their middlemen become a potential tobacco clientele.
behind their contingency upon middlemen is twofold.

The main reason

The first is the land-

holding control of their tobacco suppliers.

The second is their inability

to reorganize peasants marketing practices.

While one of the most strategic

aspects of warehouses environmental adaptation is the procuring of sufficient
tobacco to purchase, they have to operate amid an alien social organization

,

I
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inifundist peasants. A great number of small harvesters of criollo tobacco
of m
to be contacted, financed, supervised, and persuaded to sell their crop to one
have
of the competing warehouses in the zone. Warehouses, however, have neither

the Personal contacts in the peasant communities nor sufficient personnel to
get in touch and personally involved with the necessary number of minifundist
suppliers.

In this context middlemen guarantee the warehouses the necessary

supply of tobacco they need to operate instead of leaving them exposed to the
spontaneity of a mass of small producers.

At the same time they will be re-

sponsible for reimbursing the money advanced by the warehouses to minifundist
producers to assist them with production costs.
Warehouses have maintained the nineteenth century strategy of employing
middlemen to secure tobacco.

Each export house places its warehouses in the

vicinity of a tobacco zone.

Normally two and three warehouses, each one de-

pendent upon a different export packer, are grouped together.

Each warehouse

will select an average of 30 to 80 middlemen from the zone representing different communities and families, the number of middlemen fluctuates according
to the warehouse's volume of operations.
accounts:

They will receive cash in two

first, to advance to small producers during the lapse of the har-

vest; second to buy the greatest possible amount of tobacco.

Through this

arrangement the warehouses expect to reach out to the producers and secure
enough tobacco.
Two of the most cherished characteristics in a middleman from the point
of view of the warehouse are:

(i) his commercial resourcefulness in order to

compete with other community buyers for the peasant's crop; and (ii) the
control and maintenance of a wide social, adaptational network in the community, and even in the zone.

From this he might secure his normal clientele
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be introduced to other growers outside his original

an d
onlY the third characteristic expected from a middlemen.
ta nee

range~

Honesty is

Its relative impor-

resides in the influence of their marketing practices upon field tobacco

price and the risk involved if they do not reimburse the advanced and the purchasing money.

As the president of an export firm phrased it during fieldwork:

"Lo importante de los corredores no es que no sean unos ladrones, sino que
compren tabaco.

Pa'eso le avanzamos el dinero, pa'que compren tabaco; la

mayor cantidad de tabaco, mejor para ellos y para nosotros".
The nature of middlemen's work
The third variable associated with tobacco's middlemen dependence upon their

\I

social adaptational networks as a core energy resource, is the nature of their
income returns.

Middlemen work under a commission arrangement contingent upon

the volume of purchased tobacco.

Thus, the higher the volume of purchased

,,,

'

I

I

tobacco, the higher their returns.

Their possible profits, then are associated

with the number of peasants from whom they purchase tobacco, and the bulk of
their harvests.
Normally, price incentives although necessary are not sufficient motivation for minifundist peasants to sell their tobacco to a particular middleman.
The latter will always try to face the competition from other middlemen, by
keeping his purchasing price on an equal level with that of other buyers.
This further reduces the price variable as a determinant of transactional
arrangements.

In this situation, the buying control of a middleman and his

operation's profits are closely associated with each middleman's social
resources.

il

,I,l ,,

Purchasing niches and Zones of Influence

I'I
II

:ill

''··1,

Middlemen operations start at the time of the construction of the seed

,~

beds,

to say the least.

They contact future tobacco harvesters, offer them

their services, pledge financial support if needed during harvest time, and
fn

ome cases even grant them labor assistance.

S

At the end of November and

earlY December, coinciding with transplanting labors, middlemen start contacting the warehouses.

They drop by the tobacco warehouses, speak to the

person in charge, and obtain their support during the coming season.

The

person in charge of the warehouse probably knows them on a personal basis, or
if not they are introduced to him through a third person known personally to
both of them.

Contracts are sometimes signed between the warehouse and the

buyer but normally they lack legal support.
prevails in their mutual relations.

Other times a verbal arrangement

The main accord being that, unless ex-

plicitly granted the permit, the middleman is to buy tobacco exclusively for
the warehouse.
I
1'

Warehouses normally take one, at most two or three, middlemen from
each peasant community in order ot diversify their areas of contact.

At the

same time the rule is that middlemen from the same warehouse do not compete
for the same tobacco.

They divide their areas of operations under the

guidance of the person in charge of the warehouse.
at times during the season.

This rule might break down

Nevertheless, warehouse management tries to

maintain some order in the buying procedures of their middlemen and normally
they are successful in keeping independent areas of operation for every
middleman by being well informed of their operations.

Therefore what appears

a disorganized and uncontrolled operation is actually a structured process
relying upon the warehouses information of their middlemen's activities and
spheres of influence.
Curiously enough, some export firm officials do not recognize this
Phenomenon.

They refer to the anarchic situation in the purchasing operations
I

I ,i

of their middlemen.

In their opinion once the money is given either to be advanc-

ed or to purchase a harvest the money disappears with no security of ever coming
back again.

The information of 14 Gurabo middlemen's purchasing niches, and the

market relations of two warehouses in San Jose de las Matas and Gurabo and in
addition that from a local packer from Villa Gonzalez, indicates that this is
not the case.
The same might be said, although with some reservations, in reference to
tobacco warehouse's zones of influence.

Although there is no explicit rule

prohibiting warehouses from purchasing tobacco in any zone, a rational division
of purchasing areas is perceivable not only in the operations of the middlemen
of one ware house, but also of the warehouses themselves.
account for this.

First, the middlemen control of their

Two main reasons might
purchasing areas.

If

one warehouse has access to some middlemen in control of wide inner adaptational
networks and broad social relations, then it will be difficult for a second group
of middlemen to compete with them in the same purchasing niche.

This situation

is most evident, for instance, in the local communities (parajes) of the towns
of Janice and San Jose de las Matas basically controlled by one export company
through the middlemen networks of one purchasing warebouse.

Also in the com-

munities of Gurabo, Pontezuela, and Jacagua, where an almost rational division
of purchasing niches exists between four export packer warehouses.

Secondly,

it is more profitable for the companies to implicitly divide among themselves
tobacco zones into nearly independent purchasing niches.

In this way competition

·-already evidenced by the presence of almost 15 export firms each one with an
average of 3 to 6 dependent warehouses, plus 35 local packers-siderably reduced.

will be con-

As a result prices can also be more or less controlled and

tobacco purchased according to specific demands.
This rational, although implicit and not invulnerable, division of
'

,,'
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purchasing zones among the warehouses also results from their geographic allocation which makes them contingent upon a specific group of local middlemen.
In anY case in newly opened tobacco zones, or in the operating zones of warehouses from export firms who have been forced out of the market, or even when
a new export firm wants to get into the market, competition increases and new
zones of influence and niches of control have to be gradually re-established.
For instance, during

the 1971-1972 season a local warehouse in Tamboril

started buying criollo tobacco.

In order to compete successfully their strate-

gy was one of offedng middlemen of any other warehouse both relatively better

prices and receiving their tobacco without as many quality requirements as
competing warehouses.

They were hoping to obtain their necessary supply of

tobacco and integrate a network of middlemen thereby under-cutting other
nearby warehouses purchasing operations.

"
I
I

Advanced money
Once he has obtained money from the warehouse, the middleman starts
advancing money to peasants.

This money is handed out free of interest, is

advanced on solicitation., and does not carry any employment restrictions.
As previously mentioned, the only condition attached to it is the peasant's
obligation to sell his tobacco back to him; but this implicit selling agreement applies only if the middleman offers to the peasant the regular market
price of that time.

The logic behind this provision is twofold.

expected that the peasant will reciprocate the favor.
the middlemen a harvest of tobacco for purchase.
a purchase commission.

First, it is

Thus this strategy assures

This harvest in turn represents

Secondly, it is the most secure arrangement for the

recovery of the advanced money.

At selling time the middleman will get the

tobacco and pay the peasant the difference between the harvest cost and the
owed money.

If it were not for this control mechanism at selling time,

156

exPe

rience shows that it would be most difficult to collect peasants• debts.

jhiS is because of their lack of either capital or financial resources.

If a

reimbursement of the advanced money is not obtained, the loss is suffered by
the middleman who has to return the money to the warehouse at liquidation time.
For this reason, the middleman does not advance money to any peasant
indiscriminately.

As a rule, a middleman does not offer money to minifundist

peasants representing a high financial risk; nor to a peasant whom they know
has already taken money, or who is going to ask an extra advancement from
This would find the peasant with a conflict of interests

another middleman.
at selling time.

Every peasant asking for advanced money will also have to be known

by him personally or be introduced by a third person who might be accountable

on his behalf if necessary.

In the same way, sharecroppers will receive money

only if the landowner makes himself responsible fa- the transactions and reimbursement of the advanced money.
Data on the operations of 30 middlemen from San Jose de las Matas,
Gurabo, Moca and Cancas, indicate that they advanced money to landowners
ranging from 10 to 100 tareas of harvested tobacco with an average of $10.00
to $15.00 per tarea.

This was a very conservative advance since the average

tobacco price for the field work season was $26.00/qq. with an average yield of two

:1
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quintals per tarea.

Also middlemen did not give money to more than one third

of the ta reas of tobacco in each fa rm.

The 30 middlemen advanced the amount of $38, 590

·.:ll'.1

11:'

for an average $1,286.33 per buyer.

The total number of peasants benefiting

from these advances were, according to conservative estimates, 664 tobacco
Producers with an average of $58.11 per peasant.
Not all the peasants who sell their crop to a middleman have received
an advance from him.

In fact, rough estimates indicate that an average

I,

1~

·ddlernan, purchasing roughly 600 to 1300 qq. of tobacco per season, advances

m•

moneY only to one third of the peasants from whom he purchases the tobacco.
His contacts to non-financed peasants is achieved through his inner-adapattional network and his broader social network.

He will secure the - clien1

tage of this group through the customary flow of favors and personal relations
as previously mentioned.
purchase money
Middlemen might advance money to the producers as long as they consider
it opportune.

But

normally when the barresuelo

leaves are ready for harvest,

they will stop advancing money and the first phase of the purchasing period
starts, the tiroteo

phase.

From this moment on, if the peasant wants any

inore money he will be asked to sell the barresuelo harvest.
these leaves is $12.00 to $15.00/qq.
middle April to May.

The average price of

The tiroteo phase lasts normally from

During this time there is only a minimum tobacco price

fixed by the export houses and the buyers do not purchase total harvests but
only the barresuelo leaves.

The second purchasing phase lasts normally from

June till the end of August; it is known as the cosecha

(harvest) phase.

This cosecha phase is the most important since it is at this time that the
peasant is expected to sell his whole crop, and not only some leaves.

While

it last; the middleman has to make the most to secure tobacco and is normally
closely supervised from the warehouse in his purchasing operation.
During the purchasing period, the middleman's job consists of keeping
track of every single tobacco harvest in the community and passing this information on to the warehouse.

They are expected to know (1) the quality and

harvest practices of each peasant's crop, (2) when it is available for sale,
(3) the market prices of other warehouses, (4) the whereabouts of competing
buyers, and (5) any service which a peasant might require.

This information

,,,,
~
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t current through daily visits to peasant plots and farms, and through

f s ke P

cons tan

t interaction with landowners, day laborers, and sharecroppers.
In the mean time, his relations with the warehouse will also change.

NoW he will not ask for advance money but for purchasing money.

In return

the warehouse will ask him for tobacco before every new disbursement.

The sole

justification for the middlemen is their purchasing ability in a minifundist
producing environment.

In cases of conflict between the warehouse and a middle-

man during the purchasing period, the former will not pressure for a reimbursement
of the owed money.

The pressure is on the buyer to bring (tirar) the expected
I

purchased tobacco.

The money has to be invested in the acquisition of tobacco

harvests, and not in personal vices of the middlemen.

Also it cannot be used for

11

1

11

di

market speculation against warehouses own interests.

1'

During the purchasing operations warehouse and middleman interests coincide at moments but conflict at other times.

They coincide since both units

are contingent upon a purchase commission for their income.

I

The warehouse

manager normally has a commission ranging from $1.50 to $2.00 per quintal of
purchased tobacco, while the buyer receives $1.00 per quintal.
are working for the volume increase of the purchased .tobacco.
present in their relationships from a number of sources.

Thus both units
But conflict is

First, it is to the

, I

warehouse manager to buy the greatest volume of tobacco at the lowest possible
price since

he normally works under a fixed, although flexible, budget.

This

is not the case of the middleman who only has to ask for the necessary amount of
money without taking into consideration warehouse budgets.
Secondly, conflict also arises from middlemen being cruzados at liquidation time since warehouses are responsible for the recovery of the money given
to the middlemen.
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The source of the tension is in the middleman's inability, or lack of interest,
in reimbursing the warehouse for the money granted to him in order to subsidize
his operations.

If the money is not reimbursed by the buyers, then the ware-

house manager will have to reimburse it to the export house from his own
commission.

The same cruzado problem results between peasant and middleman,

and between sharecropper and landowner.

In all cases the problem is the lack

of capital and financial resources for which the cruzado could be pressured
in order to repay the contracted debt.

This is not to say that he is not

pressured, but only that in most cases not even the fake of a bribed a11T1y or
police member is able to secure the money.

Legal action is almost never

taken in these cases.
A· third source of conflict springs from the middleman re-selling the
tobacco.

In other words, they will fake the market price and re-fix it at

their own risk.

This is accomplished either by offering the peasant a lower

purchasing price than the official one, or by delivering the tobacco to the
warehouse at a price higher than actual purchasing price.

Through the first

stratagem the middleman is shrinking the peasant's legitimate profit margin;
while through the second strategy, he is inflating the market to the disadvantage of the warehouse.

In either case, he augments his profits.

According to our data both stratagems are employed by middlemen according to special circumstances.

The secret to their operations resides in the

middleman's strategic position in the market structure.

He has access and

control of both extremes of the market: the buying warehouse and the producer
peasantry.

This environmental position gives him exact market info11T1ation

frequently unknown to one or both of the units involved in the transaction.
To offer only one example of this practice let us consider the

1~

following actual case.

Middleman N. bought 36 qq. at $28.00/qq. in Jacagua

for a total of $1008.00.

N. informed the warehouse that the bulked tobacco

in the peasant's shading house when hampered amounted to less quintals than
previously estimated.

At this moment he delivered 20 qq. immediately to the

warehouse at actual purchasing price; this delivery represented for him a
$Z0.00 commission.

The remaining 16 qq. of tobacco was kept by him in a small

warehouse near his house.

Seven days later when the market price rose to

$30.00/qq, he delivered the tobacco at this new price, thus earning his commission ($16.00) plus an extra $32.00 because of the price difference.

In the

mean time, the 20 qq. previously delivered by N. cost the warehouse not $28.00
qq. but $50.40/qq. since with the $1008.00 purchase money the middleman had
only bought 20 qq. and not the 36 qq. estimated.
Still in other cases, the middleman will purchase the tobacco but
inform the warehouse that a competing middleman is bidding on the same tobacco
at higher prices, thus he needs to raise his offer in order to guarantee the
harvest.

In other instances, he might just tell the warehouse that the

peasant is asking a higher price than he has been authorized to offer.

In

whatever case, the cultural significance of these operations rely in the power
the middleman has through his contacts at the production as well as at the
purchasing level.
Warehouses normally know of these and other marketing practices of each
one of their middlemen.

But often they are not willing to stop them either

because they are good bulk buyers of tobacco, or because they are afraid that,
if suspended at the middle of the purchasing period, they might not reimburse
the advanced money which normally averages from $1200.00 to $3500.00 during
the purchasing period for an average buyer.

In other cases, this practice

is not habitual on the part of the middleman thereby not harming warehouse
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If the warehouse decides to suspend his dealings with a middle1nte rests·
hewill be so informed at liquidation time. It is not unusual for other
rna n
warehouses to contract the suspended middleman if he has an established clientele at the expense of any risk his marketing practices might present to
therTI·
Some meddlemen, as a policy, do not reimburse all the owed money ;either at
the end of the tobacco season ior during the season itself.
promising to pay the debt the next season.

Instead they keep

In this fashion, they try to force

warehouse (amarrarlos)in preserving their services regardless of their marketing practices.

Sometimes they are succesfull for one or two consecutive sea-

sons at most. This strategy was best phrased by an informant who said: Con
ei aimacen ay que estai cruzado; solo asi te dain liberta pa 1 hacei lo que
uno quiere.
The actual execution of the previously mentioned practices by middlemen does not imply that all buyers do them.

Rough estimates from our data

indicate that only one out of every five or six middlemen habitually resort
to such marketing practices.

On the other hand, a false idea would be to

assume that middlemen always have the upper hand in their transactions with
the warehouses.

In fact, they are closely controlled by the latter through

two strategies:

(i) control of purchasing money disbursements; (ii) and

direct information on the ·middleman's operations in their communities.
The warehouse's main strategy is to control the middleman's operations and
maintain a record of each middleman.

Curiously, written records have less

authority than memorized accounts, and are not as carefully kept as the latter.
The warehouse will at all times try to know how much money the middleman is
given, to buy an estimated harvest of how many quintals, from whom, and at
What price.

d
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The strategy and structure of the money disbursement is approximately
as

follows: the money will be given to the middleman only in proportion to the

anoun
bu ye r

t

of acquired tobacco he has already delivered to the warehouse.

Because

s•activities are supported by the purchasing money, the warehouse will

try to provide him with funds sufficient to bargain and obtain tobacco harvests, but not enough to give him the capacity to retain the tobacco and wait
for better prices.
Thus every release of money is normally closely considered, and is far
from being arbitrary.

An estimate of the tobacco quintal to be purchased is

made by the middleman and the person in charge of the wareshouse and an
authorized purchasing price is given to the buyer.

This is decided on the

basis of the market conditions of supply and demand and the competition of
other export companies.

In addition, the person in charge of the warehouse

will check how much tobacco he has bought -- and if none, he will inquire why
not -- since the last money disbursemenL With this information he will be able
to estimate how much purchasing money the middleman still retains with him.
Contingent upon these three variables, the amount of money to be approved for
release by the warehouse is agreed upon.
Through this procedure not only is the release of money controlled, but
also the buying price of the warehouse is set.

The tobacco received from the

middleman, normally, will only be accepted at the warehouse at the purchasing
Price stipulated between middleman and the person in charge at the time of the
lllOney disbursement.

Thus, if he pays a lower price to the peasant, as long

as he does not try to re-se 11 the tobacco at a higher price, it is of no conCern to the warehouse.

Every time he comes back to the warehouse, they will

go through the same process for every new money release and tobacco transac-
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The money release strategy is complemented with a second mechanism
of control: information of middleman's activities during the purchasing period.
'fhe warehouse person in charge obtains this information either through convers a

tions with other middlemen or by going to the field periodically.

Middlemen provide the warehouse owner with an information network so accurate
and precise that the latter is normally well informed of virtually all of his
middlemen operations and of concrete tobacco transactions in his community.
Nonnally each middleman reports his own and other buyer's operations to the
warehouse manager on a personal basis thus establishing a mixed relation of
trust and dependence.

Through this personal link with each middleman, the

person in charge of the warehouse is able to build in them a sense of importance and respect from which an attitude of cooperation and responsibility
in the warehouse well-being flourishes.

Once this is achieved, the flow of

I

fnfonnation, and of favors, is all but abnormal.

I'

Still, it is normal for the warehouse manager to periodically visit
middlemen communities and purchasing areas in order to further supervise his
operations.

II

He will try to karn about actual tobacco transactions, other

warehouse middlemen's prices in the zone; future harvest for sale; and about
arrangements between middlemen to sell tobacco either to him or to pass it
over to another warehouse or

~bacco

factory.

In general, he is interested

in every significant operation of the middleman in his own environment.

If

necessary he will pressure the corredor either by speaking to him directly,
or by contacting members of his inner-adaptational network.

These local

Visits, not only increase the knowledge the warehouse management has

of

middlemen's operations, but also help to verify the data obtained through
the middlemen's own network of information.

They also reinforce the person to

Person relationship established between the warehouse manager and the middleman.

I
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eliminary topology of middlemen
The analysis of the records of two warehouses randomly chosen for the

seasons of 1970-1971 and 1971-1972, including 67 middlemen working consequtivelY for them during both seasons, suggests a preliminary typology of tobacco middlemen.

On the basis of the volume of tobacco purchased, three

types of middlemen could be distinguished: subsistence, average, and entrepreneur middlemen.
Subsistence corredores comprised 16 of the 67 middlemen.

Their annual

average tobacco purchase in a season ranges from 150 to 600 qq. of tobacco.
The available information indicates that at least 12 of them are minifundist
peasants themselves.

Normally, their accumulated purchase commission and the

money they owe to the warehouse at the end of the year balance each other off,
leaving them without a significant profit or debt.

Available information con-

finns the assumption that they buy tobacco not so much as a way to increase
their annual income, but as an alternative to sustain themselves during the
tobacco season.

This they do by employing a share of the advance purchase money

for household needs, thus obtaining a regular income throughout the season.
This debt they repay at liquidation time with their accumulated commission
money in the warehouse.

In this perspective their strategy is to buy only the

necessary volume of tobacco to cover their debts with the warehouse.
A second group of middlemen are those purchasing an average of 600 to
1300 qq. of tobacco per season.
of the 67 middlemen.

This group of average middlemen includes 39

The information on 21 of these middlemen indicates that

none are conuquero land holders but are owners of parcelas and middle size
tobacco farms.

Their accumulated purchase commission at the end of the

tobacco season when compared with their debits to the warehouse normally
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shoW a sizable profit ranging from $400.00 to $800.00.

This figure, ob-

viously represents but a rough approximation of their actual profits.

For

instance, if some peasants did not reimburse to them the advanced money, or
if they either lowered or increased the purchasing price, or if they bought

-

a la flor tobacco, or any other such forceful practice.

Data is not available

on how many of these average middlemen did not reimburse owed money to the
warehouses, but it indicates that at least 8 of them re-sold and classified
their tobacco habitually.,
This information supports the assumption that they buy tobacco for the
business it represents.

Their strategy is to acquire more tobacco than the

needed amount to repay the warehouse its money, including whatever they might
have taken from them for household and personal expenses.

Their legitimate

profit return comes from the accumulated tobacco purchasing comniSsion in the
warehouse.
The third group, that of the entrepreneurs, consists of 12 middlemen
in the sample.

They are professional buyers because they will purchase not

only tobacco but any other crop once the tobacco season is over.
average seasonal acquisition of tobacco exceeds the 1300 qq.

Their

Available data

on seven entrepreneur-middlemen reveals that five are middle landowners,
and the remaining two are parceleros.
six comines

These seven middlemen had an average of

(second middlemen) each one buying tobacco for them outside

their traditional purchasing zone.

Six of the seven for whom data is available

classified their tobacco, bought a la flor, and habitually resold tobacco
to the warehouses.
tal working.

At all moments their main strategy was to keep the capi-

Thus their accumulated commission at liquidation time, when

compared with their debits to the warehouses, far exceeded the

latter~
1:.I

·I

1.,.1111.:
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The analysis of the record and operations of entrepreneur middlemen
implies that they use every possible strategy to increase their profit, and that
theY are highly successful in this.
could

Their legitimate profits from the records

roughly be estimated as ranging from $950.00 to $5,200.00.

To this amount

it has to be added whatever extra-income they obtained through marketing practices
other than those approved by the warehouses
If this preliminary typology is representative of middlemen, it indicates
that "harmful" marketing practices of middlemen are normally associated with
higher purchasing scale operations.

Also the range of operations of subsistence

middlemen is probably 1 imited to the purchase of tobacco from the members of their
own inner-adaptational networks.

In contrast, the entrepreneur middlemen rely

on a wide network of comines to augment their purchasing niches.

Finally, some

of the middlemen's legitimate profits are not as irrational as normally thought.
This is especially true if it is realized that their commissions have to cover
their own household and personal expenses, plus some of the handling costs not
embraced by the transportation money which the warehouse grants him in addition
to his purchasing commission.
Middlemen Interactive Quasi-groups
One of the most interesting aspects of middlemen adaptational networks
is the ''interactive quasi-group"; (for a discussion of this concept, see Meyer
1966).

Local second middlemen (comines or piches), hamperers (enceronadores),

tobacco classifiers (clasificadores), plus independent truck drivers (choferes),
are the most significant figures of these quasi-groups.
of people are centered around the middleman.

This interacting set

The actions of these members are

connected only in so far as they are a part of the social network of the middleman or one of the quasi-groups' members.

The temporary network is formed for

the purpose of assisting the middlemen in various functions he has to perform in

ole, and thus permitting him more freedom of movement as well as increasing
hfS r
his scale of operations.
Like the middleman himself, classifiers and hamperers are from a rural
extraction.
not O'lln land.

In contrast to the middleman they normally are day laborers and do
Enceronadores are the most common workers of any middleman.

middleman will normally have two to seven hamperers working for him.

A

Their job

is to hamper the tobacco once it has been sold to the middleman, but it is done
with the assistance of the landowner and some of the sharecroppers and day
laborers if they are present.
Through the performance of this labor in the tobacco shading houses,
the hamperers liberate the middleman from a necessary operation and give him
the opportunity to attend the purchase of other crops, to deal with the warehouse, or to take care of any other necessary details.

Although not intended,

hamperers can also control the quality of the purchased tobacco, and any possible adulteration of the hampers content which might artificially increase the
tobacco weight and thus its cost.

A hamper's income varies considerably.

starts working at purchasing time, and on a daily basis.

He

Average income for

them ranges from $0. 15 to $0.25 per quintal of tobacco hampered; still other
arrangements call for $0.50 to $2.00 per working day.
In some instances, the enceronadores' role is transformed to that of a
tobacco classifier; but usually there are two different persons performing these
roles.

While the labor is similar, their job is not.

Classifiers, normally

one to three per middleman, operate in the buyer's own warehouse.

These are

small countryside houses or even rooms where some average middlemen and almost
all entrepreneur middlemen gather their purchased tobacco to either desnatar
(classify the tobacco into criollo and olor tobacco) or to speculate with it
by retaining the purchased tobacco until its price increases thus re-selling it

to the warehouse as previously seen.

I
I:'
,11

The rationale behind the desnatar practice in which the classifier is
an important unit, is that good quality criollo tobacco can yield inferfbr
types of olor tobacco (tiene clase).

These normally bring a higher price;

secondly, the olor tobacco factories will buy this criollo tobacco as olor
tobacco since normally they do not have sufficient supply of tobacco.

The

inferior types of olor tobacco acquired from a good criollo harvest are usually
types A and P.

Their prices are normally higher than that of criollo tobacco

with the abnormal exception of the months of July and August of 1972, when
criollo market price rose to $30.00/qq., while olor tobacco type P (picadura)
was paid

lowe~

ranging from $28.50 to $30.00/qq.

In normal seasons, the desnatar

practice is a sound economic strategy in which some, but not all, criollo middlemen get involved.
Those middlemen who classify their tobacco have to take a double risk.
First, the harvest being classified must be of good enough quality to produce
sufficient class tobacco to justify their labor and time investment.

In some

cases, middle landowners producing criollo tobacco classify their own tobacco
thus increasing their profits.
do not.

But

paradoxically,mi~ifundist

tobacco producers

Although data is not conclusive on this point, it seems that they do not

want to risk investing money in classification labors without the certainty of
being able to obtai:n tabaco de factoria (olor tobacco) in return.

Sometimes

they also mention their lack of knowledge to distinguish different types of
tobacco.

Nevertheless, the main reason probably is that they are pressured by

middlemen not to do it.
The second risk middlemen have to take

with· desnatando criollo tobacco

is the warehouses who do not approve of this practice.

Their main objection being

that they would be paying a high price for a lower quality tobacco.

Furthermore,

their own warehouse classification for better quality tobacco will yield lesser
Percentage of types #1 and #2, thereby decreasing ther profits when selling the

i I

,,,1
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tobacco to the manufacturers.
The third unit integrating the middleman interactive quasi-group is the
truck driver.
vehicle.

Normally he comes from a semi-urban environment and owns the

With one or two peones (day laborers) he leases his services to a

group of subsistence and average middlemen in a purchasing zone nearby;
entrepreneur middlemen frequently include in their scale operations a private
vehicle.

The truck driver average income is $0.25/qq. transported from the

tobacco shading house to the warehouse.

Any weight reduction (merma} before

the tobacco is received in the warehouse or any hamper which gets lost is
usually the responsibility of the middleman.
In those cases where the truck is not able to get near the peasants'
ranch because of road conditions, for instance in the hills of Janice and San
Jose de las Matas, or in remote communities as Las Cuevas de Cevico, the
tobacco is first transported by animals to the road, and then picked up by
the truck.

This process is known as recuas, and each bestia (animal} carries

two hampers at a time amountmg to $0.25 each; if the trip is more than three
or four kilometers, transportation will increase.
Although a middleman's responsibility, transportation costs are financed
by the warehouses.

They normally add to the middleman's commission an extra

$0.50/qq. for transportaion costs, and provide them with cerones (hampers ,
averaging $0.32 each} in which the tobacco is transported.

Because the truck

driver only receives $0.25/qq. of the $0.50/qq. for transportation costs, the
middleman pays his hamperers from the remaining $0.25/qq.

If the hamperer gets

$0.15/qq., then the extra $0. 10/qq. still remains in the possession of the
middleman.

In other words, of the $1.50/qq. the buyer receives from the ware-

house (commission and transportation costs), he will probably keep $1. 10/qq.
If he employs a classifier, his operational costs will go higher, but also his
returns.
11,,
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Of all the members of the middleman's quasi-group,
are in the most commercial relationsh:ip with him.

th~

comines or piches

They frequently operate out-

side the middleman's original purchasing niches (fuera de zona) thus amplifying
his range and scale of operations.

For the most part they are local store owners,

but still others are officials of peasant local organizations, usurers, and local
majors.

Data is not clear in how the association between the middleman and his comin

originates.

But the analysis of ten middlemen operations from Pontezuela and

ramboril suggests that they frequently are friends (amigos) from infancy times
when living in a former community together, or that they are relatives.

In any

case their arrangement establishes for the comin to buy tobacco in his community
and the comin:will also. inform him of tobacco transactions occuning in the area.
The former will receive both advanced and purchasing money from the middleman to
subsidize his enterprise, and if necessary, will also employ cash from his own
commercial enterprise.

In return, he will receive either a $0.50/qq. purchasing

commission, or any profit resulting from the price difference when reselling the
tobacco to the middleman; if the price margin is ample enough they might divide
it according to specific share arrangements.
Comines' purchasing operations in the community vary from those of the
regular middlemen.

They do not have the same degree of control of the latter

over his original purchasing niches.

Instead, they normally exploit any debts

the peasant might have with them on account of other commercial, financial or
legal practices, in order to buy their tobacco.
Future of the Middlemen Distributive Role
Tobacco middlemen, especially when buying in their own purchasing niches,
maintain a network of person to person exchanges with their cl ientele which persists over time and endures longer than any singk

transaction.

Along with

market competition determining price in relation to supply and demand, there

. I

1
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are slight but significant exchanges of privileges between them ranging from
matters of sale preference to obtaining cash, and a variety of other services.
If this picture is correct, it in no way contradicts the assertion that tobacco
middlemen --especially average and entrepreneurs-- have fully developed commercial
motivations.

In fact, the use of personal ism in their transactions is economically

sound and simply reflects awareness of the characteristics of the environmental
social organization to which they have to adapt.
The purchasing practices of the middlemen with their strong personalistic
element affects the nature of the internal marketing activity of criollo tobacco.
Not only are peasants affected by the middleman's control of financial resources
and market relation, but even the export houses consider their interests affected
by their price speculations based on the twofold control of cash and tobacco

harvest which their privileged position in the industry's distributional system
grants them.

Shephard, who has studied Caribbean internal economies, soundly

warns against any unqualified judgments that, regardless of local conditions, the
middleman is economically deleterious:
It is dangerous to assume as some cooperative enthusiasts do, that
middlemen are parasites who interpose themselves between producer
and consumer and levy a toll on both without render1ng any service
•.• We must not lose sight of the fact that middlemen come into
existence in response to a demand by producers and consumers for
the essential services they perform. They are induced to undertake
these services in the expectation of profit and if the prospect of
profit permanently ceases, they cease to operate. The fact that
many middlemen earn profit cannot be accepted as conclusive evidence
of inefficiency or of excessive changes for the services they perform
... It is possible, of course, to eliminate particular types of middlemen, but ..• (their) services are indispensable and the question is
whether these services can be performed more efficiently by specialist
middlemen or by organizations of producers
(cited in Mintz 1956:22).
It is all but revolutionary to admit that the present day market practices of middlemen have to be rationalized, and probably gradually eliminated,
With the development of organizations of tobacco producers or even specialist
middlemen.

But this possibility is still remote amid a minifundist criollo
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production characterized by a significant absence of production cre9it to these
small producers and by local unstable producers' organizations.
On the other ·hand, two questbns are most relevant at this junction.

First,

what shall be done to employ economically the labor freed by the reforms if they
ever become successful.

And even most important, will the reforms of marketing

practices broaden economic opportunities for the producers, or disadvantage small
producers by favoring the export houses?

It should be remembered that some middle-

men, intensify competition and reduce chances for zonal monopolistic control by
the export houses over the supply of any group or individual; especially since
they operate with a relative margin of freedom in their purchasing niches because
of environmental social organization, and apparently without unconditionally

submitting themselves to the organized price-fixing schemes of the warehouses.

J

j
I
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CHAPTER VI
EXPORT LEVEL OF ARTICULATION
The Dominican crop of criollo and Cuban tobacco is bought and processed
by an average of 13 to 15 export houses (casas exportadoras) operating in the

country.

This operation is accomplished through a network of dependent local

warehouses and transactions with independent or semi-independent local packers
(empacadoras locales).

Once it has been packed, the tobacco leaves are exported

through international dealer houses (casas matrices) who either subsidize or
provide financial support to almost all the export houses.
These export packers constitute the core of the export level of articulation.

Thetr cultural significance is analogous to the one of the middlemen

because of their strategic position in the industry's adaptational network.

Like

the middlemen in the national environment, export houses conjoin two different environments:

the national producers and manipulators of tobacco, and the inter-

national dealers in virtual control of both capital and access to manufacturers'
markets.

The adaptational network of the exporters consists of a set of exchanges

articulating both energy resources, tobacco and capital.

Thus, their own existence

is contingent upon both the purchase and processing of the tobacco, and the financial assistance and marketing cooperation of the international dealers.
At the national sphere, their operations are most significant.

During

the ten months tobacco season in 1970-1971, these export packers put into circulatbn
approximately $22.3 mill ion pesos in the Cibao region (cf. El Sol newspaper;
Thursday, August 5, 1971).

Presently their operations integrate a permanent

labor force of 70,000 persons.

Because of the nuclear family labor organization
173
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's calculated to augment to 200,000 agricultural laborers {cf. Casals et al.
I

:9). Rough estimates call for 25,000 producers with a minimum of five agri1972
cultural laborers each. On the other hand, each export house employs an average

475

warehouse workers; and each of the estimated 35 local packers have a minimum

of 150 workers.

The remaining labor force comes from temporary workers involved

in transportation and secondary industries of strings and hampers.
As a concrete example of the economic operations of one of these export
houses we might consider the investments of the Dominican Export Tobacco Industry
(INETAB).

In June 1972, the management of Inetab announced that the company was

integrated by both Dutch and Dominican capital, but was controlled and administered
by the latter.

The assets were well beyond

one million pesos.

At the same

time, it was reported a minimum investment of RD$1.5 million pesos for the
purchase of 60,000 qq. of criollo tobacco in the 1972 season.

This investment

would generate presumably employment at the production level for 9,600 persons,
and indirectly to 14,000 agrarian workers.

In its own locale they required the

services of 21 employees and 300 warehouse workers and in other dependent
warehouses 300 workers were laboring (cf. El Listin newspaper, June 15, 1972).
Tobacco Production Costs and Profit Strategies
One of the most vital strategies of the export house operations is the
purchase and control of tobacco by zones.
economic.

The rationale behind this is strictly

Since the profit margin is contingent not only upon volume of pur-

chased tobacco but also upon higher yield of better types of tobacco when
classified in the warehouses.

These better types, such as #1 and #2 in criollo

tobacco, and long-fillers in Cuban tobacco, receive higher prices from the
manufacturers and thus augment the margin between tobacco cost and selling price.
But the increase or decrease yield percentage of the tobacco is closely contingent upon both ecological conditions and labor care of the plant during
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This being the situation, the best option available. to the export
packers

is to acquire the tobacco not randomly but by selecting purchasing

This strategy has become more urgent in the last years amid higher
final costs of the tobacco to the export houses.

Paradoxically, while the de-

mand for Dominican dark tobacco --but above all criollo tobacco-- is expected
to increase during the period of 1972-1980 the exporters face the possibility of
losing such markets.

For instance, this seems to have been already the case

with such tobacco markets as the French and the German.

The main reason for

this market loss is the sharp increase in Dominican tobacco prices.

While

Brazil and the Philippines, two of the Dominican dark tobacco competitors,
for example, delivered their tobacco to Spain in 1967 at an average price
ranging from US$32.00 to $35.00, and US$47.00 to $48.00 per 100 kilos respectively, Dominican tobacco selling prices were US$45.00 to $50.00 per 100 kilos
(see UNCTAD 1968:379).
One of the main reasons for these strenuous competing prices seems to
be the high costs of tobacco (see table 3f).

From 1963 to 1972, tobacco field

prices have increased an estimated 92% for criollo tobacco, and 11% for Cuban
tobacco thus stimulating peasants to augment their production.

While tobacco

field prices have sharply increased in the last years, the same seems not to
be true either of the tobacco field prices or the purchasing prices in competing
countries as compared to Dominican exporter's tobacco costs.
The high cost of tobacco in the field is probably related to a number of
~ariables such as:

middlemen marketing practices; export houses' inability to

reach price agreements amid low national production and competitive purchasing
Practices; and finally, their uncertainty of guaranteeing the necessary supply
Of tobacco to operate and fulfill outside agreements with manufacturers.

This

COrnplex market situation is manifested through what is commonly referred to as
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rices (guerra de precios) among competing export houses for the acquisi• war of P
f the tobacco.
tfOO O

TABLE 31
AVERAGE PRICE RECEIVED BY THE PRODUCER PER QUINTAL OF TOBACCO 1963-1972
CRIOLLO

CUBAN

14.89

46.32

15.65

47.51

14.62

42.65

1966

15.54

40.28

1967

14. 21

45.36

15.74

48.25

1969

19.50

51. 00

1970

22.64

51. 46

1971 (;';)

25.00

49. 10

1972 (,., )

26.00

1963
1964
1965

1968

I:

· (* pre! imi nary estimates).

Source:

unpub I is hed data from the Tobacco Institute

This competition has put out of business more than two export houses in the
1971-1972 season.

Also there are concrete indications that at least three of the

remaining export packers are either in collusion or already under a joint ownership while at the same time maintaining different management.
divided their operations.
criolJo tobacco.

Other firms have

While one deals with Cuban tobacco, the other buys

In all, the norm is one of overt competition with several behind

the scenes alliances.
In this adaptational environment, the national government policy up to
the Present time seems to have been one of virtual laissez-faire.

This is not

so much because of a political and economic doctrine but because of technical

177
fnco mp

etence, national plitical instability and probably because of some depen-

den Ce

on the part of the government upon the volume of dollars (divisas) invested

'bY the i nternat iona 1 dea 1ers through exporters in the country.

In any case, the

Tobacco Institute implicitly or explicitly has limited its efforts in technical
and financial assistance to producers without interfering with exporters• operations.

Its recent response to increasing prices and risk of losing European

markets for the country's dark tobacco has been a special effort to increase
production in order to augment the supply of tobacco to exporters.

It is expected

that this policy, in conjunction with the elimination of middlemen, will suffice
to stabilize tobacco field prices.

This strategy evades any interference with

export house operations or confrontation with producers, while signaling middlemen as the source of price inflation.
Nevertheless, some private and official voices have recently called
attention to the critical situation in which the Dominican dark tobacco might
find itself in coming years if its prices are not stabilized.

This is especially

critical since other producing nations have been able to keep their costs down
and manufacturers seem to be more interested in price .than in the quality of the
dark tobacco.

For these reasons they call for a pol icy of price harmonization

and production controls:
En vista de la pel igrosidad de la actual tendencia al alza de precios
por razones de la aguda competencia y la tendencia de precios mas bajos
en los productos finales hechos con tabaco negro, es indispensable
implantar una pol itica de armonizacion de precios, que, aunque asegure
al productor margenes de benef icio atractivos para incrementar la produccion, evite la sal ida de nuestor tabaco de los mercados europeos •••
Esta alza como hemos visto puede ser pel igrosa en terminos de mercadeo
externo y quizas lo mas conveniente seria fijar niveles de produccion
de acuerdo a las previsiones de la demanda mundial y conforme a las
caracteristicas de esa demanda segun los mercados de posible acceso ...
(cf. Casals et al. 1972: 4 and 10).
The importance of the tobacco field price in relation to the profit
margins of the exporters and for competitive ability with the tobacco of other
Producing nations can best be shown by the following example.

If for matters of

I

,./'I
'!'
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the criollo tobacco is only classified into three types #1, #2 and #3·,
,1ar1tY
and its average yield is 10, 50 and 40% respectively, with a selling price
average of $100.00, $90.00 and $80.00 per 100 kilos of tobacco, then the average
selling price for every 100 kilos is $87.00.

The profit margin of the export

house is between the selling price to the manufacturers and the tobacco final
cost.
During the last season --1971-1972-- the export house had to pay an
estimated average $26.00 per quintal of criollo tobacco; in other words, $52.00
per 100 kilos of tobacco.

This field purchasing price went further up with

middlemen's commission and the cost of transportation of the tobacco to the
warehouse:$1.50/qq., or $3.00/100 kilos.

Thus, for the purchase of 100 kilos

of criollo tobacco and its transportation to the warehouse in order to start
the manipulation and the packing processes, the exporter had already paid $55.00;
only $32.00 short of the average selling price.

These $32.00 per 100 kilos will

have to cover all the remaining costs of production and packing, plus administrative and financial expenses of the export house as they were estimated in table IS.
This provides a profit margin to the exporters.

The profit was estimated to

range at the time of field work from 3.5 to 7% of the tobacco selling price.
Obviously, the example is only a simplification since most export houses
maintain a large scale operation (economia de escala), and they classify their
tobacco in more types than here presented.

Nevertheless, the fact remains that

as the tobacco final cost increases, the export houses' own prof it margins shrink.
In turn, some strategies are required to improve their own economic interests
Without losing their competitive selling prices in the international market.
In this situation, at least five alternatives are open to the exporters.
They are: (i) to reduce tobacco field costs; (ii) to reduce elaboration and
administrative costs; (iii) to force manufacturers to raise their purchasing
Prices; (iv) to secure higher percentage returns of better tobacco types;
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and finally, to buy bulk volumes of tobacco thus establishing a large scale

ope ration.
Tobacco Field Costs
To the present, Cuban tobacco field costs are being stabilized through
the practice of transactions made through contracts signed at the beginning of
the season by both the producer and the buying exporter.

The contracts provide

normally for financial and technical assistance plus a tentative selling price.
In some instances, the contracts do not provide any selling price and the export
house actually operated through these contracts only as a credit source while
parchasing its tobacco on the market at harvest time.

The only case in which this

latter practice was known to be employed was where the financial situation forced
the company to appeal to this scheme in order to augment its capital.
case, the contract strategy eliminates the middlemen.

In any

It also guarantees the

export house a certain amount of the tobacco production from the beginning of
the season without leaving them at the mercy of the competition of the free
market to obtain their supply at harvest time.

On the other hand, the producer

will be guaranteed not only financial and technical assistance, but also a price
·-normally a minimum price--for his crop.

According to data from 30 producers

under contract with an export house, this price security is considered by the
growers as one of the most significant advantages of the contract arrangement in
addition to the financial opportunities which they bring to them.

At the same

time one of the export packers recognized that there is so much demand from
Producers to sign a contract with them, that they are purchasing tobacco exclusively from contracted producers.
But this is far from being the case in the criollo tobacco market.
houses have not yet found a mechanism to stabilize prices in the field.
~in reasons behind the spiralling increase in criollo prices seem to be

Export

The two
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reat number of small producers, and exporters inability ~o maintain price
the g
d between them amid marketing competition. In addition to this they seem
,ccor
unable to guarantee in advance the necessary supply of tobacco to meet export
engagements.
This situation has increased the commentaries and explanations for the
price

situation in reference to monopoly or a cartel division of the market on

the part of a few big export houses.

It is argued private 1y that some exporters

are permitting field prices to run high to force other companies out of the
market thereby protecting their capital investments and control of the market.
The assumptions being that these two or three big companies are able to support
even financial losses for a relative period of time, and have the ability to
control the market if they so desire.

Evidence of this strategy is found in

discussions, the secret colluding of some export firms, the withdrawal from the
market of minor companies, and the decreasing profit margin of the exporters.
It is argued that all these variables were also present in Brazil during the
last decade and that from an estimated 20 export houses, today only 4 are left
In the market.
Whatever the value of this explanation, the fact remains that up to
this moment criollo field prices are rising and there is no indication that
this situation will change in the coming seasons.
Elaboration and Administrative Costs
The second strategy calls for reduction of both processing and administrative costs.

Average estimates of export houses' administrative expenses range

from RD$25,000.00 to $75,000.00 per year.

These expenses are absorbed by

increasing an average 3% of the final cost of the tobacco to its selling price.
According to the presidents of five export houses, these costs are unavoidable
Once their firms go into a large-scale operation which depends upon bulk volume
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of tobacco.

The same can be said of processing costs which are estimated to be
Because one of the pressing problems between

JO% of the final tobacco cost.
expor t

an d
111ent

houses and manufacturers is the maintenance of a standard classification

manipulation of the tobacco 0n the part of exporters, the cost and investin the manipulation and packing processes are vital to them.
Significantly, local packers' strategy is precisely this, to eliminate

administrative expenses and reduce to a minimum the processing costs in the
warehouse.

In this way they wi 11 produce a cheaper tobacco than that of the

export houses and will be
both organizations.

abl~

to sell their tobacco to them with a profit to

While local

packer~

administrative costs are virtually non-

existent, they can reduce their processing costs to an average 4% as compared
with exporters' manipulation costs of 10% of the final tobacco cost (cf. table
JS').

Thus, the rationale behind all local packers' operations is, for instance,

to produce for $76.00/100 kilos, what it will cost the exporters $84.00/100 kilos
in their own warehouses.

In other words, to reduce all costs possible, sometimes

even at the expense of quality factors.
Manufacturers' Purchasing Prices
If the previous two strategies to reduce the tobacco cost have been
practically unsuccessful, especially in the criollo industry,
not seem to be an exception.
this contention.

the third one does

Sufficient data is not directly able to support

Nevertheless, it seems to be highly probable that export houses

through their international dealers have been unable to maintain their profit
margin by proportionally raising manufacturers' purchasing prices in relation
to their higher costs.

Private exporter's estimates from two criollo companies

report a tobacco field price increase in the last ten years of almost 92% per
quintal, but a slow 57% increase in manufacturers' selling prices.

These esti-

mates are supported by table 33 as well as the opinion of the president of another
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house while referring to their profits in the last four years:
e.><Port
Si nuestras ganancias se han reducido a un margen de 5 o 6% anual no
es por los corredores o porque le estemos pagando demasiado a los
productores; sino porque los manufactureros no quiren comprender que
el precio del tabaco y ce todo lo demas esta subiendo rapidamente.
Nose trata de un fenomeno exclusive en el negocio del tabaco, sino
de un proceso inflacionario internacional. Pero sin embargo, ellos
se mantienen ahi sin ceder a nuestras necesidades con tal de mantener
un precio estable frente a sus consumidores.
Higher Percentage Returns of Better Tobacco Types
The fourth and not exclusive alternative open to the exporters is to
obtain their tobacco not randomly but by taking into consideration both the
types yielding percentages and their processing costs per purchasing zone.

The

acquisition of better quality tobacco will increase the percentage of superior
types thus augmenting the average selling price and then their profits.
Turning back to our previous example, if instead of obtaining the estimated average 10, 50 and 40% of criollo tobacco types, a company is able to
secure a zone with a yielding average of 16, 57 and 27% of types #1, #2 and #3
at the previously indicated prices.

Then the average selling price for 100 kilos

Is not going to be $87.00 but $88.90.

This $1.90/100 kilos difference expands

the profit margin of the export house and is most significant when operating a
large-scale operation.

Obviously, the situation is more complicated than this

because elaboration costs per type vary, and warehouse classifications are more
complex than we have presented.

The price mechanisms, however, are the same

and thus the example gives an illustration of the value of this strategy.
Not all export houses are able to control the better quality producing
zones such as:

Cancas la Reina (Tamboril), Juan Lopez and La Laguna (Moca),

la Torre (La Vega), La Canela (Santiago), Inoa and Canafito (San Jose de las
~tas), or Unijica (Puerto Plata).

In such cases they have to export great

Volumes of low priced tobacco in order to maintain their operations and try to
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·,n a profit; these operations are known as un negacio de centavos ( a busiof pennies).

In avoiding this alternative, some export buyers move from

one zone to the other, purchasing the better harvests at a higher price than
that of the official market price.

The rationale behind this is that even

when they have to pay higher prices to procure specific harvests, they will
recover their investment when the tobacco is classified.

Also, their practice

will inflate the market to other export houses in their own purchasing zones
of influence, leaving them to acquire average type yielding tobacco amid

conditions of high final tobacco costs.
Large-Scale Operations
The fifth alternative open to export houses, not so much to reduce the
final costs of tobacco, but to sustain their profits, is connected with the
nature of their own operations.

Export houses purchase seasonally an average

of 20,000 to 60,000 qq. of tobacco criollo, and from 15,000 to 25,000 qq. of
Cuban tobacco.

Through this large-scale economy they are able to multiply

their actual profits per quintal, and decrease processing and administrative
expenses which further expands therr profits.
Is contingent upon two variables.

But this large-scale operation

First, the national production of tobacco

and the exporter's uncertainty in guaranteeing a sufficient share of it.
Secondly, the control of their purchasing networks integrated by local warehouses and local packers.
In this perspective, the export producer's ability to control purchasing
Zones involves not only guaranteeing better quality tobacco but also greater
Volumes of it.

If the case were that an export company achieves virtual mastery

over one tobacco zone, then it would also be in a better position to fix prices.
ihis last event presently is only the exception in some tobacco zones and not
the rule.

At most, warehouses have been able to preserve zones or sub-zones of
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for their purchasing operations through the control .of purchasing

their middlemen networks.
niches bY

"a rehouses
The purchase and manipulation of tobacco for the export packers is mainly
conducted through a network of local warehouses with their middlemen.
different types of warehouses connected with the exporters.

There are
could

Among them,

be distinguished main warehouses, the properly called local warehouses, and purI

I

chasing warehouses.
Main warehouses are so characterized because they are normally contiguous
to the export house's own offices; therefore, almost all of them are in the perimeter area of Santiago City.

They allocate high quality processing equipment,

and frequently maintain small scale purchasing operations thereby limiting
themselves to processing the tobacco delivered to them by other warehouses.

This

ts mainly the case with those export companies intending to standardize the pro-

duction and classification of their tobacco thus monopolizing these labors in
one warehouse with highly technical equipment.

Other companies habitually deliver

their better quality leaves to the main warehouses to be treated according to
more elaborate curing and classification procedures.
local warehouses are geographically distributed according to tobacco
zones.

They are normally placed in the core of a tobacco zone with fair communi-

~tion

access and try to maintain their adaptational influence by means of middle-

~n

operations and through price competition.

It is not uncommon to find two or

more competing local warehouses near one another.

In such cases, if the pur-

chasing zone is an old tobacco area, each warehouse will probably control or
have preferential access to specific sub-zones of the environment.
Warehouses process and pack the tobacco they obtain for export.

These local

They do not,

hcwever, have the equipment nor the skilled labor of the main warehouses.

Through

this ability to manipulate the tobacco they augment export houses elaboration
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itY and their physical space to operate.
Purchasing warehouses are a strategic device of a few export houses to

ain control over specific purchasing zones and expand their range of
further g
operations.
tobacco.

In contrast to previous warehouses, these do not process and pack

Instead, once they purchase the tobacco they proceed to pre-select the

Jeaves and deliver them to a main or a nearby warehouse.

They are small scale

organizations (3,000 to 12,000 quintals per season) in charge of tobacco in
either new zones of production or in what formerly was considered a wider tobacco
purchasing zone.

In allJ they promote purchasing operations in close relation to

local social organizations, and further protect the companies' financial investments by transferring to the managers the responsibility for the reimbursement
of the advanced money.
The number of these main, local and purchasing warehouses vary from one
export house to the other.

A close estimate of the purchasing operations of

six export houses, three of them dealing only with criollo tobacco, one with
Cuban tobacco, and the remaining two with both varieties, revealed a network of
six main, ten local and five purchasing warehouses.
were virtually subsidized by their export companies.

In all cases, these warehouses
Thus they are clearly dis-

tlnguishable from a local packer in that they purchase and pack tobacco for the
export houses with the former 1 s money, and do not sell back to them a tobacco
already theirs.

In other words, as distinguished from local packers, warehouses

are dependent organizations of the export packers.
At the beginning of every new tobacco season exporters estimate the
national production, their own purchasing ability, and the manufacturers' demand

Of dark tobacco. Accordingly, they will fix a tobacco quota to every one of
th .
eir dependent warehouses and will start subsidizing the latter's operations
. through weekly disbursements of money.

These tobacco

11

quotas 11 given to the

~arehouses are most flexible since they result from estimates of their purchasing
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'l'tY and the exporters international demands.

abl

In fact, they only serve as an

I

. ator to the exporters of how much tobacco they will obtain through each

fOd 1C

asing channel and the investment they will have to assume during the tobacco
pure h
According to actual market situations, the warehouses will be granted
the opportunity or not to change the estimates made at the beginning of the

The economic relations between export packers and warehouses are carefully recorded in formal and detailed warehouse reports.
to the

forme~

Weekly reports sent

account for the volume of tobacco purchased during the week and

the total amount obtained up to that time in the season including the prices
paid, the warehouses own expenses and the other costs to be subsidized by the
exporters.

This information is further augmented through normal visits by the

exporters to the warehouses and other informal means of communication.

Thus

when the weekly money disbursement takes place, the exporters know with virtual
exactitude the situation of the dependent warehouse and its weekly needs.

In

most cases, the disbursement is only authorized after the warehouse manager
personally justifies to the president of the export house previous and coming
expenses.
By keeping a record of price fluctuations,

1

tobacco purchased, and

the type of tobacco, the exporters will be able to rationally authorize new
purchasing prices to each warehouse in view of: (i) the warehouse local environmental conditions; (ii) the regional market situation; (iii) and the exporter's
ONn financial resources and tobacco supply needs.

Only the export house can

authorize new tobacco field prices, and it is expected that warehouses and
their middlemen purchasing operations, would be regulated according to exporters'
fixed prices and marketing guide! ines.
Curiously enough, some of the patterns of control existing between the

~arehouse and its middlemen, will now be implemented between export packers and
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warehouses; and practically for

the same reasons.

For instance; the direct

act of the farmer's management with warehouses through periodical visits allow

the exporters to inspect personally processing procedures, the quality of the
purchased tobacco, and to learn about other export companies purchasing practices.
At the same time, they reinforce their personal relations with the warehouse manager.

Amid these relations, exporters will try to prevent warehouses from desnatar

the tobacco and sell better types to olor tobacco factories or to competing warehouses at better prices.

In addition, they will prevent the reselling strategem

of the warehouses to themselves which might inflate the purchasing price of the

tobacco.
The ground and buildings of the warehouses are normally owned by the person
in charge of their operations.

Frequently these privately owned warehouses, after

the tobacco season is finished, will start processing other crops like coffee or
corn.

Regardless of whether the warehouse manager is the owner or not of the

buildings, they are normally either local residents or urban settlers in control
of considerable financial, political and social resources in their environments.
Through the operations of the middlemen, and the employment opportunities opened
by their warehouses, they will further reinforce' their assets in the community.
It is for their privileged adaptational position that exporters select them to
direct local tobacco operations.

In a sense, they offer to the latter an opera-

tional security non-existent in the rural environments.

We might say the greater

their local control and adaptational power, the more secure and successful the
exporter's operations become.
No matter who the owner of the warehouse buildings is, the export house
Pays rent, unless it is already owned by them.

The warehouse manager normally

does not receive a salary from the export house but works on a commission base.
His commission frequently ranges from $1.25 to $2.00 per purchased quintal.
responsibilities are not only to contact but also to organize processing and

His
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and packing labors.

At the same time he is responsible to the export house for
l

eimbursement of all the money granted by the latter for the finance and
the r
purchase of the crop.

For this reason, it is not only to his advantage to

augment the quantity of tobacco purchased, but also to keep tight control of
the middlemen operations.

This is

particular~

true at liquidation time.

In

manY cases, warehouses have to maintain their doors open at the end of the season for smaller quantities of tobacco, and receive them at inflated prices from
those middlemen owing them considerable sums of money.

Through this strategem,

known as chiripeando tabaco, the warehouse manager is able to secure the middlemen's reimbursement of owed money.
Normally, warehouses are managed by members of the manager's inner-adaptational network who are more frequently than not the manager's own sons and brothers.
In fact, data from nine of twelve local and purchasing warehouses studied, supports
the generalization that warehouses are a family business enterprise supported by
the manager's inner-adaptational network just as minifundist plots were at a lower
level and scale of operations.

The main difference is that the economic goals be-

hind both operating units contrast: family subsistence in one and profit maximization and environmental control in the other.

It is for this reason that warehouse

organizations become particularly significant.

The social organization common to

to the production and middlemen level of articulation becomes also relevant and
efficacious at a higher level of adaptation.

The warehouse management is shaped

by the inner-adaptational network personalistic approach to environmental pressures.
It must be able to integrate and organize both labor arrangements in the warehouse
itself as well as outside purchasing operations.

For this reason, warehouses have

Proven to be so successful not only in their purchasing and manipulation operations,
but also in establishing information networks with the middlemen and preserving
control and assent in their environments.

Warehouse managers possess not only

control of land, financial resources, and outside community influence, but employ
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energy resources through and in accord with rural social organization, thus
their
forcing their adaptational status.
rein
As an example, the importance of a warehouse organization is best illustrated
case.
from the following

During the summer of 1972 an export house which in previous

of the Dominican tobacco market was trying to resume its operayears has gone out
tions in the Cibao region.
whether a- not

At the moment they were examining two issue; in deciding

they would enter into the market of criollo tobacco again: (i) a

tobacco field price stabilization which will guarantee them a 10 to 13% profit on
their capital investment; and (ii) their ability to secure the services of three
local warehouses which, because of their purchasing network, virtually controlled
three vital purchasing zones.

The rationale behind the latter

iss~e

was that the

purchasing networks which the warehouse managers had integrated and their local
power was not replaceable in order to control those tobacco zones.
Local Packers
Local packers adapt to the criollo export houses' environment by resolving
two issues.

First of all, the export house is unable to reduce tobacco costs;

thus they pack tobacco at lower costs and sell it to them offering
an opportunity to augment their own profit margin.

the exporters

Secondly, exporters are often

unable to comply with specific datelines for shipments of manufacturers orders.
In either case, they extend the physical plant of the exporters and their range
of operations.
For instance, in 1971, a leading export tobacco house was in need of
4,000 pacas (packed tobacco, each pack weighing an average of 70 to 75 kilos)
for a coming shipment abroad.

The vice-president of the export firm went to a

supplier local packer and bought the tobacco at $74.00/100 kilos.
cost to the local packer had been $65.75/100 kilos.

The tobacco

Meanwhile, the export house

sold the tobacco at $80.00/100 kilos; the six dollars difference between the
Purchasing and selling price accounted for transportct:ion

and fumigation expenses,
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exporter's own profit margin.
Normally, local packers operate in the same fashion as a local warehouse.

TheY
50fl1e

buy and manipulate tobacco working through their own middlemen network.

In

cases, for example, in Villa Gonzalez where local packers are also big land-

owners, this middleman dependence is significantly reduced.

The tobacco is pur-

chased either directly from the owner's own farms, or the peasants deliver the
tobacco directly to them.

Local packers' operations comprise an average purchase

I
11

of 8,000 to 18,000 qq. of criollo tobacco per season, even when the bigger packers
might purchase up to 25,000 qq.

I'

For their operations they will normally invest

from $60,000.00 to $150,000.00 per season.

Their profits are commonly estimated

by informants associated with export houses as ranging from 10 to 13% of their
Investment.
According to interviews, the general impression is that export companies
would like to abolish transactions with local packers.

The main reason is that

their tobacco processing does not comply with manufacturer's requirements nor
standards of classification and the processes are not standardized.

Furthermore,

In some cases its weight shrinks considerably after having been packed thus
increasing the costs of the exporters.

Although frequent complaints of this nature

are heard, local packer's enterprise seems to be secure at present mainly because
of the service they provide for export houses by supplying them with tobacco they
need to comply with manufacturers' orders.
The social origin of local packers' owners is normally from the landed
elite and other powerful social and economical sectors from urban environments.
Their power over rural environments seems to be secured through traditional control
of the land and/or capital assets and financial resources.

Although there is not

sufficient historical data on this point, their role was most significant years
11

ago when international dealers and exporters had to establish their enterprises

~ithout previous acquaintance with the Dominican producers and

its centers

1'1111

'I
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of pa.'iers.

In this situation they were contingent upon this social sector to

nize their operations. Today their position is no less significant in the
or9 a
ional environment, but exporters' dependency upon them has significantly
na t
decreased, primarily because local packers are not able to export their tobacco
directly and the exporters maintain their own independent warehouse organizations.
Local packers might finance their own operations independently by obtaining a credit from the local banks.

But most frequently they make special

arrangements with particular export houses.

In this way, they secure both a

buyer for their packed tobacco and financial assistance for their operations.
They become what is usually referred to as a satel ite of an export house.

Their

dependence implies that they sell their tobacco almost exclusively to one export
house, and prices are mutually agreed upon with the exporters having the upper
hand.

At the same time, they are expected to cooperate with the marketing

policies of the export house.
In other cases, when the local packers want to maintain their purchasing
and selling independence but are not able to, or do not want to secure all their
financial credit from a bank, they take a middle position.

They will ask for a

bank credit plus an advancement from an export house to cover the cost of a
stipulated amount of tobacco they will process to the exporters.

In this way

they maintain a semi-independent status in their marketing operations while
establishing commercial links with a specific export packer.
Obvlously, the local packers' main economic interest is to operate independently in order to increase their bargaining power at selling time.

But this ideal

seems to be only a reality to less than seven local packers of the estimated 35
Presently operating in the country.

The lack of capital and the contingency upon

export houses to find a market for their tobacco forces their status to be one of
big, but dependent, local tobacco merchants.

In fact, local packers' general

inability to export their own tobacco is one of their greatest adaptational
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liabilities.

The main reason for this situation seems to spring out.of their

limited capital resources both in terms of financial and technical resources.
According to four owners of local packers from Vil la Gonzalez and Moca,
· restricted access and control of financial resources confines their purthe1r
chasing operations to a local tobacco zone.
with export house prices.

If pressured, they could not compete

Furthermore, a quality

11

boundary 11 is placed on their

procedures of processing and packing the tobacco because of the lack of appropriate technical equipment and skilled personnel.

This situation is further re-

inforced by the fact that they have to lower costs below exporters' own costs in
order to operate since they are not able to export directly.

This situation is

critical at the regional level of operation but it is even more critical at the
export level since they are not able to maintain direct contact with international
~nufacturers

of tobacco.

. International dealers are interested in financing

bulk tobacco operations and prefer to deal directly with their own export houses
rather than purcahsing and/or marketing small quantitites of tobacco from independ~nt

and competing producers.

On the other hand, local packers lack suffi-

cient capital to maintain an international selling organization (relaciones
comerciales) to market their own tobacco.
Export Houses
Preliminary data indicates that there are three types of export houses
regardless of whether they purchase one or both tobacco varieties for export.
Considering the financial resources of only thirteen of the nationally operating
export houses, they might be classified into: (65%) packing or commissioned
exporters (8); (20%) semi-independent or with mixed capital (3); and (15%) indePendent exporters {2).
Most of the export houses are both subsidized and partially staffed by
international dealer organizations {casas matrices).

These organizations
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e the necessary financial resources to the exporters either .in European
guaran te
at a 6.5% annual interst and then transfer this money to their commissionist
1,
5

~n~

or9 8 n

izations through the Dominican Central Bank, or in local banks at a 9.5 to

io.S% interest.

Their subsidies will include tobacco purchasing costs in the

field, warehouse production and labor expenses, transportation costs, and any
other expenses resulting from the operations of the exporter.
1118

Also they will

rket and guarantee the packed tobacco to the buying manufacturers.

Under these

arrangements the export house becomes only a dependent packing organization of the
casas matrices.

Their status is similar to that of middlemen and warehouses since

their profits are contingent upon a volume of purchased or packed tobacco through
a commission on account of either one of these operations --normally $3.00 per
purchased quintal.

In some cases, the export house receives a percentage of the

amount returning from the final tobacco sale instead of

a commision.

From this

money the administrative expenses have to be covered; management salaries and
local taxes are included in these expenses.

The remaining money represents their

profits.
Because of this financial and marketing dependency, packing companies do
not have any power to intervene in price dealings between dealers and manufacturers.
Their role is only to deliver the tobacco when so requested and their responsibillties end once the tobacco is shipped for exportation.

At the same time, infor-

mation has to be provided continuously to their respective dealer organizations
concerning purchased tobacco, prices, percentage yieldings and market conditions.
In this way the dealers will know what their actual supply is in order to meet
manufacturer~

demands.

Interacting with both operating units, export houses and

international manufacturers

will instruct their export houses in matters of

~rchasing, manipulation, field prices and export shipments.

The main difference between a commissioned and a semi-independent export
is the constitution of their capital asset.

The latter's capital normally

I,
I:
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from two sources:

,ornes

first, a group of national investors relatively in charge

e company's purchasing and manipulation process, and secondly, from an inter-

of t h

'onal dealer house which normally conducts marketing operations plus the open-

nat I

nd maintaining of tobacco markets. This situation automatically grants relaln9 a
. e operational freedom to this second group of exporters. For instance, they

tlV

will normally be consulted in bargaining operations between dealer houses and
118

nufacturers.

They might object selling prices and if the opportunity comes or

Is established they might even conduct tobacco transactions directly with manufacturers without recurring to the assistance and contacts of the interantional
dealers.

Also, at the end of the season they have a right to selling profits

as stockho 1de rs.
Finally, independent export houses finance their operations exclusively
on their own account; normally they receive credits from local banks and their
assets are owned by national investors.

This option appeared, through interviews

with the president of one of these companies, to be very difficult.

This is

because their credit resources have a high annual interest of 9.5 and 10.5%,
and are not sufficient to compete purchasing and price pressures of the exporters
financially supported or subsidized by international dealer houses.

At the same

time, their international selling network is reduced to fewer markets since they
lack the information and contacts of international dealers.

Often these inde-

Pendent houses have to transfer to international dealers the role of marketing
their tobacco at the international level; thereby they establish a relationship
similar in nature to the one existing between the local packers and dependent
export houses.
Interestingly enough, not only the number of independent exporters is
highly reduced, but that of export firms conceived and run as family enterprises
is also decreasing.

Available data seems to indicate, although it is not con-

on the point, that export houses were organized in previous years for
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·r national purchasing, processing and packing operations as family firms as
the'
the present minifundist plots and local warehouses. Father-son exchanges
are
integrated an inner-firm structure of trust and confidence amid a highly informal
environment where little cultural patterns of cooperation between non-kin existed
to guide required relationships, and where political and economic instability has
been the norm. While the father trained his sons for future transfer of business
responsibilities, their nucleus was further protected by the cooperation of members of their inner-adaptational network.

Apart from economical aspects --such

as business secrets tightly kept, family incentives for work effort, constant
communication, line of authority family reinforced-- the family firm also became

a network of strong moral obligations built up for many years.
If the family firm was to compete with large scale tobacco enterprises
subsidized or supported by international dealer houses, it will probably have to
expand

its

operations and and thus its environmental adaptation.

New financial

resources, complex purchasing operations and selling networks, and new specialized
personnel, all have to be integrated in the firm structure to face a highly competitive environmental market where maximization of profits and capital expansion
is virtually the sole goal.

Probably because of these environmental pressures,

family organized export houses ceded their place to present day relatively impersonal and business-I ike tobacco enterprises in which criteria of performance are
introducing new standards of procedure which are not family orientated.
Regardless of the export houses• inner-organization, this group has
traditionally constituted the closest reality to a sector of an oligarchic center
of control.

In fact, their adaptational network has a broad and more sophistica-

','11
''11
1

ted range of operations and consequences.

Their power over the distributive sys-

,,I

11111

tern of the tobacco industry, and thus over the country itself, is based upon
control and access to capital and sources of financial investments, the labor
market, and the commercial relations outside the country.

To the national government

'1i1

~1

1

'~I'

1,11

'1

11
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theY o f er
because o

a substantial source of divisas

(dollars) brought to the country

f their operations, and needed by the former to conduct its commercial

sactions in the international market.

cra n

To the labor market, their invest-

offer employment both in the field and in their warehouses.

,ents

At the same

roducers depend upon them to sell their crops and to get credit assistance.
time, P
fven

the national government, unless it takes upon itself this function which

cfoeS not seem probable in the immediate future, is contingent upon these firms
to market the national product and obtain dollars for international exchange.
The relations between the group of exporters are complex, and contrary
to predictions they do not seem to be a closely knit operating unit in economic

8 ~ political affairs.

Alien exporters working for international dealer houses

In the country seem the most aloof from national politics and the organization
of the country's structure of power.

Their only interest seems to be those

related to their tobacco investments and packing operations.

Their international

dealer houses do not seem to be reinvesting their profits in the country, thus
their interests are further reduced to the tobacco industry.
But the same does not hold for national exporters either working indepen~ntly

or in cooperation with casas matrices.

Their personal family status, as

well as their adaptational network depends virtually upon their power resources
In the national environment.

Thus normally they have to secure

their position

through direct involvement in national affairs, and influential control of their
environment.

Their adaptational niches are protected not only through economic

and political relations resulting from their tobacco business but also through

~mily and social ties with prominent families and groups in the country.

Through

-~ese exchanges they develop an inner-adaptational network with wider ranges of
influence and authority in the country.

These adaptational networks are analogous

to the ones operating in the production and middleman level of articulation as

~el] as between warehouse managers; the main difference is the articulation of

f rite
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rests and environments they articulate and control.

As in the panel inha

nization described by Leeds (1964) in Brazil, the members of these inneror9 a
adaptational networks represent different specific economic interests in the
CibaO region and the country as a whole.

Thus the control of power on the part

of the national tobacco exporters is multiplied and maintained as long as they

can

S uccesfully

compete in the market.

In the market, relations among exporters are strenuous.

Today three

main market rules impregnate the operations of the tobacco export houses in
their adaptational network.

They are:

secrec~

distrust and competition.

This

behavioral norm affecting their operations was frankly described by an informant
who is president of a tobacco firm.

He said: "In the tobacco business there are

neither friends nor enemies but only a compulsing need to buy tobacco and earn
a profit. 11
This attitude seems to become clearly evident in the incapacity of exporters
to cooperate as a group even in matters of supposedly common interest.
price stabilization.

For instance,

Usually at the beginning of the tobacco season exporters get

together in order to decide initial purchasing prices.

In 1971-1972 they did so

again, and agreed to sustain a common market price in order to protect themselves
from a price war growing out from stratagems of speculating middlemen and competing
companies' purchasing practices.
to raise it without mutual assent.

They all agreed on a price and none was supposed
But in less than one week the agreement was

broken and so recognized in a second meeting.

No more accords were discussed on

this subject, at least publicly, with the proper exception of dealings resulting
from allied companies.

According to three different informants, the agreement

Was broken when after the first meeting one of the export house presidents went
to ·one of his dependent local packer owners (a sate! ite) and told him to start

bu Yrng
·
tobacco at a higher price.

The reason for this being that the agreement

Was only between export houses, and did not include local packers.
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probably because of the market competition between export packers and the
formal norms of cooperation, a common saying among tobacco exporters be1ack of
relatively true: '~his is not a business for heart achers because from
c:oines
ear, and from transaction to transaction, everything changes in the
year to Y

tobacco industry."

Nevertheless, it is surprising how well informed most com-

panies are in relation to competitor's operations.

It is true that most tran-

sact .ions and adaptational alternatives are secretly conducted.

But this does

not seem to prevent a flow of information which permits other companies to know
the whereabouts of their competitors with a high degree of exactitude.

Among

other reasons, it seems reasonable to assume that this is so because their
adaptational networks are much more patterned than usually assumed.

They are

all contingent upon a common exchange structure associated with the international
dealer houses' control of markets and capital, and amid a market run according
to the 1aw of supp 1y and demand.

Thus ext rapo 1at ions from one's own adaptat i ona 1

network are also true of other competing exporters, and provide a reliable source
of informaton.
~tions

This structural information is further supplemented by communi-

coming from warehouses and international dealers.
Table 32 is presented in order to provide a relative idea of the magnitude

and range of export houses' purchasing and packing operations.

Sale values are

not exact because it is a customary practice to fake them in order to evade taxes.
(Table 32 follows on the next page.)
lnternat i ona 1 Dea 1er Houses
If at the national sphere the export houses' adaptational networks are
contingent upon the control they have of purchasing zones, at the international
Sphere they are dependent upon dealer houses.

This is the second strategic

Qriab]e determining the operations of exporters primar11y because they have to
finance their own transactions and market their packed tobacco through the
}1
:11,'
I

I I

'

'
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TABLE 32
EXPORT HOUSE OPERATIONS DURING THE 1970-1971 TOeACCO SEASON
QUINTALS

fxPORT HOUSE

VALUE (RD$)

L,---

D. T.M.

75,044

2,428,371

Hebeeka, c.a.

56,059

1,484,281

Kaubeck, c.a.

48,625

1,314,209

Manipuladora de Tabaca, c.a.

48,913

1'541'288

Empresas de Tabacos Tropicales, c.a.

24,614

491 ,951

Quisqueya, c.a.

13,439

371'164

FE TAB

7,283

321,577

IPHACO, c.a.

6,653

129,661

620

15,314

COPATA, c.a.

6,535

18,264

INETAB, c. a.

3,987

14,623

12,740

340,289

5,926

171,390

Compania Anonima Tabacalera

30,056

1 '107 '663

E. Leon Jimenes, c.a.

20,357

724,663

359,251

9, 160,507

Felix A. Reinoso, c.a.

Sociedad Comercial Tabaquera, c.a.
Victor F. Thomen, c.a.

TOTALS
Source:

unpublished data from the Tobacco Institute.

services of these casas matrices.

Just as local packers found an end to their

operations in the premises of the exporters, now export packers• business ends
at the gates of dealer's selling organizations.
International dealers maintain large scale operations not only in the
Dominican Republic, but also in other producing countries.

Through these opera-

tions they acquire bulk volumes of tobacco providing them with bargaining power
in front of both nat i ona 1 export houses and manufacturers.

This cont ro 1 is a
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further guarantee for their access and control of credit and capital resources.
oealer houses also sustain a selling organization through which they keep track
of tobacco markets and the specific demands and qua I ity requirements
facturers.

of manu-

Thus, their adaptational network results in a mapping of both the

producers and the consumers environment which is not availabe to either one.
This middleman position provides the necessary credit and capital to finance
their purchasing operations as well as the maintenance of a selling organization
of brokers.

It also enables dealer houses to direct export house operations to

the point of even fixing tobacco field prices to national exporters, and as
strategically important, to virtually monopolize international tobacco marketing.
Their international marketing procedures are supported by the large-scale
of their operations.

ManufadJ..Jrers prefer to purchase their tobacco from these

international dealers instead of small independent exporters mainly because they
guarantee manufacturers greater quantities of tobacco.

This not only satisfies

their operational requirements but also provides the maintenance of specific
blends and complies with concrete quality standards.

On the other hand, indepen-

dent local exporters will be able to guarantee only their own relatively small
volume of tobacco, including fewer varieties and with higher risk of failing to
deliver the product in case of crop failure in their own countries.
A second important advantage to the manufacturers' transactions with
casas matrices, is the latter's ability to de! iver tobacco at lower prices because
of their large-scale operations.

And, if necessary, they can sustain temporary

losses in specific markets in order to over-run independent local exporters'
Price competition.

Another advantage resulting from large-scale operations is

that they can sell the tobacco with a 90 to 180 days credit without any major
financial hardship.

In fact, it is customary among manufacturers, as in Germany

for instance, to purchase the tobacco with payment delay.

This practice is

financially most difficult to independent exporters lacking financial resources

1

1111
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,,lj

and paying high interests for their bank credit.

All these factors are reasons

tO explain why export houses are handicapped if they ignore international dealer

houses in planning their operations.

l il
·1111.'

r

1'
11

On the other hand, tobacco manufacturers both in Europe and in the United States, are content to derive their profits from the processing of the product,
leaving credit responsabilities, the gamble and the risk of crop failure and
the possible tumbling prices to the suppl icers.

As long as they are assured by

dealer houses of the chance to buy enough tobacco to satisfy the requirements of
their operations and the overhead involved in these, they will probably avoid
(i) heavy investments in cultivation and manipulation in producing countries
like the Dominican Republic, or any other investment in general, and (ii) any
attempts to supress international dealer's role.
This situation seems to be reinforced since the manufacturers are not
dependent upon the Dominican Republic, or any other single producing country,
to supply their tobacco demands.

They have no heavy expenditure in capital

equipment in producing countries but in their own.

As in the case of the sugar

industry, where there is much investment in processin·g equipment, care is taken
that the overhead on this equipment will be spread over the largest number of
producing units posible. Thus a sugar mill must try to assume a large supply of
the unprocessed crop. In order to do this they must own or control the land producing the raw product.

In the case of the tobacco industry, this would imply

the purchase of great extensions of land eliminating minifundist independent
tobacco production as presently practiced.

It would probably also mean the

substitution of the national distributive system presently integrated by middlemen, local warehouses and local packers.

But this capitalist pattern of operations

is not presently necessary to manufacturers because of the tobacco supply guaranteed
by dealer houses and the absence of manufacturing equipment in the producing

countries.

Thus the elimination of present day small producers and the complex
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distributive system of the product in the nation~l market level does"not seem
probable to occur.
The same observation is val id in relation to the purchasing operations
of the international dealer houses.

They do not have to invest in processing

equipment, and to evade excessive financial risks and dependence from any one
single nation, they do not procure their product from a restricted or exclusive
number of producers.

If, for instance, the Philippine dark tobacco crop fails,

they will purchase the necessary tobacco either in the Dominican Republic, Brazil
or any other nation where they may be subsidizing exporters' operations.

The

international purchasing organization of tobacco (and other crops) 1 iberates
the dealer houses from dependency on any country and the risk of heavy investments in any single producing country to secure their purchasing power.

But at

the same time, this situation seems to preclude the Dominican production level
from obtaining a huge accumulation and/or monopolization of land and capital in any
one single hand.

This preserves its traditional organization in the tobacco zones

as contrasted to the productive organization in the sugar zones in the country.
Furthermore, with the absence of huge large-scale industrial capitalism
and thereby the need to protect its investments, a cultural overlapping of preindustrial and industrial cultural patterns result.

A number of normally recog-

nized pre-industrial patterns (cf. Sjoberg 1955) remain amid industrial manufacturing, financier activities, and market relations.

The type of social struc-

ture required to develop and maintain a form of production utilizing inanimate
sources of power is quite unlike that present today at the production, middleman
and warehouse levels of articulation in the tobacco industry.

At the very least,

extensive industrialization requires a rational, centralized extra-community
economic organization in which recruitement is based more upon universal ism than
Particularism, a class system which stresses achievement rather than ascription,
a small and flexible kinship system, a system of mass education which emphasizes
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·versalistic rather than particularistic criteria and mass media.

uni

Modification in any of these elements affects the others and induces
changes in other systemslke those of religion and social control.

Most probably

industrial large-scale capital investments with its factory orientated production and control of great extensions of land, not only requires a special kind
of social structure within the community but would provide the means necessary
for its establishment.

But these elements accompanying industrialization are

not present at the production, middlemen and sectors of the export level of
articulation.

Not even a

11

rural proletarian••, with the exception of day laborers,

is present; their predominance seems to be hindered by the market orientated
independent minifundist tobacco household.
Transactions between dealers and manufacturers are preceded by tobacco
samples sent by the exporters to the manufacturers.

The most common requirements

expected from Dominican dark tobacco are low content of nicotine and residues
of clorhine insecticides, lesser degree of humidity and standard graduation and
packing.

If the sample is accepted the manufacturer wi 11 pay 75 to 80% of the

value and the rest upon receiving and inspecting the shipment; as previously
S~Jd,

90 to 180 days of credit might be approved.
Operations are made upon two bases.

The first is mutual confidence.

If

the suppliers should deliver a tobacco shipment not corresponding to the sample,
the manufacturer wi 11 not order any more tobacco from him.
no contracts for more than one season.

Secondly, there are

The rationale is that manufacturers prefer

to select from year to year the best crops and take advantage of better commercial
conditions.

This is not to say that manufacturers change from suppliers every

season, but only that they prefer to maintain their purchasing freedom.

As a

lllatter of fact, manufacturers are very slow to change suppliers since the tobacco
Obtained through them affects the blend characterizing their finished product
00
Pn

Which their final sales are contingent.

Therefore, manufacturers normally
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offer purchasing

11

preference 11 to their traditional suppliers .and thereby new

market penetrations are difficult.

They further protect themselves by keeping

stocks of tobacco for an average of 24 months.
The practice of only offering suppliers a purchasing preference over
other dealer's tobacco increases the risk involved in the dealings of the casas
matrices.

All of their operations are normally done on an estimated basis.

At the same time the difficulty of penetrating new

market~

just because of this

transactional custom, influences the behavior of the dealers.

I
I

They are always

prompt to supply any order received regardless of local prices and possible
losses.

Only by satisfying a manufacturer will they keep their market sales

and establish bonds of trust and cooperation with buyers.
Tobacco sale price is usually agreed to in U.S. dollars according to
weight measures of 100 kilos if exported to Europe, or of 100 pounds if
the United States.

se~

to

In the last season, because of the dollar devaluation, sales

were approved in other European currencies.

During sale transactions the rela-

tions between the manufacturers and the export houses are 1 imited to letter
exchanges.

On some occasions however, manufacturers send representatives to

inspect the tobacco harvest and warehouse manipulation.

During fieldwork, two

such representatives seemed to be as well informed of Dominican tobacco production, yields, and cost as any export house president.
'

f
i

11

I

If the export house sells his tobacco directly to the manufacturer, then
an average of 3.5 to 7% of the selling price of the 100 kilos of tobacco will

l

normally account for the exporters' profit margin.

On the other hand, this

prof it increases to an average of 6 to 13% if the sale is done through an

I

international dealer house.
care of by the buyers.

In all cases, export transportation costs are taken

Examining the profit margins, it becomes evident that the

strategy of both the independent exporters and international dealers, resides in
bulk transactions of better quality tobacco in order to increase their relatively
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1963-1970

AVERAGE SALE PRICE OF THE DOMINICAN TOBACCO AT THE INTERNATIONAL MARKET
:niiNTR IF<:;

1963

1964

1965

1966

1967

1968

1969

1970

~i:NEDlll

ll\/FRAGF

26.34

29.46

32.64

26.08

26.64

35.42

36.29

36.52

1111!=Rll(~E

IN AMERICA

38.02

37.81

70.40

50.65

42. 19

45.80

47.23

47.99

29.32
25.00
38.28
37.80

23.20

-----

---

-----

111 . 03

---

54.25
34.34
50.27
34.36

--

canada
Chi le
United States
puerto Rico
Ha it i
Uamaica
Uruguay
venezue 1a

---------

---

41. 51
51. 34

35. 13
41. 81

92. 77
50.18

83.92

-------

85.80

33,22
86.02

----26.38

---

-------

-----

---

37.86
111. 79
50.54 50.82
39.63 39.47

54.39
38.03
50.49
--148.65 153.04
48.33 40.80
19.36 269.93

----48.50
---

i•W!=RAGE IN EUROPE

23. 12

24.02

27.60

25.63

23. 61

32.02

33.01

33,70

Germany
Be 1g i um
l)enma rk
~pa in
Canary Islands
~zores Islands
Holland
Finland
France
Great Britain
Italy
Portuga 1
Switzerland

24.19
26.74
29.68
20.81
24.97
49.94
23.23

24.15
32.54
38.03
21. 70
25. 13

26.04
33. 14
41.93
20.45
26.59
42.49
29.85

22.21
34.06
32.51
19.58
24.26
34.00
25.54
30. 13

22.88
31. 78
32.42
18.29
23.92

24.91
37.58
40.82
30. 97
32.35

29. 19
41. 05
38. 17
23. 93
34.34

33.31
45.07
38.44
30.95
33,98

25.20

32.03

32,50

34.45

21.04
18.39

26.47

-----

19.02
36.03
32.97
27.65
25.06

24.25
30,73

VERAGE IN AFR I CA

~VERAGE

IN ASIA
Source:

---

32.03

-----

22.05

---

-----

---

----30.53
---

-------------

21.46

23.86

20.69

21.64

---

---

---

---

-----

---

Unpublished data from the Tobacco Institute.
in RD$.

---

-------------

---

-------

-----

---------

38.71

-----

35.00

30. 77

28. 11

31. b5

40.51

---

---

Price for

50

kilos
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low profit percentage.

As a matter of fact, during our

resear~h

.

some export

houses seemed to remain in the tobacco business not so much because of profit
maximization that competition had reduced sharply in the last years, but as a
waY of life (if covering costs) and to maintain their costly initial investments
and organizations.

On the other hand, interviews are indicative of a trend by

which small dealer houses have been assimilated by more powerful and large-scale
dealers.
Normally, dealer houses will keep track of manufacturers' needs through
a network of brokers earning from 3 to 5% of each final sale they arrange.

These

brokers are frequently in close contact with manufacturers and maintain a personal
relationship.

These are of strategic importance.

Interviews reveal that some-

times sale transactions have to be arranged through these brokers because of their
relationships with the manufacturer.

Brokers normally operate in one country and

for one dealer house exclusively; when the tobacco season is over they will probably market other products.

At no time do they have access to the tobacco or to

the money accounting for the payments.

Only in this respect does their role

differ from that of countryside tobacco middlemen.

In some instances, indepen-

dent and semi-independent export houses are able to obtain the services of some
of these dealers and thus directly keep track of the demands of manufacturers.
Cases have been reported in which personal considerations have influenced the
lowering of the broker's profit to even 2% of the final sale.
In any case the role of the brokers under present day organization of
the tobacco industry remains essential since they inform suppliers of new
markets and their possible demands.

At the same time through their personal

relations with manufacturers they secure buyers to the former's tobacco.

CHAPTER VI I
THE SOCIAL ORGANIZATION OF POWER
Tobacco Eco-market System
In supplying Dominican dark tobacco to manufacturers a complex organization of exchange is necessary.

Through it tobacco flows from the peasant's plot

to the internatinal buyers with the intervention of the middleman, local packer

!

and the export house.

Two significantfeatures are characteristic of the opera-

tions of these units.

t

First, the adaptational networks of the units are united by the flow of
one common energy resource.

In other words, the vehicle connecting the adapta1'1

I

tional networks of these units is a common
tobacco.

'~rticulating

energy resource'',

The more dependent any unit is upon tobacco transactions to procure

its ecological adaptation, the more vital this energy resource becomes to it.
They might or might not be exclusively adapted to one articulating energy resource.
But as long as they are accountable for the flow of tobacco from one level of
articulation to the other, this commodity is an articulating energy resource.
lmbedded in this feature is a distinction between specialized and diversified adaptation.

For instance, a peasant with a farm of 55 tareas seeded

with criollo tobacco is more dependent upon the tobacco market prices than
another one with 25 tareas of tobacco and 30 tareas of secondary crops.

In the

same way, international dealers normally purchase and market in addition to
tobacco other crops such as coffee and cocoa.

Regardless of the adaptational

value of this strategy, their environmental control seems to be less contingent
upon tobacco transactions than if they were dealing with only one articulating

·,1·

~I
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energy resources.
The second operational aspect of these units is the integration of a

l
f
I

I

technoeconomic organization beyond the adaptational network of any one single
unit or any one single level of articulation.

No adaptational network within

this technoeconomic organization is isolated or self-supporting.

The degree of

dependence of any one single unit upon the adaptational operations of the others
varies and is open to specific study according to a quantifiable model of power
reciprocities presented earlier in this work.

The fact rema.i:ns, however, that

the units are mutually dependent in order to guarantee the flow of the tobacco.
Not only is a distinction of specialized versus diversified adaptation
again relevant but we also find the problem of complexity and environmental
overlapping.

t

I

For instance, a criollo tobacco minifundist peasant not only has

to worry about climatic conditions affecting his crop, but with tobacco market
prices, market transactions, and production credits as well.

Prices fluctuate

according to market conditions of supply and demand analyzed by international
dealers and export houses.

Market transactions are contingent upon relations

with producer organizations, inner-adaptational network and social activities.
Production credits depend upon the private

polic~1

of export houses through

local warehouses and the official policies of the national government as well as
upon community contacts with money lenders and store house owners.

As a result,

the peasant is exposed to what might be called a "broken environment••.

In it a

number of units interact, many from different levels of articulation, conditioning
his adaptation beyond expected natural environment and community conditions.
The technoeconomic organizat1on involving the exchange networks of
tobacco for other energy resources forms what we shall call an eco-market system.
An eco-market system is a complex distributive system of energy resources articulated through a series of levels and organized through the adaptational networks of
the different operating units.

It accomplishes two main functions.
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first, by means of this technoeconomic mechanism of industrial comprex societies,
articulating energy resources are harnessed, transformed and distributed for
future consumption by specific units in the society.

Secondly, the eco-market

sys t e m protects the flow of various other energy resources of strategic importance
for the ecological adaptation of the units within the system.
The term "eco-market system" has been elaborated and receives its meaning
from two previously employed concepts in the anthropological literature: ecosystem and market system.

As frequently employed in cultural anthropology the

term ecology refers to three levels of relationship of man to his environment.
First, to the relationship of a human community to its inorganic environment.
secondly,

to the human community relationship to the plants and animals that

it depends on.

Thirdly, the interrelationships between human beings within an

organized social system and between human communities.

Since human behavior

is primarily cultural behavior, ecology is referred to in anthropology as
cultural ecology.

Briefly then, from a cultural ecologist perspective the

culture of a social unit appears as a system in process in interaction with
other systems; for instance, the biotic system.

The key to understanding the

developmental process of the cultural system 1 ies in this interactive relationship.

The total network of relationships between the systems is known as ecologi-

cal system or eco-system.
The second concept
vi6usly

he~

re-elaborated is Polanyi's market system pre-

discussed in the Introduction to this work.

Its employment tries to

emphasize the fact that the eco-system of operating units in contemporary
industrial societies is articulated by specific market relations.

Polanyi

(1968:32-35) convincingly argues that it was not the coming of the machine as

J
'l

such, but the invention of elaborate and therefore specific machinery and plant
that completely changed the relationship of the merchant to production.

The

use of elaborate technology involved the development of the factory system.
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industrial production ceased to be an accessory of commerce organized by merchants
as a buying and selling proposition.
corresponding risks.

Now it includes long term investments with

Thus, unless the continuance of production is reasonably

assur ed , Such a risk is not bearable.

The fiction in regard to such "commodities''

as labor (human activity), land (nature) and money (a token of purchasing power
which comes into being through the mechanism of banking or state finance), supplies
a vital organizing principle in regard to the whole society.

It affects the whole

society because no social arrangement is allowed to exist that might prevent the
actual functioning of the market mechanism of buying and selling contingent upon
the priced flow of these non-commodities.
The tobacco eco-market system has been defined in relation to

the

exchange through which an articulating energy resource is harnessed as a raw
product and successively transformed until it is ready for consumption.

It should

be noted, however, that after the final tobacco products are manufactured a new
process starts.

Industrial manufacturers supply and depend upon local distribu-

tors and commercial houses to market their final products to the public at large.
The commercial level of articulation as well as the manufacturing level of the
tobacco eco-market system were not studied during field work for two main reasons.
First, time was not sufficient in order to conduct this research.

Second, the

manufacturing and commercial levels of articulation take place outside the Dominican Republic in Europe and the United States.

Hopefully, future research will

fill the gap and determine these phases of the flow of the commodity to be the
last two stages of the tobacco eco-market system.
The Tobacco Eco-market System:

A Segmentary Organization?

A segment is, generically, one of an indef1nite number of parts comprising
a whole in which one part is like another in structure
tion.

or composition and func-

It also refers to the common process of growth by division into equivalent
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The tobacco eco-market system resembles in its functional organization

parts.
at each level of articulation the segmentation studied by Sahl ins at the tribal
Jevel of sociocultural integration (1961).

t
t

In his study, Sahl ins expanded the concept of habitat to include the
presence or absence of neighboring tribal groups.
a segmented organization.

According to him, a tribe is

It is composed of a number of equivalent, unspecial-

jzed, multifamily groups, each the structural duplicate of the other.

Each

segment, composed by a collection of kinship and residential units, not merely
patrilocal bands, is economically as well as politically autonomous.

Segmen-

tation then is studied as an adaptation to specific pressures faced by the Tiv
and the Nuer tribes.

It refers to the fact that each segment of a tribal

society is an autonomous replica of all the others, without centralization of
control.

This replication denotes numbers of people which can vary greatly in

each of the segments.

I

The adaptive advantage of the segmentary 1 ineage is the

form taken by a tribal society when it settles in an area previously inhabited
by other groups.
defense

But if there is not pressure to establish a confederated

or offense against neighboring tribes, there will be 1 ittle inclination

on the part of the segments to unite.
If the Tiv-Nuer segmentary 1 ineage is a "political machine 11 , the ecomarket system is a technoeconomic adaptive form.

It guarantees the flow of

energy resources in an industrial complex society between heterogeneous environments achieving a stage of organic solidarity regardless of patterns of conflict.
The principal selective pressures associated with the origin of the tobacco
eco-market system are:

first, the more extensive technical ability of industrial

societies in contrast to hunting and gathering, tribe, chiefdom, and pristine
state sociocultural systems.

This is specifically true in relation to the

technological refinement of industrial societies and the division of labor it
requires coordinated by centers of control and of role specialization.

Secondly,
I
, I
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we find the complexity of the distributive system common to complex societies
where producing and consuming units do not necessarily coincide.

Thirdly, the

geographical mobility within and between contemporary societies augments the

If

range of contact and exchange of any particular group, city or state beyond
its own frontier.

Fourthly, the market economic system under which commodity

transactions take place in industrial societies emphasizing the accumulation of
capital, financier investments, and monetary equivalencies.
At first sight, the differences between a tribal segmentary lineage as
defined by Sahl ins and the tobacco eco-market system seem overwhelming.
tobacco system is not politically or economically autonomous.

The

It operates

within a wider societal environment and under specific regulations of various
independent states.
of the other.

In addition, each level of articulation is not the replica

Especially, when analyzed in terms of scale of operations, environ-

mental control and adaptational specialization.

l

Whether or not the tobacco eco-

market system as a unit is the replica of other operating market systems in
industrial societies will have to be decided by future comparative studies.
In any case, the differences between the tribal segmentary lineage and the ecomarket system seem to result from their different adaptations:
to an industrial level of

sociocul~ural

integration.

to a tribal and

This adaptational differ-

ence also accounts for their contrasting mechanical and organic solidarity.
Regardless of the previous differences, the structural operations within
each level of articulation of the tobacco eco-market system are analogous.

The

differences in scale of operations of the different units at the various levels
of articulation reveal functional operations recurrent throughout the ecomarket system, especially, in relation to the conditioning imposed upon them
by market based transactions.

These similarities are so basic that they suggest

this technoeconomic organization as a segmentary adaptive mechanism characteristic of industrial complex societies.
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The present discussion does not intend to argue whether or not ecosegmentary organizations.

market systems are

It only wants to acknowledge

the possible taxonomic precedent of the tobacco eco-market system in an evolution-

I
t

l

I

ary perspective.

Some of the structural similarities recurring at each level of

articulation and conditioning the ecological adaptation of the units within the
system will be considered in the following subsections.

But .the scope of the

argument will be wider than mere structural similarities in the operations of
the different operating units within the levels of articulation.
Adaptational Strategy

l

To be ecologically adapted is to be able to control and use the necessary
environmental energy resources.

These, by definition, are the means environ-

mentally available for the subsistence, survival and expansion of the operating
unit's existence.

The success or failure of the adaptational process is determined

by the cultural perception of the control and use of what Wolf has called "cultural necessities 11 (1966:6).

t

In industrial complex societies there are two characteristic features
associated with the flow of energy resources:

first, more energy resources are

employed by the social units than is available in any single environment; secondly,
access to society's energy resources is normally conditioned to a previous functional transformation of them through an "instrumental energy resource'':
assets or just money.

liquid

Under these conditions direct access to the energy

resources is restricted on the part of the laboring units within society.

Con-

siderations of kinship, marriage rules and descent and residential units, formerly
of prime causal importance to determine access to the group's energy resources
are now substituted or conditioned by evaluations of legitimacy and labor outputs.
The labor output of the units in their adaptational networks has then to be (i}
Valued and (ii) proportionally converted into the instrumental energy resources
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of the society.

After this process takes place the unit will. exchange its instru-

mental energy resources for other resources being controlled, transformed and distributed by the cultural system.
The main task of the adaptational process of the units in the society is

I

then to increase their bargaining power at the market place in order to control

t

the necessary amount of instrumental resources which are to be converted into
other energy resources.

To achieve this goal the adaptational strategy of all

units within the tobacco eco-market system consists in increasing the value of
their operations in competition with the remaining units in the system.
The reason for this strategy lies in the fact that the value of their
labor output is arbitrary; in other words, it is culturally determined.

If

they are able to increase their power base within the eco-market system the
units will find themselves in a better position to determine the value of their
operations to be then transacted for instrumental energy resources.

The sign

of this environmental exercise of power is related to their ability to control
and determine the flow of tobacco through their intervention in the process of
harnessing, transforming and distributing this commodity.

By controlling the

flow of tobacco they preserve or improve their position within the eco-market
system.

In addition, the units reinforce the value of their operatbns in the

system.

I

I
Core Energy Resources
The control exercised upon the flow of tobacco in the eco-market system

I
il

is contingent upon environmental power harnessed by the units and strategically
employed within the system.

Furthermore, the status and role of each operating

unit (stratification) within the tobacco eco-market system is causally dependent upon its power resources.
The unit's power base in the system is obtained through the control of

t
~1

I,!

~

1t
I,

~

I
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••core energy resources".

t

These are the strategic resources upon which the process

of production, transformation and distribution of the articulating energy resource
of the eco-market system is based:

i.e., land or technology.

By strategically

utilizing and controlling core energy resources the units within the system are
able to influence a fluctuating volume of energy.

The larger the volume the

greater will be the unit's power over the flow of tobacco in the system.

At the

core of the market transactions then lies an environmental power base contingent
upon the unit's control of core energy resources.
The eco-market system is mainly the

~ructure

for the power manifested in

the strategic employment of means of power according to marketing conditions.

By harnessing control over the environmental core energy resources the intervening
units strive to

~ei_nforce

their power domains within the eco-market system and

within society at large by controlling greater amounts of instrumental energy
resources.

I

At the same time, their power domain in the eco-market system will -

further reinforce their previous control over core energy resources.

Thus a

generalization summarizing the process of ecological adaptation within the
tobacco eco-market system is as follows:

Power over core energy resources gen-

erates control over the flow of articulating energy resources (tobacco).

This

increases the bargaining power over instrumental energy resources and further
reinforces power over core energy resources.
The analysis of this propositon will be undertaken below to determine
how control over core energy resources is obtained and the interaction of different forms of resources.

But first some marginal considerations in the following

two sub-sections are necessary.
Market Exchange
The exercise of power within the eco-market system is best exemplified
in the structural mechanism through which the tobacco flows.

The internal

organization of the system is marked by power based transactions.

These tran-
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sactions have a market structure of exchange, i.e., supply and demand.
it at least two energy resources flow:
'

tobacco and liquid assets.

Through

A supplying

unit offers on demand the tobacco under its control to a purchasing unit.

The

commodity is exchanged at public market price for a certain proportion of liquid
assets controlled by the former unit.

In this fashion tobacco will finally

reach the manufacturers and the consuming public while a reallocation of liquid
asset takes place.
The operating units do not exchange tobacco with the eco-market system
as an entity.

Within the system each operating unit articulates with another

one in their market relations.

Thus their adaptational networks are environ-

mentally delimited with respect to the range and scale of their operations by
their relations with specific limiting units.
The articulation taking place between the units at different levels and
with assymetrical power bases manifest a patron-client structure.

Variations

do occur in the relations of international dealers and manufacturers from those
of peasants and middlemen obviously.
istics seem to be present.

But in all cases the following character-

First, the relations are established by units when

"instrumental friendship" (see Wolf 1966b:16) reaches a maximum point of imbalance.
This one unit is clearly superior to the other in its capacity to control the
flow of tobacco in the system as well as of granting other goods and services.
Secondly, the relations grow out of the need or mere desire to procure adaptational advantages.

Thirdly, the relations are not patterned exclusively nor

primarily upon objective norms of behavior but according to personal standards
of confidence and trust.

Fourthly, at the core of the relations there is an

explicit principle of competition which seems to strive toward the leveling of
i nequa 1 it i es.
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formal Elements of the Tobacco Eco-Market System
As previously discussed the most significant units within the tobacco
eco-market system are:
At the production level of articulation:
peasants, and small-middle land owners.

sharecroppers, minifundist

All of these run a household with lack

of sufficient control over land and production credits.

In addition, there are

middle, entrepreneur, and big landowners who normally depend upon sharecroppers
to run their under-exploited farms and estates.
At the middle level of articulation:

middlemen articulate small scale

producers with tobacco packers through their social networks and control of the
local peasant social organization.
At the export level of articulation:

warehouses and local packers directly

secure the tobacco through their purchasing middlemen networks, and pack the leaves
for overseas shipment.

Export houses direct operations in their domains and con-

trol the flow of capital within the eco-market system.

In direct contact with

the former and frequently subsidizing their operations are the international
dealer houses.

They control access to final marketing of the raw tobacco leaves

thereby securing access and control of the flow of capital and financial resources
within the eco-market system.

Finally, a level which has been included within

the export level of articulation is that of the tobacco manufacturers.

Concerned

with the demands of the specific markets for their final products they purchase
the tobacco from the dealers thus initiating the operations of the whole system.
The operations of these units within the tobacco

eco~market

system are

supported by the control achieved and preserved upon core energy resources.

First,

these are capital resources in the form of land, technology, financial resources,
and other kinds of fixed capital.

Secondly, these may be social networks in and

outside the market place through which production and commercial operations occur.
(See f i gu re 1 , )

From the strategic interplay of these core energy resources the
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market power of the unit
'

or~inates.

poWer Organization in the Tobacco Eco-market System
No operating unit in the tobacco eco-market system controls all these
core energy resources.

At least, not to the same degree.

Normally, however,

control over one of them extends access to other available core energy resources
in the environment.

A case in point, for instance, is that of the landed elite.

Through their command over land they secure their adaptational network and
guarantee not only loans and technological inputs in their estates if so desired,
but also ascendency over the local social networks.
Control over energy resources is not a sufficient guarantee of ecological
adaptation.

This process in the eco-market system is submitted to selective

pressures of competition according to market rules.

Thus inefficient employment

of, or a critically limited access to, or both of the former alternatives, might
hinder the adaptational chances of an operating unit within the system.

An

example of the second alternative is that of sharecroppers and minifundist

I

producers.

They are in control of reduced extensions of labor land and under

deleterious labor arrangements.

Thus they are unable to improve their financial

standing and to capitalize sufficiently to meet cultural expectations.

They

maintain a process of adaptation characterized by its chronic indebtedness and
dependence upon other power holding units in the societyand the tobacco eco-market
system.
The selective pressures determining the process of ecological adaptation
are closely related to the strategic significance of the environmental core
energy resources.
standardized.

The value of these resources is not necessarily fixed or

In each level of articulation and in association with the opera-

tions taking place within it, the strategic value of these energy resources
fluctuate.

This seems to be the case with such core energy resources such as

I

I

'"
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land and technology.

I

Nevertheless, still other resources are irreplaceable and

their value seems to be standard regardless of the scale of operation of the
units and their level of articulation.

Such seems to be the case with financial

resources and social networks.
An illustration of the differential relative importance of core resources
is the case of land control.

The significance of land resources is not identical

for a middleman in his role of a tobacco buyer in comparison to a sharecropper
or a minifundist peasant.

In the same way, the operations of international dealer

houses and exporters are not contingent upon the ownership of specific plots of
land or even great extensions of land.

As long as they are able to purchase the

crop and do not have to protect large capital investments in processing machinery
they seem to evade production responsibilities and control over the land.
same is true for tobacco manufacturers.

The

But to producing units it is not so ir-

relevant whether or not they hold control over 10, 30, 150, 800 or 3500 tareas
of land.
In the cultural perspective the strategic importance of financial
resources is unique.

At the core of all adaptational networks within the

tobacco eco-market system is financial resources, either in the form of loans,
production credits, advanced money, bank credits or the like.

Access to and/or

control over it is a condition sine gua non to the operations of all units within the system.

Regardless of the unit or of the level of articulation, the

tobacco eco-market system itself is contingent upon this single form of energy
more than on any other for the maintenance of its operations.

It is the medium

by means of which one form of capital is transformed into another. Therefore,
command over financial resources virtually become the most determinant variant
in the power network of the system.

Contrell ing and then providing access to

its use is the main power strategy within the eco-market system.
Both small and large-scale operations within the tobacco eco-market
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system require financial resources beyond the means of family financial pools.
Thus there are three fundamental alternatives of getting the necessary form of
capital:

from a large foreign corporation, from a domestic corporation that

will pool the resources of investors, or from the government which uses its
taxing or borrowing power to acquire the funds and channel them through the
Agricultural Bank and the Tobacco Institute.

International corporations, banks

and other financial organizations become necessary as a means of assembling and
distributing funds and credits.

This is especially when the state is not the

exclusive investor as in a socialist country.

In any case, the machinery of

investment is a necessary counterpart of the operatons within the tobacco
eco-market system.
There exists a significant feedback relationship in the eco-market system
between control over financial resources and control over other core energy
resources, especially capital.

Normally, the greater the power ova- financial

resources the easier it becomes to control other forms of core energy resources,
and vice versa.

This relationship might be stated as follows:

The degree of

power of a unit upon financial resources is directly proportional to the unit's
power base upon other environmental core energy resources.
For instance, let us consider the situation of minifundist peasants.
Even when in control of their own plots they remain vulnerable to the strategem
of financial powers.

Normally, they are in need of production and household

credits but their lack of capital resources further undermines their access
to the former.

Thus, although in possession of small plots, peasants are not

able to be economically autonomous or to maintain independent control of their
environments.

This seems to be one of the critical reasons behind the failure

of most land reform programs in Latin America in general:
the peasant but his dependence cJrcuit is not broken.
financial, technical, and marketing assistance.

•....................

~~-

(and is granted to

He is not supported with

This situation is further
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aggravated when banks officially subsidized transact with these small-scale
producers under a commercial pattern normally applied to bigger land holders
and other agricultural and industrial investing units.
The flow both of 1 iquid assets and therefore of capital resources in
general into the tobacco eco-market system is basically related to the operations
of international dealers and manufacturers.

Their operations are contingent

upon both the cultural valorization of tobacco by a consuming sector of society
and the commercial phase of the final tobacco products.

The reason behind this

is that if no one were to consume the commodity, manufacturers obviously would
not invest in the purchase and processing of the product.

Since tobacco cannot

be eaten, commercial production of it would be paralyzed.

With this situation

the flow of energy resources within the eco-market system would cease.
Although related, one factor accounts for the flow of these energy
resources into the tobacco eco-market system and another one explains how capital
is accumulated at certain levels and within the domain of specific operating units.
As previously noted, there is a positive correlation between control over capital
energy resources and domain over financial resources. specifically.

This situa-

tion in part encourages a concentration of environmental power in the hands of a
few units within the system.

In the normal process of adaptation, if not affected

by other units outside the eco-market system (such as state control) the accumulation of energy resources is in the power network of some units to the exclusion
and detriment of others.
This accumulation of energy resources is reflected in the power network

wi~in

the eco-market system.

As already seen, power is exercised by the

units upon the flow of tobacco through their control over supply in conditions
of market competition.

But the control of supply is associated with the scale
I
, I

of operations of the units.

I

The ability to extend the range of operations and
I
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thereby the power of any one unit over other environments will generate a larger
scale of operations.

The goal is to articulate the operations of various adapta-

tional networks plus having access
environments.

to the flow of energy resources in those

This can be summarized by the following generalization:

The

degree of control over core energy resou\ces is proportional to the scale of
operation of the unit and to its control of supply within the eco-market system.
The control of

~pply

within the tobacco eco-market system, however, further re-

inforces the unit's accumulation of power within the system.
For example, export houses by financing local warehouses extend their
influence into specific tobacco zones.

As a rule, efficiency of operations

remaining constant, the more local warehouses within the domain of the export
packers the higher the volume of tobacco they control.

It also follows that the

higher the volume of tobacco controlled by the export house the lesser the power
of any single warehouse in its transactions with the exporters.

Thjs then

increases the exporter 1 s power base in dealing with international dealers.
Because of the close association between scale of operation and control
of supply on the one hand, and power over core energy resources on the other,
the phenomena of capital accumulation frequently becomes a political affair.
There is normally an accumulation and transmission of power at the same levels
of articulation and between the same operating units.

Power becomes self-

perpetuating in the system; it establishes a way of 1 ife for the operating units
whcih is handed on from generation to generation and normally along family lines.
The structure of power resulting from the endogamous nature of power hinders the
adaptational opportunities of other units in the system.
A state of dependency of some units under the power domain of others and
maintained through patron-client relations is

evident within the system.

This

contingency is not related to the necessary functional interdependence of the
unit 1 s operations.

Dependent units such as sharecroppers and minifundist peasants
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in relation to the landed elite, or even exporters when related to international
dealer houses, find themselves unable to control ther own environments.
The crucial problem to solve in this perspective becomes:

how can each

operating unit maintain an independent and autonomous power base in its environ-

~

ment thus evading negative or unbalanced .power exercised over them from the units
in control of the eco-market system?

Furthermore, how can the national govern-

ment break the structure of power within the system to guarantee the independent
operations and environmental control of the units in their respective environments?
These questions become still more crucial in view of the following dilemma
facing small scale national units within the system.

The scale of operation

of

any unit in the tobacco eco-market system is proportionally related to the proximity it maintains to the manufacturing level of articulation.
the largest scale of operations

In other words,

is associated with tobacco manufacturers and

international dealers and decreases proportionally as they remove themselves
away from direct relationships with the formers.
The only apparent exception to this propositon seems to be the presence
of middlemen above the production level of articulation.

Their adaptational

network, however, is contingent upon a minifundist tobacco production.

Thus,

the scale of operation of these middlemen has to be analyzed in relation to that
of minifundist peasants and not in association with entrepreneur and the landed
elite operations.

As a matter of fact, all indications are that middlemen

maintain a larger scale of operations than minifundist peasants and thus a more
secure power base.
The articulation of the units at one level or another within the tobacco
eco-market system is related to two social variables in additbn to their control
over capital energy resources.

They are:

control of environmental information.

the unit 1 s social networks, and its

At this point it is relevant to note

that the structural arrangements and the social networks in the tobacco eco-market

>"·.
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become mutually contingent upon one another.

ne t

Furthermore, the social

works underlie the access to and the accumulation of capital energy resources.
The organization of the tobacco eco-market system of the Dominican
dependent upon social relations inside and outside the market place.

These social networks might be commercialJy oriented and thus relatively transitory and not necessarily bounded in space or time, or very intensive and personorientation.

Regardless of the characteristics of these social net-

increase the range of influence of the units beyond their own original
Without these social contacts and exchanges, each unit would be
to its own kin relations.

Thus each set of core energy resources --cap-

and social networks sustain each other.
As previously noted, social relations between different operating units
the form of patron-client relations in the eco-market system.

This is

especially apparent at the national sphere where objective criteria of efficiency
and competence is mediated by person to person arrangements and personal loyalOperating units within the system are not only contingent upon their
ascribed statuses because of kin affiliation, their

~perations

are restricted

beyond any possibility of achievement (by corporate or private enterprise)
through ranges of social influence dependent upon patron-client structures.
Structured according to a criterium of fidelity to the patrons, these relations
confine mobility from one level of articulation to another within the system.
In addition, patron-client relations provide an organizational pattern of social
~exchanges

between operating units and guarantee social contacts to take place

beyond objective role qualifications.

Therefore, any enterprise within the

tobacco eco-market system is limited to those known and trusted by the units
: on a personal basis and roles become restricted and ascribed to closed groups.
Mobility of personnel characteristic of industrial economies does not seem to
hinder patron-client associations in the system.
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It might be noted that if large capital investments were ever to take
place on the part of tobacco manufacturers or international dealers with its
consequent elimination of a minifundist production, then this situation will
probably change.

The protection of capital will require a new social organiza-

tion within the system causing structural changes at the production and middlemen
level of articualation.

This rearrangement will modify the present nature of

the social networks built upon the operations of independent units.
the fact remains that today, even behind the

11

In any case,

preferential 11 relations determining

the transactions of manufacturers and their suppliers of tobacco, adaptational
operations are contingent upon criteria of personal ism between independent
patrons and clients in this stratified distributive system.
These social networks are closely related to the flow of information
within the eco-market system.

Through these social relations the units have

access to environmental information outside their original range of operations.
This information permits the mapping of various environments to the exchanging
units.

When the social relations are maintained between units in the same power

domain, the flow of information is normally uni-directional.
flows to the more powerful unit controlling the relations.

The information

'

This communication

network guarantees a feedback process to the units extending their adaptational
network.

Through it it their power base is further secured and their exercise of

power becomes more effective.
It is highly significant, for instance, that while peasants do not know
of exporter's operations, the latter have a mapped environment of the farmer's
production activities.

In the same way, exporters through their contacts with

warehouses know of market conditions within the middlemen level of articulation;
but the contrary is not true.

The same observation might be made in relation

to international dealer houses transacting with exporters about the latter's
domain, or to manufacturers•• control of information of the operations and
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organization of the eco-market system as a unit.
At this point then we contend that power is going to be not only the
effective control that one operating unit holds over the environmental resources
of another unit, but that this

11

effective

control" of any unit's environment is

related to the control of information about its environment.

Power exercise,

then, is contingent upon the ability of a unit to become ecologically adapted
in relation to its environmental information.

Thus the units within the tobac-

co eco-market system are dependent upon an informational feedback process

obtained through their social networks to direct their power based operations.
Summary
It seems appropiate to conclude that the structure of power within the
tobacco eco-market system is contingent upon three features.

First, the scale

of operations of the operating unit and thus its control of supply within the
system.

Secondly, operational information within the system further related to

control and access to environmental core energy resources.

Finally, social net-

works and capital resources as here defined, especially capital in the form of
financial resources, are the most significant and universally valued core energy
resources to gain control over the flow of tobacco within its eco-market system.
The latter's technoeconomic organization is the "playground" for power based
transactions to gain access to instrumental energy resources.
These conclusions have been presented in a set of propositions above.
For reasons of clarity they are listed below.
(1) The technoeconomic organization resulting from the exchange networks
of tobacco for other energy resources is an eco-market system.

This we have defined

as a complex distributive system of articulating energy resources through a
series of levels of articulation and organized by the adaptational networks of
different operating units.

228
(2) The status and role of each operating unit within the tobacco ecomarket system is functionally dependent upon its power resources.
(3) The task of the adaptational process of operating units in industrial
complex societies is to increase its bargaining power at the market place in order
to control the necessary amount of

instrume~tal

resources which are to be con-

verted into other energy resources.
(3a} The adaptational strategy of all units within the tobacco eco-market
system is to increase the value of their operations in competition with the remaining units in the system.

This they are able to achieve by controlling and deter-

mining the flow of the articulating energy resource of the system.
(4) In order to understand the marketing process within the tobacco ecomarket system three energy resources can be distinguised: (i) instrumental energy
resources (liquid assets); (ii) articulating energy resources (tobacco); (iii) core
energy resources:

capital (land, technology, financial resources, and other forms

of fixed capital), and social networks.

(5) The process of ecological adaptation within the tobacco eco-market
system is summardzed

as follows.

Power over core energy resources generates

control over the flow of articulating energy resources (tobacco).

This increases

the bargaining power over instrumental energy resources and further reinforces
power over core energy resources.
(6) This exercise of power over core encergy resources is summarized by
the following proposition:

The degree of power of a unit upon financial resources

is directly proportional to the unit's power base upon other environmental forms of
core energy resources.

(7) The accumulation of energy resources in the range of operations of
specific units is summarized by the following proposition:

The degree of control

over core energy resources is proportional to the scale of operation of the unit
and to its control of supply within the

eco~market

system.

But the control of
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supply within the system further reinforces the unit's accumulation of power
within the eco-market system.

(8) The scale of operation of any unit within the tobacco eco-market
system is proportionally related to the proximity

they maintain to the manufac-

turing level of articulation.
(9) The articulation

of the units at one level or another within the

tobacco eco-market system is related totvo social variables in addition to their
control over capiltal energy resources.

They are: (1) the unit's social net-

works which normally are of the patron-client form, and (2) their control of
environmental information upon which the efficient exercise of power is contingent in the system
Industrial Complex Societies and Eco-Market Systems
Before concluding, a number of questions seem pertinent to suggest
possible trends of future research.

The most crucial one of these deals with

the representativeness of the tobacco eco-market system in relation to other
technoeconomic organizations in industrial complex societies.
could examine the following question cross-culturally:

Future research

Is the technoeconomic

sub-system of industrial complex societies articulated by a number of eco-market
systems which define the flow of energy resources in the society?

Hopefully,

the use of the comparative method in answering this question will contribute
to better place the eco-market system organization in an evolutionary perspective and contribute to determine its regularities and cultural effects.
The study of other articulating energy resources should try also to
determine the organization of their eco-market systems as well as to establish
significant parallelisms with the tobacco eco-market system.

In these researches

special importance has to be given to more complex eco-market systems.
instance, the one of the automobile or the oil industry.

For

These more complex
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systems provide a market for a number of other eco-marketing systems thus
increasing their power base in the society at large.
From the point of view of the social structure, special interest should
be given to whether or not units adapted to corresponding levels of articulation
and with similar power bases in different eco-market systems constitute a subculture of society.

This line of research will illuminate the relationships

existing between the technoeconomic organization of society and its social
structure.
cepts as

11

Specifically, it will contribute to the understanding of such conthe culture of poverty1 1 ,

11

ghettos 11 , "masses", and

11

el ites".

This

approach of research will hopefully provide a holistic view of industrial complex societies.
Anoth~r

· set of questions in need of being answered is the role of the

state and other service organizations in industrial societies.

Using a graphic

image, the eco-market system articulates the labor market of society vertically
at different levels of articulation and with different scales of operation.
Meanwhile, the state and other service organizations (the Church, the military,
etc.) provide a horizontal inter-locking of society.

They serve as a vehicle

of union to the operations of different eco-market systems.

In addition, they

procure to articulate the composing units of these eco-market systems to a wider
cultural frame of reference and of action beyond the technoeconomic subsystem
itself.

The power base of these horizontal inter-locking systems is another

important ground for future analysis, especially in correlation with their
exchanges with eco""market systems.
Finally, future research will have to take the problem of a typology
of energy resources both for eco-market systems and for inter-Jocking systems
in industrial complex societies.

Concretely, this typology needs to be further

elaborated from the one here presented.

The importance of this line of inquiry

being that human societies do not seem to rely upon a single energy resource;
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or in the case of industrial complex societies, upon a single set of these energy
resources.

The problem then consists in analyzing the strategic importance of

the various articulating and core energy resources in industrial complex societies
to determine their influence upon the organization of the latter.

The result of

these studies should provide a closer understanding of power within and between
contemporary societies.

APPENDIX
Field Research
The field work which resulted in the present study took place from June 2
to September 16, 1972.

Once in the field two main handicaps pressured the actual

conduct of the investigation:
ledge on the subject matter.
first field experience.

available time and funds plus lack of prior knowI had read how Anthropologists feel lost in their

But during the last week of May, I remember myself sit-

ting at the monument to the National Restoration in Santiago City, and thinking
that none of those reports did justice to the sense of disorientation that I was
then experiencing.

In fact, at the time I started to think that the whole enter-

prise was impossible.

was an explorer with a theoretical map in his hands but

unable to find a compass to put him on the road.
Since early 1972, I started to plan the research.

The main goal at the

time was to conduct an ethnography on the structure of power in the Cibao community of Gurabo with which I had previous contacts.

But once in Gurabo the four

months of actual field time proved this project to be out of reach.
It was then that the idea of studying the organization of power in the
tobacco production and exportation was born with the help of Dr. Ken Sharpe.
The intention was frankly exploratory, and there was no detailed research to
follow or desire to test pre-conceived hypothesis or theoretical models.

Myself

and the few assistants I had at the time were all too young and inexperienced to
have calculated the dimensions of the enterprise we were ready to start.
for this reason, the present work is preliminary in nature.
to it as a

11

Merton would refer

post-factum sociological interpretation 11 of the field data.

.-~-2-32~~~~
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And in
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fact he would have been correct even in reference to most of the material in the
first chapter.

Such explanations, Merton would theoretically add,

11

remain at the

level of plausability rather than leading to compelling evidence ..• The documentary evidence merely illustrates rather than tests the theory 11

(1957:93s~}.

This

final statement could be argued (cf. Liebow 1967:10-12; Becker 1958; Gans 1962}.
But evading epistemological questions at the time, I will agree with Merton with
the hope that the degree of probability behind the hypothetical model of power
and of the technoeconomic organization in industrial complex societies here developed stimulates future research on these problems.
The discovery of the existence of the different units operating in the
tobacco eco-market system was, in large part, through accident.

During the first

four to five weeks of fieldwork the field diary reveals day after day, new operations and new persons appearing in the environment.
just as one operation seemed to justify the following.

One interview lead to another
Gradually the whole sys-

tem became a unit in itself and surprisingly familiar; as a matter of fact, its
original complexity seemed at the end all but natural and expectable.

Nevertheless,

before that moment came, more than a dozen instances of almost despair had to be
endured.
Two problems are crucial in any research:
study, and their representativeness.

the selection of the units of

The former question, as far as it was also

a geographical problem did not prove to be difficult to solve.

The historical

record, common knowledge and present day national statistics all clearly identified the Cibao region as tobacco country.

In addition, the 1971 sixth national

agricultural census indicated the province of Santiago as the core of this industry.
Guided then by the results of the agricultural census (at the time still
being counted in a Santiago office in the old municipal building, by early field
interviews in some of the export houses with which I had previous personal contacts, and by studying the area of operations of almost all export houses and the
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Tobacco Institute, a number of concrete communities were then selected for
specific and intensive study.

They were:

Gurabo, Pontezuela, Jacagua, Tamboril,

Licey, the western region of Moca, Cutupu, San Jose de las Matas, Villa Gonzalez,
El lngenio and Janico.
same reasons.

Not all of these tobacco zones were significant for the

For instance, in Villa Gonzalez and El lngenio great landholdings

predominate with production of Cuban and plor tobacco.

In addition, the former

has a number of local packers but no export house warehouses.

In Moca, Tamboril

and San Jose de las Matas, on the other hand, minifundist peasants grow criollo
tobacco and there is a considerable number of local warehouses.

While Tamboril,

Jacagua and Villa Gonzalez are traditionally tobacco zones, San Jose de las Matas
and Cutupu are not.

Regretfully, new tobacco zones as Dajabon and San Critobal

were not even visited.

Other communities 1 ike La Torre, Cotui and La Canela

were sporadically visited, and some casual interviews were conducted there as a
technique of control.
In order to cover this territory the following arrangement was achieved:
I was to make contact with either a group of peasants, of middlemen or a warehouse in each zone.

Normally I was introduced to peasants by peasants, to

middlemen by middlemen, and to warehouses by export houses.

In each zone I

freely labored in the capacity of the group under study according to the participant-observation technique.

This observation took place while conducting

the same labor activities that the units under study would normally conduct.
Through this strategy I was able to:
conditions and market strategies.
and community persons at large.

First, obtain direct experience of labor

Secondly, establish rapport with my informants
Thirdly, introduce myself in the community as

a student interested in learning about their daily life by participating in it.
did not follow a rigid time schedule, but moved from one community
to the other, and from one category of labor to the other, depending on circumstances.

Surprisingly, no major opposition or even suspicion was encountered.

r
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When bulking and hampering tobacco in a peasant's shading house, when purchasing
the crop or when working in a warehouse, I was expected to labor as any other
one in the group without any privileges.

First moment curiosity aroused by my

presence normally disappeared when it was noticed that I mastered the Spanish,
was a student looking for new experiences; was not telling anyone what to do
or how to do it, and was interested in their 1 iving conditions and adaptational
strategies.
I would have to guess at this time that my physical appearance was one of
the main reasons why
to them.

was not considered to be a political informant (cal ie) sent

Furthermore, it seems to me in retrospect that the fact that I labored

hand in hand with them was a point in favor of establishing rapport with everyone
regardless of my national and social precedence.

In addition, while in a place

I tried to accomodate my own standard conditions of 1 iving to those of my host's.
This experience of entering into the world of these peasants, middlemen and warehouse laborers and managers, was the most rewarding experience of all.

It lasted

throughout the fieldwork with the exception of two weeks.
In only one community this pattern of data gathering was not followed.
In Cutupu I stayed four days only, and during that period of time I relied heavily
on the Catholic parish priest to introduce me to minifundist peasants.
acknowledge that his services were valuable, and

I have to

his expertise "in the f ield 11

most revealing.
From the methodological point of view, the value of the short one to
three weeks labor in different communities might be questioned.

Obviously, they

could not substitute for the intensive field work of one to two years in a community.

Nevertheless, it should be remembered that the objective of the study

was not community nor value oriented.

I was interested in a synchronic region

wide view of the operations of a technoeconomic organization.
The data was collected mainly through participant observation as already
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mentioned.

But in addition, something like an information hetwork of 17 peasants,

middlemen and employees of warehouses and export packers was formed.
group was of 21.

The orignal

In some cases.this arrangement has worked very efficiently up

to the time in which this report is being written.

They served as field assis-

tants in the full sense of the word and permitted me to widen the range of operations considerably as well as to cherish their friendship.

Twelve of them had

only grammar school, and only two had finished high school, none had college
training.

None of them received special training beyond precise instructions on

what to look for and, if possible, to report it back to me.
instructed to ignore any

11

They were specifically

confidential 11 information for we were not establishing

any secret eliciting operation.

I have to confess that their knowledge of the

operations of which they are part proved to be a great asset to the information
I received from them.

The services and the intelligence of these anonymous

peasants, laborers and employees is a significant proof of their responsibility,
initiative and labor.

None of those involved in this quasi-group was paid or

worked beyond their customary range of operations.
During field work a questionnaire consisting of ten problem solving
questions was constructed with the cooperation of three of the above mentioned
assistants.

Some of the results are presented in chapters four· and f1ve.

The

object of the questions was to obtain a larger sample in some crucial matters.
It was administered by the three persons just mentioned and myself.

At the

beginning we though of putting it on paper and distributing it, but the 1 iteracy
factor recommended the other option.

The questions were verbally read to the

randomly selected interviewed persons and then reported back by the interviewer
on his own record sheet.

It was not possible to apply the questionnaire in all

communities under study because of time pressures and some technical difficulties.
In addition to this technique, open questionnaires were constructed for
specific informants in each category of labor with the assitance of five other
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field assistants of the original assistant group previously·mentioned.

These

interviews with more than 45 informants, tried to explore the informants' work
histories, their geographical and social mobility, wealth and property, associations and affiliations, kinship and friendship social networks.

Normally the

informants were interviewed more than three times during fieldwork and always
under informal conditions.

Frequently the interviews took place while at work

in the field so that every question would be introduced casually and growing
out of the activities of the moment.
It was obvious from the outset that if legitimate comparisons between
the informants were to be made, that the data involved would have to be collected
under rigourously standardized circimstances and that further, these data must
be at least minimally quantifiable.

~s

all anthropologists are acutely aware,

satisfying such conditions in field research is difficult in the extreme.

However,

following a series of conferences between field assistants and consultation with
persons skilled in sundry interviewing, an interviewing program was decided upon
that, .with luck, had a chance of being successful.
The interviewswith four exceptions were conducted by myself.
beginning the use of a tape recorder was planned.
an ill-though idea.

At the

But soon it proved to be

Especially peasants and middlemen

seemed afraid of it

and it even increased suspicion as if it were a matter of forcing them to say
something while maintaining a record of it.

Besides, it proved to be quite

difficult to be carrying a tape recorder while at work.

For these reasons, their

answers were recorded in small notebooks like the ones normally used by middlemen
to keep track of their operations.

Use of the memory proved to be a great asset

under the circumstances.
The informants who participated in these open interviews were normally
randomly selected.

The relationships to be established were reinforced by

circumstantial variables.

For instance, the informant's ability as a "good"
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informant, the rapport existing between us and the physical accessibility to
them.

In over all, these informants proved to be a most valuable source of

information about daily family and labor life.

The interviews themselves were

conducted without conspicuous evasion or withholding of information.
The study of big land estates, local packers and export houses was done
by means of interviews and special visits to the places.
selection of these informants are mixed in nature:

The factors behind the

at times they were selected

randomly, at others by pure accident, and still others were determined by circumstances.

For instance, ten export houses were initially visited.

two had to be discarded because of absolute lack of cooperation.

Of these

In all, however,

the interviews with export houses were conducted in an atmosphere of friendliness
and mutual curiosity.
expected.

Not all questions were answered, but more than was initially

As a matter of fact, in four of these export

significantly open.

houses, cooperation was

The same generalization is val id for big tobacco landholders

and local packers.
The interviews with the members of these units were more formal in nature
than the ones with peasants and middlemen, but still basically informal and unstructured.

I tried to present the same outline of questions to all of them

according to the type of their operations.

Their questions ranged from social

life to business operations, and from their perception of peasants and middlemen
to the European market,

tobacco manufacturers, and international dealers.

some occasions the tape recorder was employed in these interviews.
the norm was to use a notebook.

On

Nevertheless,

As in the case of the peasants, the tape recorder

gave an air of formality and gravity to the interview that seemed to inhibit the
conversation rather than to facilitate it.
The interviews with presidents and officials of export houses, of local
packers or with agricultural entrepreneurs and big landholders were normally
conducted in their off ices or houses, and lasted from one to three hours.

To

r
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conduct one of these interviews I had to prepare a set of specific topics to
discuss with them.

In addition, I normally had to leave the peasant community

in which I was working at the time, take a shower, change clothes and go into
"another world 11 •

I have to admit that this minicultural shock was most signifi-

cant in enlarging the perspective of the study and in understanding the complexity
of the problems under consideration.
My primary informants, either at the peasant communities or at the local
packers and export houses, are distinguished from other persons who provided me
with information on the basis of the purposes of my relationship with them
(research) and the time devoted to the relationship.

And even in these circum-

stances I should acknowledge that lasting and profound friendships were originated
within these relationships.
Earlier it was mentioned that one of the main problems in a fieldwork is
the representativeness of the units of the analysis.
representativeness is familiar to anthropologists.
responses of the informants?

The problem of sampling or
How representative are the

How much important information is lost when it is

impossible to deal with a statistically representative sector of the population
studied?

Facing similar questions Plotnicov responded:

1

~here

is little that

ethnographers can do to compensate for such possible data lacunae and the biases
of selected informants that may together

skew analysis and interpretation.

This is the region where ethnographic field work partakes of common sense and
art as much as scientific methodology.

Merely to attempt a comprehensive

ethnographic description of a society would require a company of researchers
with unlimited time and funds 11 (1967:26; cf. Gulliver 1965:97).
Obviously the problem of sampling is a vital one.

It is my personal

belief that anthropology should not depart from common sense and art in its
attempt to outline the significant areas of social interaction.

But this

objective should not be an excuse to evade the conventional norms of scientific
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methodology.

In a way the original idea was to intermix

11

bones and- flesh 11 :

extensive questionnaire techniques and statistical treatment of the data with
participant-observation and intensive field interviews.
goal was unobtainable.

As it turned out this

My personal inexperience and also probably insufficient

time and funds, undermined the full employment of the questionnaires and of more
sophisticated statistical techniques.
omission was the

11

But at no moment the reason for this

impersonal flavor 11 of questionnaires.

For these reasons, I sincerely hope that the results of this work be
turned into an hypothetical questionmark and that further research will try
to prove its regionwide representativeness and the theoretical value of the
technoeconomic model of eco-market systems.

As a matter of

fact~

this is an

appeal to statistical handling of the data as well as inter-disciplinary
11

intersubjectivity1 1 •

For the time being, however, this descriptive and inter-

pretive material is considered to be applicable to the population sectors
from which it was obtained and elaborated.

It goes without saying that an

ultimate test of a scientific method is its ability to yield results that can
be replicated by independent investigators.
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